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I. Introduction
"I was taught from a little girl that you have to be careful what
you ask for. .. "
-Assemblywoman Gloria Davis'
After defeating incumbent Mario Cuomo and assuming of-
fice in 1995, George E. Pataki became New York's first Republi-
can governor since 1974.2 Throughout his election campaign,
Pataki promised to restore capital punishment to a state which
last conducted an execution in 1963, 3 and which had on its
books a constitutionally deficient death penalty statute. The
New York Court of Appeals had invalidated New York's very
restrictive death penalty statute in 1973, 4 and subsequently
1. Record of Proceedings, New York State Assembly, Bill No. 4843, 474 (Mar.
6, 1995) [hereinafter Assembly Debate].
2. The last Republican governor was Malcolm Wilson, who served the remain-
der of Nelson Rockefeller's unexpired term after Rockefeller resigned as New
York's governor in 1973 to become Vice President of the United States under Presi-
dent Gerald Ford. THE NEW YoRK REDBOOK, 1993-1994 31 (George A. Mitchell ed.,
New York Legal Publishing Corp. 92d ed. 1993). Governor Wilson signed death
penalty legislation in 1974. Act of May 17, 1974, ch. 367, sec. 2, § 60.06, 1974 N.Y.
Laws 1209; id., sec. 5, § 125.27. Over two decades later, Wilson and several other
prominent New Yorkers endorsed a statement of "Fairness Principles" regarding
the drafting of the 1995 death penalty statute. NEW YORKERS FOR FAIRNESS IN
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (undated) (on file with PACE LAW
REVIEW).
3. Eddie Lee Mays was executed for murder on August 15, 1963. WILLIAM J.
BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 1864-1982 471
(1984). See also, The Last Electrocution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at B5 (describ-
ing Mays' crime and his execution).
4. The Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal
Code had recommended abolition of the death penalty in New York in 1965. In-
stead of abolishing capital punishment, the State Legislature restricted it signifi-
cantly that same year to apply only to the murder of a peace officer or to murder
committed by a life term prisoner. Act of June 1, 1965, ch. 321, sec. 1, § 1045, 1965
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ruled that replacement legislation enacted in 1974 also was un-
constitutional. 5 Then, for eighteen consecutive years, the State
Legislature approved capital punishment bills, only to have
Governors Carey (from 1977 through 1982) and Cuomo (from
1983 through 1994) veto the bills.6 A new chapter began in New
York's extensive history with the death penalty when Governor
N.Y. Laws 1021-22. A 1971 amendment added the killing of an employee of a jail
or correctional institution as a form of capital murder. Act of July 6, 1971, ch.
1205, sec. 1, § 125.30(1)(a)(ii), 1971 N.Y. Laws 3122-23. At this time, juries had
unregulated discretion to sentence a convicted murderer to death or to life impris-
onment. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court ruled that
sentences of death imposed at the unfettered discretion of sentencing authorities
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Applying Furman, the New York Court of Appeals ruled in 1973
that the state's death penalty procedures were unconstitutional. People v. Fitzpat-
rick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 512, 300 N.E.2d 139, 145, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 802, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973). See generally James R. Acker, New York's Proposed Death
Penalty Legislation: Constitutional and Policy Perspectives, 54 ALB. L. REV. 515,
524-29 (1990)[hereinafter Policy Perspectives].
5. New York, like several other states in the confusing aftermath of Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), enacted mandatory death penalty legislation in
1974. The statute required that a sentence of death be imposed upon offenders
convicted of murdering a police officer or the employee of a jail or correctional insti-
tution, and upon life term prisoners convicted of murder. Act of May 17, 1974, ch.
367, sec. 2, § 60.06, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1209; id., ch. 367, sec. 5, § 125.27(1)(a), 1974
N.Y. Laws 1209-10. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that mandatory capi-
tal punishment for murder is unconstitutional. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). Even nar-
rowly defined crimes, such as the murder of a police officer, could not automatically
be punished by death with no consideration given to individual offense and of-
fender circumstances. Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per
curiam). Relying on these decisions, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that
mandatory capital punishment for the murder of a corrections employee, as pro-
vided under the new death penalty law, was unconstitutional. People v. Davis, 43
N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998
(1978), and cert. denied sub nom., People v. James, 438 U.S. 914 (1978). A few
years later, the state court invalidated the portion of the statute mandating capital
punishment for murder committed by a life term prisoner. People v. Smith, 63
N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227
(1985). The United States Supreme Court later ruled that mandatory capital pun-
ishment for life-term prisoners convicted of murder is unconstitutional. Sumner v.
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987). See generally Policy Perspectives, supra note 4, at
529-33.
6. See Sponsor's Memorandum in Support of N.Y.S. 6350, N.Y.A. 9028, 217th
Sess. (1994) (providing legislative history of capital punishment bills that passed
the State Senate and Assembly, gubernatorial, vetoes, and failed override at-
tempts). See also Policy Perspectives, supra note 4, at 535-36.
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Pataki signed legislation returning capital punishment to the
State of New York, effective September 1, 1995. 7
The enactment of this law fulfilled Governor Pataki's cam-
paign promise, and a commitment which the new governor reit-
erated during his inaugural address to the people of New York:
Our founders believed that one area where government
should be strong and effective was maintaining public order and
public safety. They understood society's first obligation is to those
citizens who obey the law and respect the rights of others, and
they expect government to protect them from those who do not.
Let me also note that when a society does not express its own
horror at the crime of murder by enforcing the ultimate sanction
against it, innocent lives are put at risk.
Not out of a sense of vindictiveness, then, but a sense of jus-
tice-indeed, a sense of compassion for those who otherwise might
become victims of murder-I will ask the Legislature to pass and
I will sign and enforce the death penalty. And let me say-and let
me say: if one police officer's life is saved, if one less child is
caught in a crossfire, if one fewer cabdriver or shopkeeper is killed
in a robbery, then the death penalty will have proven itself
worthwhile.8
On hearing these remarks, Pataki's audience erupted for
what was by far the most prolonged and enthusiastic ovation of
his address.9 Not all in attendance were so taken by these
7. Governor Pataki signed the bill (N.Y.S. 2850, N.Y.A. 4843, 218th sess.
(1995)) into law on March 7, 1995. New York has been no stranger to the death
penalty. Between 1890 and 1963, a total of 692 people were executed under state
authority in New York. BOWERS, supra note 3, at 458-471 (identifying 695 persons
lawfully executed in New York during this period, including three executed at Sing
Sing Prison pursuant to federal death sentences). Since 1930, when national exe-
cution data first became available, New York's total of 329 executions ranks only
behind Georgia and Texas among all jurisdictions in the United States. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993 675
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics 1994).
8. 'The People Seek Change': Transcript of Pataki's Inaugural, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 1995, at A28.
9. Kevin Sack, A Call for Change: Republican Again Urges Cuts in State
Taxes and in Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1995, at Al. See also Assembly De-
bate, supra note 1, at 429-30 (remarks of Assemblyman Alexander Grannis):
There was a very interesting thing that happened last week. Governor
Pataki appeared at a breakfast for Crane's Business Weekly or Monthly,
[Vol. 17:41
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words. Mario Cuomo, who was among the officials on the ros-
trum, and who had politely applauded at other juncture's dur-
ing the new governor's speech, sat impassively. He later
observed that, "It disconcerts me that the loudest cheer would
be for death."10
New York thus became the thirty-eighth state to adopt a
capital punishment statute. While this new law in some re-
spects resembles the legislation that was voted on and vetoed
for the preceding eighteen years, it has several different fea-
tures, including a number of unique provisions that distinguish
it from the nation's other death penalty laws. This article pro-
vides a detailed description and analysis of New York's death
penalty statute. This statute is significant in part because New
York, as the nation's third most populous state and a recognized
leader in many other legal, political, and social issues, had for
many years been regarded as a linchpin among the embattled
minority of jurisdictions holding out against capital
punishment.
New York finds itself in the uncustomary position of being
a juristic latecomer, and not a trend-setter, in the enactment of
capital punishment legislation. The specifics of this statute
merit close consideration because in death penalty legislation
the "devil truly is in the details." Throughout this article, ver-
bal thrusts and parries made by State Senators and Assembly
representatives during the legislative debate on the bill are re-
counted. Many state legislators insisted that their constituents
demanded this statute. Now, it is a statute that the people of
whatever it's called, and he took his message about tax cuts there, luke-
warm, lukewarm response. He took his message on budget cuts, really luke-
warm response. These people are smart. And then he got to his punch line
and he repeated once again his campaign pledge to sign the death penalty
bill,.. . the room erupted, these people these business leaders from around
the City, stood up and cheered and clapped and were overjoyed.
Id. Other governors, from an earlier era, also have earned favor from their audi-
ences by touting capital punishment. "While Nevada's governor read his state of
the state address to the legislature in 1973, he 'was interrupted by applause just
once,' when he called for a return to capital punishment. New York's Governor
Rockefeller received 'thunderous' applause when he made the same suggestion at a
labor conference." LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND
LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 90 (1992).
10. Sack, supra note 9, at A29.
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New York must live with1' and, from time to time, perhaps
must die under as well.
II. New York's Death Penalty Legislation
The legislation I approve today will be the most effective of its
kind in the nation.
-Governor George Pataki 12
[This] is a bill that we think is as fair as any in the country.
-Senator Dale Volker i3
[Tihe death penalty is one of those measures that looks a lot
better when you don't have it than when you have it .... [A]fter
you have the death penalty for a while and it's used.., it doesn't
look so good to the public anymore, because invariably, the some-
what freakish, arbitrary nature of the ultimate irreversible pen-
alty becomes apparent.
-Senator Martin Connor 14
The bill to reintroduce capital punishment in New York
was printed on Thursday, March 2, 1995. Under the state con-
stitution, bills must be available for consideration by the Legis-
lature for at least three days before action can be taken on
them, unless the Governor issues a message of necessity. 15 The
death penalty bill lay idle on Friday, March 3, and over the
weekend. On Monday, March 6, the State Senate debated and
passed the bill by vote of 38-19. Debate in the Assembly com-
menced directly after the Senate's vote and continued well past
midnight. The bill passed in the Assembly, by a margin of 94-
52, on March 7 at 4:37 a.m. 16 Governor Pataki signed the bill
into law later that same day.
11. "And how sad it is when even long opposed members from my side of the
aisle, without a hint of irony urged that we accept the inevitable and draft a death
penalty bill we could live with.... [Some] of my colleagues... are fond of passing
such oxymoronic propositions... ."-Assemblywoman Barbara Clark. Assembly
Debate, supra note 1, at 152.
12. Memorandum from State of New York Executive Chamber, filed with
N.Y.S. 2850, 1 (Mar. 7, 1995)[hereinafter Executive Memorandum].
13. New York State Senate Death Penalty Debate, Bill No. 2850, 1851 (Mar.
6, 1995) [hereinafter Senate Debate].
14. Id. at 1857.
15. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 14 (amended 1938).
16. James Dao, Death Penalty in New York is Restored After 18 Years; Pataki
Sees Justice Served, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al, B5.
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No public hearings were conducted prior to the bill's pas-
sage, and there were no other opportunities for public review or
comment. Some charged that this "death penalty express" was
a product of closed-door, back-room politicking. Assemblyman
Albert Vann observed, "I think I know a deal when I see it. This
is definitely a done-deal... ."17 Assemblyman Roger Green was
even more disenchanted by this process:
I fear this day that the first victim of the death penalty is
democratic discourse itself, that on a question as important as life
or death, that we would not have allowed the people to express
their concern .... [W]e don't pass sewage bills like this in the
State of New York.'8
The apparent haste with which the legislation was drafted,
and the absence of an opportunity for public debate and com-
ment to help shape the specific provisions of the law, are evi-
dent in some particulars of the statute. In other provisions, the
statute reflects considerable thought and careful drafting. New
York has a new death penalty law on its books, and it is a law of
tremendous significance. "That is the headline. But the fine
print is equally important."19 Senator John Marsh lamented
that, "We ought to be putting this whole issue under a jeweler's
17. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 303.
18. Id. at 397-98. See also Symposium, Are Executions in New York Inevita-
ble?, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 557, 561 (1995) (remarks of Ronald J. Tabak):
There was no real debate over the death penalty in the 1994 New York
gubernatorial campaign. People merely knew that one candidate favored it
and one candidate opposed it. Sadly, there have been no legislative hear-
ings concerning the death penalty at which non-legislators could testify in at
least twenty-five years; the legislation enacted on March 7, 1995 was
drafted in secret; and the final version was released on Friday, March 3, just
a weekend before both houses of the Legislature voted for it on Monday,
March 6.
Id. See also, Remarks of Senator Emanuel Gold. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at
1957:
I'm almost embarrassed for us that a situation like this was decided not
by the Legislature the way we're supposed to be doing it in open debate but
with counsels working weekends and nights; and then when the Senate and
the Assembly and the Governor agree, it doesn't matter what we do after
that. We look at our watches.
Id.
19. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 7 (remarks of Assemblyman Eric
Vitaliano).
1996]
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eye. . ."20 The detailed analysis of the law that follows comes
too late from this perspective, but it still merits presentation.
The law will inevitably be accompanied by many questions in
its application. It faces certain judicial challenge, may eventu-
ally may return to the legislature for amendment, revision, or
reconsideration.
A. First-Degree Murder
1. The Mens Rea Requirement
The statute defines twelve varieties of killings as first-de-
gree, or capital murder. For all types of first-degree murder,
the offender must act with the "intent to cause the death of an-
other person .. "21 The intent-to-kill standard is more de-
manding than the mens rea required to support a sentence of
death under the federal Constitution. For example, offenders
who commit felony murder may be executed consistently with
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as long as they were
major participants in the predicate felony and acted with reck-
less indifference to human life, even if they did not personally
kill the victim and had no intent to do so.22 A number of state
death penalty statutes authorize capital punishment for mur-
der absent proof that the offender intended to kill, 23 so in this
respect New York's legislation is relatively exacting.
At the same time, the mens rea standard used to define
capital murder in New York is not as demanding as it used to be
and, arguably, is not as stringent as it should be. As recently as
1965, the state's first-degree murder statute required proof of
20. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 2012-13.
21. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Two affirmative de-
fenses are recognized under the statute:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the rea-
sonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in
the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be ....
(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the
use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.
Id. § 125.27(2) (McKinney 1987).
22. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
23. See James R. Acker & C. S. Lanier, The Dimensions of Capital Murder, 29
CRiM. L. BULL. 379, 385-88 (1993)[hereinafter Dimensions of Capital Mur-
derJ(collecting statutes).
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"deliberate and premeditated design to effect the death of the
person killed, or of another."24 Although the elements of delib-
eration and premeditation have been criticized as vague, 25 they
are useful conceptually to identify the kinds of cold-blooded and
planned killings that would justify capital punishment most
strongly on either retributive or deterrent grounds. Intentional
killings can be, and often are, spur-of-the-moment reactions to
unusual precipitating circumstances. As such, they may not re-
flect as adversely on an offender's character as would a killing
committed deliberately and after premeditation.26 Additionally,
killings preceded by planning and reflection should theoreti-
cally be more readily discouraged by the threat of capital pun-
ishment than intentional killings not accompanied by
premeditation and deliberation.
Some states have legislation limiting death-penalty eligibil-
ity to premeditated and deliberate killings,27 and in this respect
resemble first-degree murder legislation introduced in the State
of Pennsylvania over two centuries ago.2 A few lawmakers'
slips of the tongue during the 1995 legislative debate suggested
that premeditation or deliberation were elements of capital
murder. 29 However, the resulting first-degree murder statute
retained "intent to cause death"30-no more and no less-as the
threshold mens rea requirement for death-penalty eligibility.
24. Act of June 1, 1965, ch. 321, secs. 1-2, § 1045-a(2), 1965 N.Y. Laws 1021-
22. Only two types of killings were made capital crimes under the 1965 statute.
Id. at sec. 1, §§ 1021-22.
25. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide:
I, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 707-09 (1937); Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Penn-
sylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 773-75 (1949).
26. Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 382, 388-89.
27. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2502(a)
(West 1983); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31(1)-(9)(Michie Supp. 1995).
28. 1794 Pa. Laws 257 §§ 1-2. Although this statute defined various felony
murders as capital crimes, without a heightened mens rea requirement, first-de-
gree murder otherwise was limited to "willful, deliberate and premeditated" kill-
ings, and such analogous killings as those committed by poison or by lying in wait.
See generally Keedy, supra note 25.
29. See Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1875, 1882 (remarks of Senator Ste-
phen Saland, referring to the bill as pertaining to different forms of "premeditated"
killings); id. at 2023 (remarks of Senator Nancy Hoffman, stating that the bill sent
"a warning to those people who commit the crime of premeditated murder....").
30. The mens rea provision of "intent to cause the death of another person"
carries over, without change, from a 1967 revision of New York's penal law. Act of
May 2, 1967, ch. 791, sec. 9, § 125.25, 1967 N.Y. Laws 2131, 2137. The new statute
1996]
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
2. The Minimum Age for Death-Penalty Eligibility
To be convicted of first-degree murder, and thus to be eligi-
ble for the death penalty, an offender must have been "more
than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the
crime."31 As with the mens rea requirement, this provision lim-
its the reach of capital punishment to a greater degree than re-
quired by the federal Constitution. Presently, 16-year-old
offenders can be executed consistently with the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" that are the measure of cruel and unusual
punishments under the Eighth Amendment. 32 No jurisdiction
has yet adopted specific authorizing legislation 33 that would al-
low 15-year-old murderers to be executed.
New York law has exempted offenders who are not over 18
from death-penalty eligibility since 1963.34 Prior to that time,
younger offenders were eligible for and received capital punish-
ment. Fourteen juveniles have been executed in New York dur-
ing the 20th century for crimes committed at age 16 or 17. The
two most recent of these executions took place in 1956, when
Norman Roye was punished by death for a murder committed
when he was 16, and when William Byers was executed for a
murder he committed at age 17.35
specifically recognizes first-degree murder liability in cases involving "transferred
intent." It provides that, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person .... " N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
31. See id. § 125.27(1)(b).
32. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
33. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). In Thompson, the four jus-
tices in the plurality were of the opinion that the Eighth Amendment flatly prohib-
its the execution of offenders 15 years old or younger. Justice O'Connor concurred
only in the judgment, and expressly conditioned her vote on the fact that the legis-
lation at issue did not affirmatively authorize capital punishment for 15-year old
offenders. Id. at 857-58.
34. Act of May 3, 1963, ch. 994, sec. 1, § 1045(3), 1963 N.Y. Laws 3018.
35. Victor L. Streib, Excluding Juveniles from New York's Impendent Death
Penalty, 54 ALB. L. REV. 625, 638, 649-53 (1990); BOWERS, supra note 3, at 471.
Streib reports that Byers, who was 19 years old at the time of his execution, "'went
to his death at a slow, indifferent trot, chewing bubble gum.'" Streib, supra at 653,
(quoting F. LIPsIG, MURDER-FAMILY STYLE 158 (1962)).
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New York joins 13 other states36 and the federal govern-
ment 37 in forbidding capital punishment for crimes committed
by 16- and 17-year olds. These jurisdictions use different lan-
guage to exclude young offenders from death-penalty eligibility
than the New York statute. These jurisdictions exempt mur-
derers "under the age of 18," or those who had not "attained the
age of 18 or more," or who were "less than 18," or who were a
"minor," or a "juvenile," or who had "not reached the age of ma-
jority," or who were "not found to have been eighteen years of
age or older" at the time of committing their crimes. 38 New
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (Deering Supp. 1996) ("[Tlhe death penalty shall
not be imposed upon any person who is under the age of 18 at the time of the
commission of the crime."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(1)(a) (Supp. 1995) (per-
mitting death penalty "unless the defendant was under the age of 18 years at the
time of the commission of the offense.. . ."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h)
(West 1994) ("The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if
.. at the time of the offense (1) he was under the age of 18 years.. . ."); 420 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/9-1(b) (West Supp. 1995) (allowing death penalty
only for a "defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained
the age of 18 or more.. . ."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4622 (Supp. 1994) (prohibiting
death penalty on "a finding that the defendant was less than 18 years of age at the
time of the commission thereof" capital murder); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 412(g)(1) (Supp. 1995) ("If a person found guilty of murder in the first degree was
at the time the murder was committed less than 18 years old ... at the time the
murder was committed, the person... may not be sentenced to death."); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-105.01 (1989) ("[T]he death penalty shall not be imposed upon any per-
son who was under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
crime."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (XVII) (Supp. 1995) ("In no event shall a
sentence of death be carried out upon.., a person for an offense committed while a
minor."); but see id. at § 630:1 (V) (1986) ("In no event shall any person under the
age of 17 years be culpable of a capital murder."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(g)
(West 1995) ("A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder
shall not be sentenced" to death); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14(A) (Michie 1994)
(prohibiting capital punishment "if the defendant has not reached the age of major-
ity at the time of the commission of the capital felony...."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.02(A) (Anderson 1993) (prohibiting death penalty for any person "who is not
found to have been 18 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the
offense .... ."); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.620 (1995) ("[A] sentence imposed upon any
person remanded from the juvenile court . . . shall not include any sentence of
death.... ."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134(a)(1) (Supp. 1995) ("[Nlor may any child
transferred under the provisions of this section [pertaining to transfers of jurisdic-
tion from juvenile court to criminal court] receive a sentence of death for the of-
fense for which the child was transferred.").
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) (Supp. 1995) ("[N]o person may be sentenced to death
who was less than 18 years of age at the time of the offense."); 21 U.S.C. § 848(1)
(Supp. 1995) ("A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is
under 18 years of age at the time the crime was committed.").
38. See supra notes 36 and 37.
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York's elimination of first degree murder eligibility for offenders
who are "more than eighteen years old at the time of the com-
mission of the crime" is intriguingly different. Requiring that a
person be "more than" 18 to be guilty of first-degree murder
could mean either that the offender must be "beyond his or her
18th birthday" at the time of the crime, in which case 18-year-
olds would be eligible for punishment by death, or it could mean
murderers must be "at least 19," in which case they would not.
The legislative history regarding this issue is inconclusive.
The sponsor of the bill in the Assembly 9 and at least two other
Assembly members apparently assumed that the exemption ap-
plies only to persons under age 18,40 while at least one sup-
porter of the bill in the Assembly praised the law for "spelling
out 18-year-olds not being eligible for"4' punishment under the
statute. Memoranda filed by the Governor 42 and the Assembly
Codes Committee43 explaining the bill simply track the statu-
tory language that a person must be "more than eighteen years
old at the time of the commission of the crime" in order to be
convicted of first-degree murder.
The lone judicial decision on point, issued by a trial judge in
a noncapital case, construed the statutory exemption to be un-
available to a defendant who may have been 18-years old at the
time he allegedly committed first-degree murder.44 Other New
39. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 461 (remarks of Assemblyman Eric
Vitaliano) ("[Uinder this bill, no one under 18 can be executed.").
40. Id. at 58 (remarks of Assemblyman Robert Straniere) ("[In the past, we
have discussed who.., from an age standard, should be subject to the death pen-
alty, and this bill, about to become law, says no one under 18."); id. at 142 (remarks
of Assemblyman David Townsend, Jr.) ("T]here's a specific provision in here that
says you must be 18 or older, under line 34 of page 4, so we're not going to kill our
children and make them subject to the death penalty.").
41. Id. at 42 (remarks of Assemblyman Joseph Robach). An opponent of the
bill lamented the fact that anyone under the age of 21 was made eligible for the
death penalty. Id. at 98, 478 (remarks of Assemblyman Roger Green).
42. Executive Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1.
43. N.Y. ASSEMBLY CODES COMMITTEE BILL MEMORANDUM, A. 4843, S.2850, at
3 (1995)[hereinafter BILL MEMORANDUM].
44. People v. Carr, 159 Misc. 2d 1093, 608 N.Y.S.2d 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings
Co. 1994). The court's ruling may be only dicta because the issue arose on a motion
to dismiss a first-degree murder indictment filed by a defendant about whom con-
fficting evidence regarding a date of birth was presented to the grand jury. The
grand jury heard evidence that the accused could have been either 18 or 19 years
of age at the time of the alleged murder. Id. at 1094, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The court
refused to dismiss the indictment, and opined that "the words 'more than eighteen
[Vol. 17:41
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York statutes involving age limitations normally specify that a
person must be "at least" or "under" the age made significant by
law,45 although the Legislature occasionally has required that a
years old' include persons who have reached the eighteenth year of the anniver-
sary of their birth." Id. at 1095, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The opinion acknowledged
that the "court's research disclosed no published decisions or legislative history on
the meaning of the phrase 'more than eighteen years old' as used in the statute,"
although it did cite a "letter sent to then Governor Malcolm Wilson, dated May 14,
1974 from the Committee on Youth and Correction of the Community Service Soci-
ety of New York" included in the Legislative Bill Jacket on Penal Law § 125.27 (L.
1974, ch. 367), "which states that the proposed legislation would exclude 'persons
under 18.'" Id. at 1094 & n.1, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 49 & n.1.
45. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(4) (McKinney Supp. 1996)(limiting sec-
ond-degree murder liability to defendants who are "eighteen years old or more"
who kill a child less than 11-years old under the defined circumstances); id.
§ 125.20(4) (similarly, limiting liability for first-degree manslaughter to persons
"eighteen years old or more" who kill a child younger than 11 under the described
conditions); N.Y. VES. & TRF. LAw § 502(2)(a)-(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (requir-
ing that applicants for different types of driver's licenses must be "at least" 21, 18,
17, or 16 years of age, as appropriate); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.21(a)(1) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1996) (a "'minor' shall mean a person under eighteen years of age,"
subject to various restrictions, for purposes of securing consent for mental health
treatment of minors); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 15(2) (McKinney 1988) (authorizing
clerk to require documentary proof of age of applicant for a marriage license if the
applicant is "under eighteen years of age," and requiring written consent by par-
ents to the marriage of a minor who is "at least sixteen years of age but under
eighteen years of age . . . ."; but see id. (authorizing clerk to require documentary
proof of age if the "clerk shall be in doubt as to whether an applicant claiming to be
over eighteen years of age is actually over eighteen years of age . . . ."); id. § 15(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1996) (requiring written judicial approval of the application for a
marriage license by a party "under the age of sixteen years"); id. at § 81 (McKinney
1988) (allowing surviving parent of "any living child under the age of eighteen
years and unmarried" to "dispose of the custody and tuition of such child" to an-
other upon death of one parent); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2504(1) (McKinney
1993) (authorizing "[amny person who is eighteen years of age or older" to consent
to medical, dental, health, and hospital services): N.Y. ALco. BEv. CoNT. LAw
§ 65(1), (5) (McKinney 1988) (prohibiting, under most circumstances, sale or deliv-
ery of alcoholic beverages to a person "under the age of twenty-one years . . .");
N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 260.20(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (forbidding persons from
involving children "less than eighteen years old," and "less than twenty-one years
old," in specified activities, with exceptions granted to certain persons "under the
age of twenty-one.. . ."); N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 100(2)(a), (2)(b) (McKinney
1987) (forbidding persons "under the age of eighteen" from working in establish-
ments that sell alcoholic beverages, subject to certain exceptions); id. at § 65-
b(1)(a) (prohibiting persons "under the age of twenty-one" from displaying fraudu-
lent identification for the purpose of purchasing alcoholic beverages); N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAw §§ 180.75(3)(a), (b) (McKinney 1995) (processing of felony complaints
regarding persons "under the age of sixteen"; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.1(3)(c) (Mc-
Kinney 1983) (juvenile delinquency petition must allege that "respondent is a per-
son under sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged act or acts"); N.Y. PENAL
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person must be "over" or "more than" a certain age to be covered
by or exempt from the provisions of a statute.46 The meaning of
the requirement that the defendant must have been "more than
eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime"
will not be certain until the New York Court of Appeals has an
opportunity to decide the minimum age of liability for first-de-
gree murder under the statute.47
3. Twelve Forms of First-Degree Murder
[Slome of us are disappointed that the terms of this about-to-
be law might result in only some twenty percent of the potential
convicted murderers ever, in fact, being executed.
-Assemblyman Robert Straniere"
I have no problem with the crimes that are enumerated in
this bill, and perhaps I might be willing to go further-not per-
haps, I would be willing to go further.....
-Senator Stephen Saland4 9
Twelve types of intentional killings are defined as first-de-
gree murder under the new statute. The provisions defining
these different forms of capital murder are considered below.
LAW § 30.00(1) (McKinney 1987) (subject to certain exceptions, "a person less than
sixteen years old is not criminally responsible for conduct."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 720.10 (McKinney 1995) (for purposes of youthful offender procedures, '[y]outh'
means a person charged with a crime alleged to have been committed when he was
at least sixteen years old and less than nineteen years old .... ").
46. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15(2) (McKinney 1988), supra note 45;
N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 301.2(1) (McKinney) ("'Juvenile delinquent' means a person
over seven and less than sixteen years of age, who, having committed an act that
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. .. ."); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW
§ 14-a(3) (McKinney 1992) ("A person over eighteen years of age may apply for a
certificate of age" regarding an employment certificate, and such certificate shall
issue "if he furnishes evidence that he is over eighteen years of age . . . ."); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 130.55 (McKinney 1987) (authorizing affirmative defense to crime of
sexual abuse in the third degree if, inter alia, the alleged victim "was more than
fourteen years old .... ") (cited in People v. Carr, 159 Misc. 2d 1093, 1095, 608
N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1994)).
47. An offender convicted of first-degree murder may be punished by death,
life imprisonment without parole eligibility (hereinafter LWOP), or a prison sen-
tence ranging from a minimum of 20- to 25-years to life. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 60.06,
70(3)(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Of course, an 18-year old offender who re-
ceived any of these sentences, and not just the death penalty, could argue that he
or she could not be convicted of and punished for first-degree murder under the
statute.
48. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 60-61.
49. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1875.
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(i) The intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivi-
sion 34 of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at
the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his
official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the intended victim was a police officer.50
Murdering a law enforcement officer is a capital crime5' or
an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes52 in all
death penalty jurisdictions. The rationale for making the mur-
der of a police officer a capital offense is clear: "Because these
people are literally the foot soldiers of ordered liberty, the State
has an especial interest in their protection."53 This type of first-
degree murder under the 1995 New York law carries over from
the pre-existing 1974 murder statute, with only minor
changes5 4
The "police officers" to whom this type of first-degree mur-
der applies include several law enforcement officers that tradi-
tionally are covered by death penalty laws, including members
of the state police, county sheriffs and deputy sheriffs, and
sworn officers of city, town, and village police departments. 55 A
number of less obvious officials are also among the eighteen sep-
arately-defined types of "police officers" incorporated by refer-
ence from the Criminal Procedure Law into the first-degree
murder statute. This includes investigators employed in dis-
trict attorneys' offices, 56 environmental conservation officers,5 7
and department of taxation and finance personnel assigned to
50. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
51. See Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 402-04 (reviewing
statutes).
52. James R. Acker & C. S. Lanier, "Parsing this Lexicon of Death": Aggravat-
ing Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 30 CRiM. LAW BULL. 107, 142-46
(1994)[hereinafter Lexicon of Death](reviewing statutes).
53. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
54. The new law inserts "intended" in front of the word "victim," and makes a
minor stylistic change. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(i) (McKinney
1974) ("the victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision 34 of section 1.20 of
the criminal procedure law who was killed in the course of performing his official
duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim
was a police officer").
55. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw §§ 1.20(34)(a),(b),(d) (McKinney 1992).
56. Id. § 1.20(34)(g).
57. Id. § 1.20(34)(j).
1996]
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enforce specific tax laws.58 While it must be presumed that the
Legislature acted deliberately in defining such killings as first-
degree murder, the inclusion of some of the other types of "po-
lice officers" listed in the statute strains the general rationale
for making the killing of a law enforcement officer a capital
crime. For instance, the intentional killings of Suffolk County
park rangers,59 and "sworn officer[s] of the water-supply police
employed by the city of New York and acting outside said city"6°
also are covered under the statute.
The breadth of the class of "police officer" victims also exac-
erbates the problem created by authorizing the conviction of of-
fenders who did not actually know, but "reasonably should have
known," that their victims were police officers. Arguably,
neither deterrence nor retribution justifies making an offender
eligible for capital punishment if the offender actually was una-
ware at the time of the slaying that his or her victim was a po-
lice officer. At least two states' statutes require that the
defendant must have known of the victim's status as a law en-
forcement officer before such a killing qualifies as capital mur-
der.61 The more common practice is for death penalty
legislation to conform to New York's format ("knew or reason-
ably should have known"), or to remain silent about whether
the offender must have known or reasonably should have
known that the victim was a police officer.6 2
58. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. § 1.20(34)(q) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
59. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. § 1.20(34)(r) (McKinney 1992).
60. Id. § 1.20(34)(o).
61. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2)(a) (1994); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a)(1) (West 1994).
62. See Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 402-03; Lexicon of
Death, supra note 52, at 144-45. During the debate on New York's death penalty
bill, Assemblyman David Townsend, J., lamented that this provision did not go far
enough because "[niot only your undercovers, but your plain clothes detectives, the
people who serve on your warrant squads, that all travel around dressed like we
are face the possibility of being killed." Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 143.
Assemblyman Townsend explained that his former partner from the Syracuse po-
lice department was shot and killed during an undercover narcotics investigation,
and he expressed concern that such a killing would not be defined as a capital
crime under the provision pertaining to the murder of police officers. Id.
This provision does not require that the murder victim actually be a police
officer. Instead, it requires that "the intended victim was a police officer .. " N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). Applica-
tion of this section may produce some counterintuitive results. For example, an
offender who intends to kill a police officer by shooting at the officer, but misses
[Vol. 17:41
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/3
1996] WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED
During a 10 year interval (1975 through 1984), 66 law en-
forcement officers were feloniously killed in New York, or an av-
erage of between 6 and 7 per year.63 Over the next 10 years,
from 1985 through 1994, 40 law enforcement officers were felo-
niously killed in the state, an average of 4 per year.64 Since
first-degree murder consists only of intentional killings of per-
sons whom the offender knew or reasonably should have known
were police officers, fewer killings will qualify as capital murder
each year under this section than would be suggested by the
annual number of police officers feloniously killed.
and kills a civilian third-party, presumably would be guilty of first-degree murder
under this section. Conversely, an offender who intended to kill a civilian by shoot-
ing, but who missed and instead killed a police officer, would not be guilty of first-
degree murder under this provision. Several other provisions of the first-degree
murder statute share this feature. See id. §§ 125.27(1)(a)(ii) (intended victim was
a designated peace officer); 125.27(1)(a)(iii) (intended victim was a correctional em-
ployee); 125.27(1)(a)(v) (intended victim was a witness to a crime or witness' imme-
diate family member); 125.27(1)(a)(xii) (intended victim was a judge).
63. The numbers of law enforcement officers reported feloniously slain in New
York during this time period are as follows: 1975 - 10; 1976 - 4; 1977 - 10;
1978 - 5; 1979 - 7; 1980 - 11; 1981 - 7; 1982 - 6; 1983 - 1; 1984 - 5. See
N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1975 CRIME AND JUSTICE AN-
NUAL REPORT 156 (1976); N.Y. STATE DISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES,
1976 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 182 (1977); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1977 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 188 (1978);
N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1978 CRIME AND JUSTICE AN-
NUAL REPORT 210 (1979); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES,
1979 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 226 (1980); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1980 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 255 (1981);
N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1981 CRIME AND JUSTICE AN-
NUAL REPORT 241 (1982); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES,
1982 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 221 (1983); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1983 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 212 (1984);
N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1984 CRIME AND JUSTICE AN-
NUAL REPORT 211 (1985).
The definition of "law enforcement officers" for purposes of these reports is not
clear. Early reports mention the state police, municipal police agencies, sheriffs'
departments, and "special police agencies such as parks, railroads, university and
authority forces." See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT '76, supra at 182.
64. The annual numbers of law enforcement officers reported feloniously slain
in New York during this time interval are as follows: 1985 - 1; 1986 - 2; 1987 -
9; 1988 - 4; 1989 - 7; 1990 - 2; 1991 - 3; 1992 - 4; 1993 - 3; 1994 - 3. See
1992 U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED 23 (1993); N.Y. STATE
DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1993 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT
170 (1994); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1994 CRIME AND
JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 166 (1995).
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(ii) The intended victim was a peace officer as defined in para-
graph a of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three,
twenty-four or sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of
section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of
the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties,
and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that
the intended victim was such a uniformed court officer, parole of-
ficer, probation officer, or employee of the division for youth.6 5
Sixty-four types of "peace officers" are defined under New
York law.66 The intentional killing of four kinds of such of-
ficers67 is first-degree murder under the new statute68 if the of-
fender knew or reasonably should have known that the
intended victim was a peace officer, and the officer was killed
while performing his or her official duties. The four kinds of
peace officers covered in the first-degree murder law are
"[u]niformed court officers of the unified court system;"6 9
"[p]arole officers or warrant officers in the division of parole;" 70
"[p]robation officers;" 71 and "[e]mployees of the division for
youth assigned to transport and warrants units who are specifi-
cally designated by the director . .. "72 The most conspicuous
omission from the list of public service officers included under
the "police" and "peace officer" sections of the first-degree mur-
der statute involves firefighters, whose intentional slaying in
the line of duty is not made a form of capital murder.73
65. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
66. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 2.10 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996).
67. Under death penalty bills passed prior to the 1995 Legislative Session, the
murder of all "peace officers" defined under the Criminal Procedure Law was made
a capital offense. The present statute's limitation to just four types of peace officers
consequently represents a significant narrowing of this category of first-degree
murder. See Policy Perspectives, supra note 4, at 581.
68. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
69. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 2.10(21)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
70. Id. § 2.10(23) (McKinney 1992).
71. Id. § 2.10 (24).
72. Id. § 2.10 (25).
73. The killing of firefighters in performance of their official duties is a form of
capital murder, or an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes, in several juris-
dictions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(9) (Deering Supp. 1996); ; LA. CODE
CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(2) (West Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.033(7) (Michie Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(k) (1995).
Firefighters and fire marshals in various localities in New York are defined as
"peace officers," but apparently there is no statewide classification of firefighters in
this official capacity. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 2.10(28) (McKinney 1992)
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(iii) The intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as
defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law,
who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of per-
forming his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that the intended victim was an employee of a
state correctional institution or a local correctional facility.74
Like the preceding two provisions, this category of first-de-
gree murder was designed to apply to the killing of persons in
the performance of official duties directly related to the enforce-
ment of laws or maintaining public order and safety. Under
this section, the intended victim must be an employee of a state
or local correctional facility, 75 and, as with the "police" and
"peace officer" elements of first-degree murder, the offender
must have known or reasonably should have known about his or
her victim's official status. This section doubtlessly was enacted
for its presumed deterrent value, since correctional personnel
work closely with potentially dangerous prisoners, and for re-
lated retributive reasons. However, as drafted, this provision
does not mesh well with its logical justifications.
This section applies to the murder of all "employees" of
state correctional institutions and local correctional facilities, a
class which presumably includes not only corrections officers
and jail guards, but also clerical and custodial staff, who may
not be directly responsible for the custody and care of the incar-
cerated, as well as people working in administrative or supervi-
sory positions, who infrequently come into contact with
prisoners. In this respect, the statute seems rather expansive.
However, if the threat of capital punishment is presumed neces-
sary to deter the imprisoned and jailed from committing mur-
der, then the reach of this provision may be too narrow, since
the murder of neither visitors to correctional facilities nor other
(defining "officers and members of the New York City fire department" as peace
officers); id. § 2.10(30) (Nassau County fire marshalls and fire inspectors); id.
§ 2.10(41) (municipal fire police squad members); id. § 2.10(51) (members of the
fire investigation divisions of the fire departments in the cities of Binghamton,
Rochester, and Utica); id. § 2.10(61) (Suffolk County fire marshals); id. § 2.10(62)
(Town of Babylon fire marshals).
74. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
75. "Local correctional facility' means any county jail, county penitentiary,
county lockup, city jail, police station jail, town or village jail or lockup, court de-
tention pen or hospital prison ward." N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 40(2) (McKinney 1987).
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prisoners is made a capital crime. Indeed, the statute creates
the anomalous situation that if a prisoner serving a term of
years intentionally kills a staff counselor employed by the
prison, he or she may be guilty of capital murder, but the same
prisoner would be guilty of only second-degree murder for inten-
tionally killing either a visitor to the facility or another prisoner
who may have been accompanying that counselor.
Another curiosity is that this section applies equally to
prisoners and non-prisoners who murder correctional employ-
ees. There is no requirement that a killing be causally related
to the victim's performance of his or her duties as a corrections
employee. The statute only specifies that the victim must have
been "engaged in the course of performing his official duties"
when killed. Thus, a corrections officer who murdered another
on the job, 76 or a secretary who killed a co-worker in a correc-
tional facility after an argument, could be convicted of capital
murder. 77 The Legislature surely did not envision that such
homicides deserve punishment as first-degree murder simply
because a corrections employee was killed, but the wording of
this provision supports such applications.
(iv) At the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant
was confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise
in custody upon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon
a sentence commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for
an indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen
years and the maximum of which was natural life, or at the time
of the commission of the killing, the defendant had escaped from
76. In the case in which the provision under New York's former death penalty
statute for mandatory capital punishment for murder committed by a life term
prisoner was declared unconstitutional, the prisoner (in a defense rejected by the
jury) claimed that the corrections officer he was convicted of murdering may have
been killed by other corrections officers. People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 59, 468
N.E.2d 879, 886, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706, 713 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
77. On July 14, 1995 two corrections officers allegedly were murdered by a
third corrections officer in a housing complex maintained for corrections officers in
Dutchess County. The alleged killer, Joseph King, was charged with two counts of
second degree murder. See Carole DeMare & Joe Picchi, Prison Guard Accused of
Killing 2 Colleagues, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), July 15, 1995, at Al, A9. Had
these killings occurred on or after the effective date of the death penalty law, Sep-
tember 1, 1995, and had the two victims been engaged in the performance of their
official duties, the slayings could have qualified as first-degree murder.
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such confinement or custody while serving such a sentence and
had not yet been returned to such confinement or custody. 78
There was another case, Lemuel Smith, People v. Lemuel
Smith, which overturned our death penalty at that time. This
gentleman was in prison for committing five murders and two
rapes, when he murdered the prison guard, who was a lady. They
found bite marks all over her, and in addition in some of his prior
murders they found bite marks. What do you do with a guy that
commits five murders and then commits a sixth murder in prison?
Do you give him another life without parole... ?
-Assemblyman Stephen Kaufman 79
Although his most recent crime was committed in 1981,
Lemuel Smith continued to haunt the Legislative debate on the
death penalty in 1995,80 much as his cases had in intervening
years. Smith was incarcerated in Green Haven Correctional In-
stitution in 1981, where he was serving three consecutive
sentences of twenty-five-years to life imprisonment after being
convicted of kidnapping and two counts of murder.8' Smith had
been indicted for two additional murders allegedly committed in
close proximity to his other crimes, but these indictments were
dismissed after the three life sentences were imposed for his
other offenses. He was also suspected of having committed an
additional murder.82 While serving his life sentences at the
Green Haven prison, he murdered corrections officer Donna
Payant in 1981 by beating, biting, and strangling her, and then
disposing of her body in a garbage dumpster. The mandatory
sentence of death he received under the state's 1974 death pen-
alty law was declared unconstitutional, 83 and Smith conse-
quently was resentenced to another life prison term. His
78. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
79. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 94.
80. See Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1855 (remarks of Senator Dale Vol-
ker); id. at 1876 (remarks of Senator Stephen Saland); id. at 94 (remarks of Sena-
tor Nancy Larraine Hoffinan).
81. Under the law in existence at the time Smith was sentenced, his three
consecutive sentences of 25-years to life merged into a single sentence of that same
duration. People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 50 n.1, 468 N.E.2d 879, 882 n.1, 479
N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 n.1 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
82. Smith's Record a Grim Trail of Murder and Mutilation, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany, N.Y.), April 22, 1983, at A-13.
83. People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
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criminal history and the brutality of his crimes have earned
Smith the title of New York's "poster man for capital
punishment."8 4
Conduct such as Smith's would be punishable under at
least three separate provisions of New York's first-degree mur-
der statute: killing a corrections employee engaged in her offi-
cial duties, 5 murder committed by a person with a prior murder
conviction,8 6 or a killing committed by an incarcerated or es-
caped prisoner serving a minimum term of at least fifteen years
and a maximum of life.87 The present discussion focuses on the
latter section.
Not all prisoners covered by this element of first-degree
murder will have the character or prior criminal record of a
Lemuel Smith, or will commit such brutal, unprovoked killings.
These are the principal reasons that the courts have invalidated
mandatory capital punishment for life term prisoners who com-
mit murder, in favor of discretionary statutes that permit con-
sideration of individual offense and offender circumstances
before punishment is imposed.88 Under New York law, various
crimes are punishable by a minimum term of fifteen years in
prison and a maximum of life, including first-degree 89 and sec-
ond-degree murder,90 attempted first-degree murder, 91 arson,92
kidnapping,93 and the possession 94 and sale95 of designated
types and amounts of controlled substances. Furthermore, re-
84. Hy Rosen, As Hy Rosen Sees It (political cartoon), TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.), Apr. 22, 1983, at A15 (on file with PACE LAW REVIEW).
85. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra
notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
86. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(ix). See infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
87. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(iv). See supra note 77 and accompanying
text. Smith's conduct might be punishable under other provisions of the first-de-
gree murder statute, as well: the "torture" provision (N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27(1)(a)(x); the "serial killing" provision (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(xi)),
assuming that he killed two or more additional persons in separate criminal trans-
actions within a two-year period of the murder for which he was sentenced, and
the murders were "committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common
scheme or plan." See infra notes 143-59, 160-65 and accompanying text.
88. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41,
468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
89. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
90. Id. § 125.25.
91. Id. § 110.05(1) (McKinney 1987).
92. Id. § 150.20.
93. Id. § 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree).
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peat and persistent felony offenders may be sentenced to prison
terms of such duration.96 First-time rapists,97 armed robbers, 98
burglars,99 persons convicted of aggravated assault on law en-
forcement officers, 100 and numerous other felons cannot be sen-
tenced so harshly.
This section of the murder statute thus provides no guaran-
tee that the most violent or incorrigible offenders are singled
out for death-penalty eligibility if they kill while incarcerated or
on escape. Nor does it do a good job of identifying prisoners
who, because of the lengthy sentences they already are serving,
can afford to be indifferent about sanctions other than death.
Unlike offenders with such aggravated records as Lemuel
Smith's, most prisoners serving life sentences realistically can
expect to be released on parole some time after serving their
fifteen to twenty-five-year minimum terms. 10' On the other
hand, this provision is significantly more restrictive than stat-
utes in some other jurisdictions, which make murder committed
by any prisoner a death-penalty eligible offense. 0 2
94. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.21 (McKinney Supp. 1996) (criminal possession of
a controlled substance in the first degree). An attempt to commit this offense is
punished similarly. Id. § 110.05(1) (McKinney 1987).
95. Id. § 220.43 (McKinney 1989) (criminal sale of a controlled substance in
the first degree). An attempt to commit this crime is punished similarly. Id.
§ 110.05(1) (McKinney 1987).
96. Id. § 70.06(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (second felony offender, for a class
A-Il felony); id. § 70.08(2) (McKinney 1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.08 (3)(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1996) (persistent violent felony offender, for a class B felony, maxi-
mum sentence of life imprisonment, minimum sentence of 10- to 25-years to life);
id. § 70.10 (McKinney 1987) (persistent felony offender).
97. Id. § 130.35.
98. Id. § 140.30.
99. Id. § 160.15.
100. Id. § 120.11 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
101. See generally James R. Acker, Mandatory Capital Punishment for the
Life Term Inmate Who Commits Murder: Judgments of Fact and Value in Law
and Social Science, 11 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 267, 289-90 &
n.46 (1985)[hereinafter Mandatory Capital Punishment]. The new statute creates
a higher mandatory minimum sentence for first-degree murder (20- to 25-years,
instead of 15- to 25-years), and also creates an alternative sentencing option of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.00(3)(a)(i) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1996); id. § 70.00(5); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(10) (McKinney
Supp. 1996). The Legislature did not take the opportunity to limit the application
of the first-degree murder statute to the narrower class of prisoners serving
sentences of either 20- 25-years to life, or LWOP.
102. See Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 398-99 & n.114;
Lexicon of Death, supra note 52, at 116-18.
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Homicides have occurred relatively infrequently in New
York prisons over the past several years.10 3 The number of
prison homicides may increase as changes occur that affect
prison conditions and prisoners, such as greater overcrowding,
and increased use of "double-ceiling," or housing two prisoners
in a single cell. Lengthier sentences for some felonies, including
the new sentencing option of life without the possibility of pa-
role (LWOP) for first-degree murder,10 4 may increase the
number of prisoners serving fifteen-year to life sentences. Even
with such changes, homicides committed by life-term prisoners
are not likely to represent a large category of first-degree
murder.
(v) The intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a
prior occasion and the death was caused for the purpose of
preventing the intended victim's testimony in any criminal action
or proceeding whether or not such action or proceeding had been
commenced, or the intended victim had previously testified in a
criminal action or proceeding and the killing was committed for
the purpose of exacting retribution for such prior testimony, or
the intended victim was an immediate family member of a wit-
ness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the killing was
committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the testi-
mony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate
family member of a witness who had previously testified in a
criminal action or proceeding and the killing was committed for
the purpose of exacting retribution upon such witness for such
prior testimony. As used in this subparagraph "immediate family
103. See Policy Perspectives, supra note 4, at 572-73 (reporting that there
were 38 homicides of prisoners in New York's prison system between 1976 and
1984, or about four a year). Between 1989 and 1992, a total of 19 prisoners were
the victims of homicides committed within prison facilities. N.Y. STATE DEPr. OF
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, DEATHS OF NEW YORK STATE INMATES, 1978-1992 8
(1994)(on file with PACE LAW REVIEW). The number of prison homicides has risen
in recent years, but because the size of the prison population has skyrocketed, the
annual rate of prison homcides actually has declined over the period 1978 through
1992. Id. at 8-9. Three homicides of prisoners occurred within prison walls in New
York in 1994. N.Y. STATE DEI-r. OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, UNUSUAL INCIDENT
REPORT, January-December 1994 1 (1995) (on file with PACE LAW REVIEW).
104. See supra note 101 (regarding the new sentence of LWOP). See generally
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06(6) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (determinate sentences for sec-
ond violent felony offenders); id. § 70.40(a) (specifying limitations on parole eligi-
bility); N.Y. CoRRECT. LAw § 803(1),(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (specifying
limitations on prisoners' good-time credit); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 410.91 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1996) (limiting parole eligibility).
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member" means a husband, wife, father, mother, daughter,
son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent, stepchild or
grandchild.105
The "witness-killing" form of first-degree murder is rela-
tively narrow in certain respects, and broad in others. This pro-
vision applies generally to the murder of a witness to a crime, or
of an immediate family member of that witness, committed for
the purpose of preventing, influencing, or retaliating for the wit-
ness' testimony in a criminal proceeding. "[S]uch killings
threaten the integrity of the justice system and impede the abil-
ity of law enforcement authorities to prevent and punish serious
crime."O6
An important limitation on the reach of this provision is the
requirement that the person slain 0 7 was "a witness to a crime
committed on a prior occasion." This limitation excludes kill-
ings committed contemporaneously with the witnessed crime
from qualifying as first-degree murder. For example, the car
thief who kills the owner of a car as the owner "witnesses" the
offender drive the vehicle away should not be eligible for prose-
cution under this section even if the killing allegedly took place
to prevent the car-owner's later courtroom testimony. Nor
should the pickpocket be prosecuted for killing the owner of the
stolen wallet, who was in hot pursuit after "witnessing" the
theft and would have testified about the crime in court. The
restriction that the crime must have been "committed on a prior
occasion" from the killing essentially excludes spontaneous kill-
ings of witnesses to crimes from death-penalty eligibility. This
provision instead applies to murders committed after some op-
portunity for deliberation, and for the specific purpose of
preventing, influencing, or retaliating for a witness' testimony.
In this respect, this element of first-degree murder is analo-
gous to a special circumstance used under California law to
render an offender death-penalty eligible:
The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally
killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any
105. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(v) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
106. BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 2.
107. This provision also applies to the killing of immediate family members of
witnesses for the purpose of preventing, influencing, or retaliating for witnesses'
testimony in criminal actions or proceedings.
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criminal or juvenile proceeding, and the killing was not committed
during the commission or attempted commission of the crime to
which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a
crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her tes-
timony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding .... 108
Death penalty statutes in most other jurisdictions with pro-
visions applying to witness killings do not expressly require
that the slaying and the witnessing of a crime be separated.
For example, an aggravating circumstance used for capital sen-
tencing under Delaware law applies when "[t]he murder was
committed against a person who was a witness to a crime and
who was killed for the purpose of preventing [his] appearance or
testimony in any grand jury, criminal or civil proceeding involv-
ing such crime."10 9 The Delaware statute is typical of several
others that appear to encompass the killing of persons contem-
poraneously with crimes they witnessed. However, the prosecu-
tion must prove that the murder was committed for the purpose
of preventing testimony.110
Unlike the California and Delaware statutes, as well as
other states that have similar statutes, New York's witness-kill-
ing provision applies only to testimony in criminal actions and
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (Deering Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
Ohio law contains a similar aggravating circumstance: "The victim... was a wit-
ness to an offense who was purposely killed to prevent his testimony in any crimi-
nal proceeding and the aggravated murder was not committed during the
commission, attempted commission, or flight immediately after the commission or
attempted commission of the offense to which the victim was a witness, or the
victim... was a witness to an offense and was purposely killed in retaliation for
his testimony in any criminal proceeding." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(8)
(Anderson 1993). Both California and Ohio have laws which conceivably could be
applied to make the killing of a witness to a contemporaneous crime a form of
capital murder or an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(5) (Deering Supp. 1996) ("The murder was committed for
the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or to perfect, or attempt to
perfect an escape from lawful custody."); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(3)
(Anderson 1993) ("The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detec-
tion, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the
offender.").
109. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(g) (1995).
110. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(10) (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
720, para. 5/9-1(b)(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art.
905.4(A)(8) (West Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(2)(16) (West Supp. 1996);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 (G) (Michie 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9711(d)(5)
(West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(i) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.020(8)(a) (West Supp. 1996).
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proceedings, and does not include testimony pertaining to juve-
nile or civil actions."' However, a criminal action or proceeding
need not actually be pending at the time the witness to the
crime is killed. This feature of the statute potentially invites
broad application of this section. For instance, a man could be
charged with the first-degree murder of his wife if he previously
assaulted her, and it is alleged that the killing was committed
to ensure that she would not testify against him for the assault.
The killing could be charged as capital murder "whether or not
[a criminal] action or proceeding had been commenced" for the
prior assault. Juries traditionally have been relied upon to re-
solve factual issues such as motive in criminal matters, includ-
ing potentially capital cases. Nevertheless, the courts will have
to scrutinize jury verdicts and prosecutors' charging decisions
carefully in order to help avoid unjustifiably broad application
of the witness-killing provision.
(vi) The defendant committed the killing or procured commission
of the killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than
the intended victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in ex-
pectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a
party to the agreement or from a person other than the intended
victim acting at the direction of a party to such agreement. 112
Contract killings are a form of first-degree murder under
this section. Since this provision applies only to murders com-
mitted pursuant to an agreement in which the killer will receive
something of pecuniary value for the killing, killings committed
for pecuniary gain alone do not qualify as capital murder. 13
111. In addition to the California and Delaware laws, which respectively are
quoted supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text, various other statutes do not
limit the witness' prospective or past testimony to criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(10)(1995 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(i) (1995);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(8)(a) (West Supp. 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-
2-102(h)(viii) (Michie Supp. 1995).
112. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
113. In many jurisdictions, a murder "committed for pecuniary gain" is a form
of capital murder or a sentencing circumstance that renders the offender eligible
for capital punishment, without the further requirement that there be a prior
agreement that the killer will receive pecuniary gain from a party to the agree-
ment. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(7) (1994); id. § 13A-5-49(6); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(5) (West 1995); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-604(6) (Michie
1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (Deering Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
10-30(b)(4) (1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(f) (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
3-20(C)(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(f) (1995).
1996]
27
PACE LAW REVIEW
Both the killer and the party procuring the killing are guilty of
first-degree murder, unless the intended victim is one of the
parties to the agreement.
This provision applies only to killings for hire.114 It is care-
fully worded so that the pecuniary gain from the killing must be
realized from a party to the agreement or from another person
acting at the direction of a party; it specifically rules out the
intended victim as the source of the pecuniary gain. Signifi-
cantly, this wording excludes killings where, for example, A and
B agree with each other that they will kill C in order to steal C's
car, C's cashbox, or realize anything else of pecuniary value
from C, the intended victim. Although such a killing would be
committed pursuant to "an agreement.., in expectation of the
receipt of anything of pecuniary value," it would not be first-
degree murder since the financial gain from the killing would
come directly from exploiting the victim, instead of representing
consideration paid by a party to the agreement or by someone
acting at the direction of a party.115
(vii) The victim was killed while the defendant was in the course
of committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of rob-
bery, burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in
the first degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape in
the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the
first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or escape
in the first degree, or in the course of and furtherance of immedi-
ate flight after committing or attempting to commit any such
crime or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after
attempting to commit the crime of murder in the second degree;
provided however, the victim is not a participant in one of the
aforementioned crimes and, provided further that, unless the de-
fendant's criminal liability under this subparagraph is based
See generally Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence, for Purposes of Death Penalty, to
Establish Statutory Aggravating Circumstance That Murder Was Committed for
Pecuniary Gain, as Consideration or in Expectation of Receiving Something of
Monetary Value, and the Like-Post-Gregg Cases, 66 A.L.R. 4TH 417 (1988).
114. BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 2 (referring to this section as "ap-
plicable to 'murder-for-hire' agreements.").
115. Id. at 2-3 ("Where two persons agree to commit a robbery and kill a vic-
tim, the actual killer may be liable for a conviction for first-degree murder under
subparagraph (vii) of this subdivision [pertaining to killings committed in further-
ance of designated felonies], but neither would be subject to conviction under this
subparagraph because the pecuniary gain would not come from one of the parties
to the agreement.").
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upon the defendant having commanded another person to cause
the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to section
20.00 of this chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where the
defendant's criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another
pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter.116
Contemporaneous-felony killings are certain to be the most
commonly committed form of capital murder. From this per-
spective, this provision stands out as the most significant one in
the first-degree murder statute. The contemporaneous-felony
circumstance is present in over three-fourths of the cases of
murderers on death rows across the United States. 1 7 It is not
unusual in some jurisdictions for 80% to over 95% of death
sentences to involve this circumstance.1 8 Killings committed
during armed robberies generally account for the greatest share
of contemporaneous-felony murders. 1 9 Since the mid-1970s,
roughly 28% to 45% of New York homicide victims, where the
116. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
117. Baldus et. al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of
the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133,
139 n.14 (1986) [hereinafter Baldus, Arbitrariness and Discrimination].
118. Id. at 138-39 (stating that "[mWore than 80% of the defendants on death
row today became death eligible because they killed in the course of a contempora-
neous offense, usually an armed robbery or rape") & n. 14 (citing studies that report
that the contemporaneous felony factor is present in the cases of 87% of death row
prisoners in Georgia, 72% of the death row prisoners in Florida, and 79% of the
death row prisoners in Texas); Raymond Paternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The
Administration of the Death Penalty in South Carolina: Experiences Over the First
Few Years, 39 S.C. L. REV. 245, 278-79 (1988) (examining 1,686 nonnegligent
"homicide events" committed in South Carolina between June, 1977 and Decem-
ber, 1981, identifying 311 of those cases as including a statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance that made the murder a potentially capital crime, and concluding that,
"[iun 97% or 302 of the 311 capital murders the requisite aggravating circumstance
was the commission of a contemporaneous felony."). See also Richard A. Rosen,
Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L.
REV. 1103, 1127-28 (1990) [hereinafter Rosen] ("One study found that felony mur-
der indictments comprise 40% of all first-degree murder indictments. Another na-
tion-wide study found that 28% of all homicides were felony murders.") (Footnotes
omitted; emphasis in original).
119. Rosen, supra note 118, at 1132 n.76 (citing studies which estimate that
between 58% and 81.6% of felony-related murders involve armed robberies). Kill-
ings committed during armed robberies comprise the largest share of felony-re-
lated homicides in New York, as well. For years in which these data were
reported, victims killed during robberies accounted for the following proportions of
victims known to have been killed during felonies. (Note: for each year, there are
large numbers of cases for which the circumstances under which victims were
killed are unknown. The relevant statistics were no longer reported after 1988).
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circumstances surrounding the offense are known, died in fel-
ony-connected killings. 120
Not all of these killings would qualify as first-degree mur-
der under the contemporaneous felony category because several
important limitations apply. First, this provision, like all other
Year Victims Known Killed During:
Felonies (total) Robberies %
1976 368 305 82.9
1977 373 276 74.0
1978 343 243 70.8
1979 521 417 80.0
1980 489 384 78.5
1981 431 334 77.5
1982 396 313 79.0
1983 259 191 73.7
1984 261 136 52.1
1985 257 146 56.8
1986 389 169 43.4
1987 354 157 44.4
1988 411 179 43.6
TOTALS 4852 3250 66.7
See N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1979 CRIME AND JUSTICE
ANNUAL REPORT 88-89 (1980); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES,
1984 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 94-95 (1985); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1985 CRIME AND JUSTICE 74 (1986); N.Y. STATE DIVI-
SION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1986 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 75
(1987); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1987 CRIME AND JuS-
TICE ANNUAL REPORT 75, 80 (1988); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SERVICES, 1988 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 73, 78 (1989).
No explanation is given for why armed robberies account for a dwindling per-
centage of the victims known killed during felonies beginning in 1984. Generally,
killings committed during the other named felony categories of sex crimes and ar-
son remain fairly stable, but the generic category "other felonies" increases dra-
matically. Perhaps an increasing volume of drug crimes and related killings
explains the sharp rise in killings committed during "other" felonies, but this is
sheer speculation.
120. Since 1976, the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services has
reported the total number of "murder" victims killed each year in the state (for this
purpose, "murder" also includes nonnegligent manslaughter), and has reported the
number of those victims known to have been killed during felony-connected homi-
cides, during nonfelony-connected homicides involving altercations and other cir-
cumstances, and during homicides for which the circumstances were unknown.
The latter category of "circumstances unknown" always has been substantial. It is
hazardous to estimate the total percentage of homicide victims killed under cir-
cumstances connected to felonies because of the large size of the "circumstances
unknown" category. The percentages of victims killed in felony-connected homi-
cides is based only on the killings for which the circumstances (felony-connected or
nonfelony-connected) are known. The reported figures are as follows:
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kinds of first-degree murder defined in the statute, requires
that the offender intentionally killed his or her victim (or a third
person).121 Unintentional killings, which are within the scope of
Felony- Non-Felony "Murder"
Total Connected Connected "Murder" Victims Among
"Murder" "Murder" "Murder" Circumstances Known
Year Victims Victims Victims Unknown Circumstances
1976 1,978 368 800 810 31.6
1977 1,913 373 923 617 28.8
1978 1,818 343 784 691 30.4
1979 2,098 521 1,030 547 33.6
1980 2,228 489 714 1,025 40.7
1981 2,177 431 687 1,059 38.6
1982 2,061 396 638 1,027 38.3
1983 1,965 259 680 1,026 27.5
1984 1,788 261 642 885 28.9
1985 1,690 257 613 820 29.5
1986 1,936 389 796 751 32.8
1987 2,003 354 665 984 34.7
1988 2,257 411 610 1,236 40.3
1989 2,266 428 636 1,202 40.2
1990 2,624 455 858 1,311 34.7
1991 2,567 470 577 1,520 44.9
1992 2,394 438 626 1,330 41.2
1993 2,428 446 642 1,340 41.0
1994 1,985 385 528 1,072 42.2
See N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1979 CRIME AND JUSTICE
ANNUAL REPORT 88-89 (1980); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES,
1984 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 94-95 (1985); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1985 CRIME AND JUSTICE 74 (1986); N.Y. STATE DIV-
SION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1986 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 75
(1987); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1987 CRIME AND JUS-
TICE ANNUAL REPORT 75 (1988); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERV-
ICES, 1988 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 73 (1989); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1989 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 97 (1990);
N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1990 CRIME AND JUSTICE AN-
NUAL REPORT 70 (1991); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1991
CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 78 (1992); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVICES, 1992 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1993); N.Y. STATE
DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1993 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT
18 (1994); N.Y. STATE DISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1994 CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE ANNUAL REPORT 18 (1995).
121. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996). See supra
note 21 and accompanying text. However, one commentator has observed that
"the number of felony murder defendants who are not intentional killers is unclear
but probably not many, which means that few defendants are excluded from the
class." Rosen, supra note 118, at 1131. One form of second-degree murder under
New York law is causing a death in the course of and in furtherance of the commis-
sion or attempted commission of named felonies (robbery, burglary, kidnapping,
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traditional felony-murder rules, 122 do not qualify as first-degree
murder.
A second limitation concerns the predicate felonies. Only
intentional killings committed in connection with the named
felonies-robbery, first- or second-degree burglary, first-degree
kidnapping, first- or second-degree arson, or first-degree rape,
sodomy, sexual abuse, aggravated sexual abuse, escape, or their
attempts, during flight after committing or attempting to com-
mit second-degree murder-are defined as first-degree murder.
A notable exception from this list is a killing committed during
a drug-related felony, which is included in some jurisdictions as
a form of capital murder or as an aggravating circumstance for
sentencing, 12 even though drug offenses are not among the in-
herently dangerous crimes which historically were recognized
as predicate felonies for purposes of the felony-murder rule.
124
Additionally, there must be a temporal and causal connec-
tion between the killing and the commission or attempted com-
mission of the felony, or a related escape. Not only must the
defendant have killed while "in the course of' committing or at-
tempting the felony, or in the "immediate flight" therefrom, but
the killing also must have been "in furtherance of" the felony or
the immediate flight. These limitations exclude killings that
are only remotely connected in time or purpose to the named
felony, or are not committed "in the course of and furtherance of
immediate flight" after the felony or attempted felony oc-
curred. 125 Nor does the section apply when the victim is one of
the participants in the felony.
arson, first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree or aggravated sexual
abuse, or first- or second-degree escape), or immediate ffight therefrom. Intent to
kill is not a necessary element of second-degree murder. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.25(3).
122. See Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doc-
trine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 450-57 (1985); ROLLIN
M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 61-62 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter
PERKINS].
123. See Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 393 n.80; Lexicon of
Death, supra note 52, at 122 n.74 (collecting statutes).
124. PERKINS, supra note 122, at 61-66; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 7.5 (b), at 623-25 (2d ed. 1986).
125. See generally id. § 7.5 (f), at 632-37. "[I]t is not enough that a killing
occur 'during' the felony or its attempt or 'while' it is committed or attempted;
something more is required than mere coincidence of time and place .... There
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The final significant limitation on the reach of the contem-
poraneous-felony element of first-degree murder involves the
exclusion of accomplice liability for a killing committed by a
cofelon, unless the accomplice "commanded another person to
cause the death of the victim or intended victim ... ." Under
section 20 of New York's Penal Law, which is specifically refer-
enced in this exclusion, one defendant normally is criminally li-
able for the conduct of another under the following
circumstances:
When one person engages in conduct which constitutes an of-
fense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when,
acting with the mental culpability required for the commission
thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intention-
ally aids such person to engage in such conduct. 126
Why accomplices who "command" another person to kill a vic-
tim are guilty of first-degree murder when that victim is killed,
but not accomplices who "solicit," "request," or "importune" kill-
ings, remains something of a mystery.127 Whatever the reason
might be for these fine distinctions, the overarching significance
of this exclusion is to limit first-degree murder liability in the
vast majority of cases to the felon who actually killed the victim.
Other participants in the contemporaneous felony ordinarily
would not be guilty of capital murder even if they possessed the
requisite intent to kill. 28
must be some causal relationship between the felony and the death .... " Id. at
633 (footnotes omitted).
126. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 20.00 (McKinney 1987).
127. The "Practice Commentary" accompanying N.Y. PENAL LAw § 20.00 (Mc-
Kinney 1987 & Supp. 1996) does not discuss the meaning of the different verbs,
"solicits, requests, commands, [and] importunes," nor does it discuss the signifi-
cance of the differences between the underlying constructs. See also 35 N.Y. Jun.
2d Elements of Accessorial Liability -Requisite Intent § 3388 (1996).
128. The scope of this exclusion, in combination with the intent-to-kill mens
rea requirement for first-degree murder, means that capital-punishment eligibility
for killings committed during contemporaneous felonies is significantly more re-
strictive under New York law than would be permitted under federal constitu-
tional guidelines. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding that
"major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference
to human life" is sufficient to expose a defendant convicted of felony-murder to the
risk of capital punishment, even if the offender did not intend that the killing take
place, and did not personally commit the killing). The exclusion also is far broader
than the statutory affrmative defense available to defendants who did not person-
ally kill who are accused of second-degree murder committed in the course of, in
1996]
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(viii) As part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant,
with intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an
additional person or persons, causes the death of an additional
person or persons; provided, however, the victim is not a partici-
pant in the criminal transaction. 129
Another form of first-degree murder involves the slaying of
multiple victims, "[a]s part of the same criminal transaction,"
exclusive of other participants in the criminal transaction. The
precise meaning of the limitation that the killings occur during
the same criminal transaction awaits judicial definition, 130
although it is clear that this provision is not intended to apply
to recidivists 13' or serial killers who commit murder over a pro-
longed period of time. 32 Several other jurisdictions have simi-
lar multiple-victim provisions in their capital murder or capital-
sentencing statutes. 3 3 The statute requires the prosecution to
prove that the defendant intended to kill one or more victims as
an element of all categories of first-degree murder, but the "in-
tent to cause serious physical injury" suffices as the mens rea
under this section for the killing of the additional victims.
(ix) Prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been con-
victed of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this
article, or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense
furtherance of, or immediate flight from a felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3)(a)-
(d) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
129. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(viii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
130. A section of New York's Criminal Procedure Law defines "criminal trans-
action" in a different context, pertaining to the circumstances under which "[a]
person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the same act
or criminal transaction. ... " N.Y. CrM. PRoc. LAw § 40.20(2) (McKinney 1992).
In this context, "[c]riminal transaction' means conduct which establishes at least
one offense, and which is comprised of two or more or a group of acts either (a) so
closely related and connected in point of time and circumstance of commission as
to constitute a single criminal incident, or (b) so closely related in criminal purpose
or objective as to constitute elements or integral parts of a single criminal ven-
ture." Id. § 40.10(2).
131. Another type of first-degree murder under the statute applies to offend-
ers with prior murder convictions. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(ix) (McKinney
Supp. 1996). See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
132. Certain serial killings are made first-degree murder under another pro-
vision of the statute. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(xi). See infra notes 161-66
and accompanying text.
133. See Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 399; Lexicon of
Death, supra note 52, at 132-33.
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which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of
either of such sections. 3
4
An offender's criminal history can make the difference be-
tween whether a murder is a capital or noncapital crime, and is
directly relevant to capital sentencing decisions in many death
penalty jurisdictions. Several state statutes have copied the
Model Penal Code's aggravating circumstance, that "[t]he de-
fendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a fel-
ony involving the use or threat of violence to the person."135
Some statutes more vaguely focus on the defendant's "substan-
tial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions,"'136 or use
similar terminology. 137 Others, like New York's first-degree
murder law, only make relevant the narrower criminal history
of previous murder or other homicide convictions. 38 The New
York statute permits other criminal convictions to be considered
an aggravating circumstance, under appropriate circumstances,
but only for sentencing purposes. 39 Thus, confining this ele-
ment of first-degree murder to offenders with prior murder con-
victions significantly limits the death-penalty eligible class.
Nationwide, roughly 10% of prisoners on death row have a rec-
ord of prior criminal homicide convictions, but well over 50%
have previously been convicted of other felonies.140
134. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(ix) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
135. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980). See Lexicon of Death, supra note 52, at 112-13 n.29 (collecting statutes pat-
terned after this provision of the Model Penal Code).
136. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(1) (Michie 1990); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(1) (Michie Supp. 1995).
137. See generally Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence,
for Purposes of Death Penalty, to Establish Statutory Aggravating Circumstance
That Defendant Was Previously Convicted of or Committed Other Violent Offense,
Had History of Violent Conduct, Posed Continuing Threat to Society, and the
Like-Post-Gregg Cases, 65 A.L.R. 4TH 838 (1988).
138. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(2) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3(c)(4)(a) (West 1996); See generally Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra
note 23, at 398; Lexicon of Death, supra note 52, at 114.
139. N.Y. CalM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(7)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See infra
notes 230-68 and accompanying text.
140. Approximately 2,575 people were under sentence of death at the end of
1992. The prior felony history of 2,421 members of this group was reported.
Among this group, 230 (9.5%) had prior criminal homicide convictions; 1,310
(54.1%) had previously been convicted of another known felony; 120 (5.0%) had
been convicted previously of an unspecified felony, and 761 (31.4%) had no prior
felony convictions. Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
1996]
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This provision of the statute applies to offenders who com-
mit murder after already having been convicted of first-degree
or second-degree murder in New York,141 or of an offense in an-
other jurisdiction which satisfies the elements of first- or sec-
ond-degree murder under New York law. The killing must have
occurred following the offender's conviction for a prior murder,
and not simply after the commission of the murder. The statute
does not exempt offenders whose prior murder convictions cor-
respond to crimes committed before they reached the age of ma-
jority. A child as young as thirteen can be convicted of second-
degree murder in New York,142 and such an offense could serve
as the predicate murder conviction for this element of first-de-
gree murder.
A defendant being tried for the commission of first-degree
murder could be unfairly prejudiced if the jury knew about a
prior murder conviction. Accordingly, in prosecutions under
this section:
if the defendant denies the previous murder conviction or remains
mute, the people may prove that element of the offense only after
the jury has first found the defendant guilty of intentionally caus-
ing the death of a person as charged in the indictment, in which
tice, 1992 Correctional Populations in the United States 143 (1995). The specific
offenses constituting the nonhomicidal felonies are not reported, so it cannot be
estimated how many of these involved the types of violent felony convictions that
can form the basis for a conviction for capital murder or serve as an aggravating
circumstance for sentencing purposes under some death penalty statutes.
141. Second-degree murder is defined under section 125.25 of New York's Pe-
nal Law, to which reference is made in this provision of the first-degree murder
statute. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Second-degree murder in-
cludes: (1) the intentional killing of another, subject to the affirmative defenses
that the offender "acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse," or that the offense consisted
of causing or aiding another person to commit suicide, without duress or deception;
(2) causing another's death "[ulnder circumstances evincing a depraved indiffer-
ence to human life" through which the offender "recklessly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another person"; (3) killing another during
the course of and in furtherance of the commission, attempted commission, or im-
mediate flight from designated felonies, subject to an affirmative defense available
when a number of conditions are met, including that the defendant did not commit
or aid the commission of the homicidal act; and (4) causing the death of a child less
than 11 years old, by an offender who is 18 years old or more, who "recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or death
to" the child. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)-(4) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
142. Id. § 30.00(2).
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case the court shall permit the people and the defendant to offer
evidence and argument... with respect to the previous murder
conviction.14
3
(x) The defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner
pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting
torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this
subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved in-
fliction of extreme physical pain; "depraved" means the defendant
relished the infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim
evidencing debasement or perversion or that the defendant evi-
denced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical
pain.144
In order to address "the special case of a style of killing so
indicative of utter depravity that imposition of the ultimate
sanction should be considered,"145 the drafters of the Model Pe-
nal Code created an aggravating factor for capital sentencing
trials that applies when "[t]he murder was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity." 46 Sev-
eral jurisdictions have copied the Model Penal Code's "heinous,
atrocious or cruel" (hereinafter HAC) circumstance, or have
adopted a variant thereof in their death penalty laws. 147 Most
of these provisions are sentencing factors and become operative
only after the offender has been convicted.'4 A few others, like
143. N.Y. CIum. PRoc. LAw § 200.60(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
144. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(x) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
145. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6, Commentary, at 137 (Official Draft and Re-
vised Comments 1980).
146. Id. § 210.6(3)(h).
147. See Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 400-01; Lexicon of
Death, supra note 52, at 124-30. See also Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Hei-
nous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard,
64 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1986)[hereinafter Rosen, Aggravating Circumstances].
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6) (1995) ("The defendant committed the offense
in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that it involved torture or
serious physical abuse to the victim."); 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(12) (Supp. 1995) (same);
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(8) (1994) ("The capital offense was especially heinous, atro-
cious or cruel compared to other capital offenses."); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
703(F)(6) (West 1995) ("The defendant committed the offense in an especially hei-
nous, cruel or depraved manner"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604(8)(A)-(C) (Michie
1993) ("(A) The capital murder was committed in an especially cruel or depraved
manner. (B) For purposes of this subdivision, a capital murder is committed in an
especially cruel manner when, as part of a course of conduct intended to inflict
mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture upon the victim prior to the
victim's death, mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture is inflicted.
1996]
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'Mental anguish' is defined as the victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate. 'Se-
rious physical abuse' is defined as physical abuse that creates a substantial risk of
death or that causes protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impair-
ment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 'Torture' is defined as the
infliction of extreme physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the vic-
tim's death. (C) For purposes of this subdivision, a capital murder is committed in
an especially depraved manner when the person relishes the murder, evidencing
debasement or perversion, or shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim
and evidences a sense of pleasure in committing the murder."); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-103(5)(j) (West Supp. 1995) ("The defendant committed the offense in an
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
46a(i)(4) (West 1994) ("[Tlhe defendant committed the offense in an especially hei-
nous, cruel or depraved manner."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(1) (1995)
("The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, use of an explosive device or poison or the
defendant used such means on the victim prior to murdering him."); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1995). ("The capital felony was especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel."); id. § 921.142(6)(j) ("The defendant committed the of-
fense in a heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that the offense involved torture
or serious physical abuse to the victim."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1990)
("The offense of murder... was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhu-
man in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim."); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(5) (Supp. 1995) ("The murder was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity."); id. § 19-
2515(h)(6) ("By the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the de-
fendant exhibited utter disregard for human life."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para.
5/9-1(b)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) ("The murdered individual was under 12
years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(10) (Michie Supp.
1995) ("The defendant dismembered the victim."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4625(6)
(Supp. 1994) ("The defendant committed the crime in an especially heinous, atro-
cious or cruel manner."); LA_ CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(7) (West Supp.
1995) ("The offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(h) (1994) ("The capital offense was es-
pecially heinous, atrocious or cruel."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(2)(7) (West Supp.
1996) ("The murder in the first degree was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind."); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-303(3) (1995) ("The offense was deliberate homicide and was committed by
means of torture."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(d) (1989) ("The murder was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary
standards of morality and intelligence."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(8)
(Michie Supp. 1995) ("The murder involved torture, depravity of mind or the muti-
lation of the victim."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII)(a)(h) (Supp. 1995) ("The
defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved man-
ner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the victim."); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c) (West 1995) ("The murder was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an ag-
gravated assault to the victim."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (Supp. 1995)
("The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (West 1995) ("The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9711(d)(8) (West Supp. 1995) ("The offense was
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New York's analogous provision, define a category of capital
murder.149 The potential breadth of these circumstances makes
HAC-factors especially significant. As many as 60 to 80% of
cases resulting in death sentences in some jurisdictions may in-
volve the "vile murder" or "heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor.150
It is unlikely that the "especially cruel and wanton" torture
murder defined under New York law will figure so regularly in
capital cases. Provisions of this type are notoriously vague,
committed by means of torture."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(h) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1995) ("The murder was committed while in the commission of the fol-
lowing crimes or acts: physical torture."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(6)
(Michie Supp. 1995) ("The offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to
the victim. Any murder is wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman if the victim is
less than thirteen years of age."); TEN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(5) (Supp. 1995)
("The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture
or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death."); id. § 39-13-
204(i)(13) (Supp. 1995) ("The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim
after death."); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (C) (Michie 1995) ("The penalty of death
shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable
doubt ... , or that [the defendant's] conduct in committing the offense was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, deprav-
ity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim."); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(vii)
(Michie Supp. 1995) ("The murder was especially atrocious or cruel, being unneces-
sarily torturous to the victim.").
149. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (Deering Supp. 1996) ("The murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. As uti-
lized in this section, the phrase especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manifesting
exceptional depravity means a consciousless, or pitiless crime which is unnecessa-
rily torturous to the victim.") (special circumstance); id. at § 190.2(a)(18) ("The
murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. For the purpose of
this section torture requires proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain no mat-
ter how long its duration.") (special circumstance); IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(a) (Supp.
1995) ("All murder which is perpetrated... when torture is inflicted with the in-
tent to cause suffering, to execute vengeance, to extort something from the victim,
or to satisfy some sadistic inclination... is murder of the first degree."); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.030(1) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("Murder of the first degree is murder
which is: (a) Perpetrated by means of . . . torture . . . ."); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.095(1)(e) (1995) ("The homicide occurred in the course of or as a result of
intentional maiming or torture of the victim."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(q)
(1995) ("[T]he homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel,
or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before
death.").
150. Lexicon of Death, supra note 52, at 125 (citing Baldus, Arbitrariness and
Discrimination, supra note 117 at 138-39 & n.14; William J. Bowers & Glenn
Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26
CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 627 (1980)).
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although several have survived constitutional challenge after
court decision have defined significant terms and narrowed
their application. 151 The drafters of the New York statute have
made a deliberate attempt to minimize potential vagueness
problems by defining operative terms of this section. Vagueness
issues are particularly acute because this provision defines an
element of first-degree murder, rather than serving only as a
sentencing factor.
For a killing to fall within this element of first-degree mur-
der, the defendant must have (a) "acted in an especially cruel
and wanton manner," (b) "pursuant to a course of conduct," and
(c) "intended to inflict and inflict[ed] torture upon the victim
prior to the victim's death." The requirement that the defend-
ant acted in a "cruel and wanton manner" is likely to be con-
strued as superfluous or redundant to the "torture" aspect of
this element. That is, proof that the defendant intended to and
actually tortured the murder victim may well suffice to demon-
strate that the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wan-
ton manner. Nevertheless, since these requirements are stated
separately, there is some chance that they will be interpreted as
discrete sub-elements that demand independent proof.
The statute requires that the defendant engage in a "course
of conduct" involving torture before his or her acts are covered
by this section. This wording clearly signifies that not all gratu-
itous acts of cruelty toward a homicide victim qualify a killing
151. Compare Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992) (sentencer's reliance on
Arizona's unconstitutionally vague "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggra-
vating factor requires invalidation of death sentence), Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738 (1990) (inadequate definition of "heinous, atrocious or cruel" circumstance
requires that death sentence be vacated), Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988) (Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor, as
applied, is unconstitutionally vague), Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (as
applied, aggravating circumstance that murder was "outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim" is unconstitutionally vague) with Arave v. Creech, 507
U.S. 463 (1993) (as construed by Idaho courts, aggravating circumstance that de-
fendant exhibited "utter disregard for human life" is not unconstitutionally vague),
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) ("especially heinous, cruel or depraved"
aggravating factor is not unconstitutionally vague as construed by state supreme
court). See generally Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994) (discussing gen-
eral principles and standards for determining whether capital-sentencing aggra-
vating circumstances are unconstitutionally vague, and upholding three statutory
sentencing factors against challenge).
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as a torture-murder. "The fact that the torture must be inflicted
pursuant to a 'course of conduct' inserts both a temporal ele-
ment and a requirement for a series of distinct acts prior to the
victim's death as part of the definition of the crime." 52
"Torture" is defined as "the intentional and depraved inflic-
tion of extreme physical pain." Significantly, proof of the vic-
tim's psychological trauma or sensations of terror prior to death
does not satisfy this definition. 153 Since the torture must be in-
flicted "prior to the victim's death," cases involving mutilation
or dismemberment of the victim's body following death also are
excluded.154
The defendant not only must intentionally inflict extreme
physical pain on the victim pursuant to a course of conduct, but
must do so in a "depraved" way. "'[Diepraved' means the de-
fendant relished the infliction of extreme physical pain upon the
victim evidencing debasement or perversion or that the defend-
ant evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme
physical pain."155 Almost mercifully, the statute does not define
words such as "relished," "debasement," and "perversion."
"'Vague terms do not suddenly become clear when they are de-
fined by reference to other vague terms.'" 15 6
The Supreme Court's "vagueness review is quite deferen-
tial"157 when the Justices assess the adequacy of the eligibility
and selection factors 58 articulated in death-penalty statutes.
152. BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 3.
153. Cf Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 646 (1990) (approving Arizona
Supreme Court's narrowing interpretation of "especially heinous, cruel or de-
praved" statutory aggravating circumstance, which included the defendant's inflic-
tion of "mental anguish," or a "victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate," as a
part of the definition of "cruel.").
154. Cf TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(13) (Supp. 1995), supra note 148.
155. See also ARYu CODE ANN. § 5-4-604(8)(B), (C) (Michie 1993), supra note
148 (defining "torture" and "especially depraved manner" as part of capital-sen-
tencing aggravating circumstance).
156. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 693 n.16 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987), affd,
486 U.S. 356 (1988)).
157. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
158. "The eligibility decision fits the crime within a defined classification.
Eligibility factors almost of necessity require an answer to a question with a
factual nexus to the crime or the defendant so as to 'make rationally review-
able the process for imposing a sentence of death.' The selection decision, on
the other hand, requires individualized sentencing and must be expansive
enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to assure an as-
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However, since New York's torture-murder provision defines an
element of first-degree murder, and does not simply serve as a
sentencing consideration, due process standards used to assess
the vagueness of elements of crimes should be fully effective. 15 9
Imprecise statutes invite arbitrary application, and arbitrari-
ness has long plagued the administration of death-penalty sys-
tems. The Legislature commendably has attempted to define
and limit the scope of the torture-murder element of capital
murder. Nevertheless, due to the conceptual difficulties inher-
ent in identifying "especially cruel and wanton" killings, and
the limitations of language as a device for harnessing discre-
tion, a provision of this nature simply may defy meaningful
definition.160
(xi) The defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more
additional persons within the state in separate criminal transac-
tions within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a
similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan.161
This "serial murder" provision applies when (1) an offender
has intentionally killed at least three people (the victim of the
first-degree murder charged, and "two or more additional per-
sons"), (2) in the State of New York, (3) during a two-year pe-
riod, (4) in "separate criminal transactions," and (5) the killings
were "committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common
scheme or plan." While presumably intended to apply to kill-
ings such as those committed in the infamous "Son of Sam"
case, this element of first-degree murder is laden with defini-
tional and operational uncertainties. One question concerns
how the additional killings, committed during "separate crimi-
sessment of the defendant's culpability .... There is one principle common
to both decisions, however: The State must ensure that the process is neu-
tral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing
decision."
Tuilaepa at 2635 (quoting Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 467 (1993)).
159. See generally Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Peo-
ple v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 57 N.Y.2d 371, 442 N.E.2d 1222, 456 N.Y.S.2d
711, (1982); People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 151 N.E.2d 871, 176
N.Y.S.2d 313 (1958).
160. See Rosen, Aggravating Circumstances, supra note 147; Lexicon of Death,
supra note 52, at 130.
161. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(xi) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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nal transactions," are to be proven. The statute does not indi-
cate whether these other killings must be established by
introducing prior convictions or whether they may be proven as
indicted or unindicted crimes as a part of the offender's first-
degree murder trial.
Tennessee's death penalty law includes a "mass-murder"
aggravating sentencing factor similar to New York's serial-kill-
ing provision, although the former law does not require that the
multiple killings must have been committed "in separate crimi-
nal transactions."1 2 Relying on its state constitution, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court has ruled that killings must be
established by convictions before they can be used to prove the
multiple homicides that form a part of the "mass-murder" sen-
tencing factor. 163 Even if the courts impose a similar require-
162. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(12) (Supp. 1995) ("The defendant com-
mitted 'mass murder,' which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons
within the state of Tennessee within a period of forty-eight (48) months, and perpe-
trated in a similar fashion in a common scheme or plan."). Since the Tennessee
sentencing factor, unlike New York's serial-murder provision, does not require
that killings be committed during separate criminal transactions, a murderer in
Tennessee who kills three victims during the course of a single bank robbery, for
example, can have the "mass murder" factor applied to his or her case. See State v.
Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 183-84 (Tenn.1991):
The language of the subsection "within a period of forty-eight (48) months,"
would be applicable to the kinds of serial murders committed by Wayne Wil-
liams in Atlanta, by the "Son of Sam" in New York, or by Theodore "Ted"
Bundy in Florida. The language would also be applicable to multiple
murders such as those committed by Charles J. Whitman by sniper fire from
the tower on the University of Texas campus. The term "mass murderer" as
used in the statute can apply to multiple murders committed close in time or
multiple murders committed singly over a longer period of time, not to ex-
ceed four years. We are of the opinion that the statute encompasses a situa-
tion where a defendant is simultaneously tried, as in the present case, for a
series of separate but related homicides committed as part of a common
scheme or plan.
Id. See also State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 478 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1577 (1994):
In Black [supra], the defendant murdered three persons within a period of
minutes. In the present case the killings were committed by the defendant
and his accomplices within minutes, while engaged in the commission of the
robbery.... We find the trial court was not in error when it charged the
mass murder aggravating circumstance at the sentencing phase.
Id.
163. State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945, 951-55 (Tenn. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
872 (1987). The Tennessee Supreme Court has upheld application of this aggra-
vating factor when the defendant was convicted of multiple homicides at his or her
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ment for the serial-murder element of New York's first-degree
murder statute, further uncertainty exists about when proof
should be offered about the other killings. Specifically, the stat-
ute gives no guidance about whether the other alleged killings
should be proven during the accused's first-degree murder trial,
or whether, to avoid unfair prejudice to the defendant, the other
alleged killings should be proven during a separate proceeding,
much as is required under the section governing capital trials
involving previously convicted murderers. 64
Further confusion is caused by the requirements that the
killings were committed "in separate criminal transactions" and
"in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan."
A distraught father who shot and killed his three sleeping chil-
dren with a single blast from a shotgun presumably could not be
convicted under this section, because the deaths did not occur
"in separate criminal transactions." But what if the children
were killed by three shots from a single-action gun while sleep-
ing in the same bed? Of if they were sleeping in separate bed-
rooms, and the father walked from room to room and shot them
individually? Would those killings involve "separate criminal
transactions"?
The prosecution additionally would be required to prove
that the children were killed "in a similar fashion or pursuant
to a common scheme or plan." Would it be sufficient to establish
that each child was shot to death while sleeping to demonstrate
that the three were killed "in a similar fashion"? What if one of
the children awakened and was shot while trying to run from
the house? Or if the father's gun jammed and he ended up
strangling one child after shooting two?
And would a killer who routinely left bite marks on his fe-
male victims while in the course of strangling them have killed
"in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or
plan"?165 Would it matter if some of the victims were stabbed
instead of strangled, or if some had not been bitten, or if not all
capital murder trial. State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 478 (Tenn. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1577 (1994); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 183-84 (Tenn.
1991).
164. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (discussing the crimes of
Lemuel Smith).
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of the victims were female? The vagueness of the essential
terms, "in separate criminal transactions," and "committed in a
similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan," is a
troublesome aspect of this category of first-degree murder. The
deceptively simple description of this element as a "serial mur-
der" provision'6 belies several difficult issues that remain to be
resolved in its application.
(xii) The intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision
twenty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the
defendant killed such victim because such victim was, at the time
of the killing, a judge.167
Many death penalty statutes contain provisions applying to
the murder of officials who hold public office, 168 and to the mur-
der of court personnel, including judges, prosecutors, and some-
times jurors and defense lawyers.169 The final element of first-
degree murder under New York law involves the relatively nar-
row prohibition against killing a judge.170 For this provision to
apply, the victim must have been killed "because" he or she was
a judge. The judge apparently would not have to be acting in
his or her official capacity when murdered, as long as the de-
fendant committed the killing "because of the victim's status as
a judge."'7 ' However, the provision would not apply if a retired
or former judge were killed for reasons related to his or her judi-
cial activities, since the victim must be "at the time of the kill-
ing, a judge."
166. The bill memorandum prepared by the Assembly Codes Committee sim-
ply describes this element of first-degree murder as follows: "Serial Murders. This
subparagraph makes an intentional killing first degree murder when the defend-
ant has committed two or more additional intentional killings within a 24 month
period in separate criminal transactions that were committed in a similar fashion
or pursuant to a common scheme or plan." BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 3.
167. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(xii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
168. See Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 404-05 & n.148;
Lexicon of Death, supra note 52, at 148.
169. See Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 404 & n.147; Lexi-
con of Death, supra note 52, at 146-48.
170. "'Judge' means any judicial officer who is a member of or constitutes a
court, whether referred to in another provision of law as a justice or by any other
title." N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw § 1.20 (23) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
171. BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 3.
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B. The Sentencing Provisions
1. Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty
Neither this bill nor existing statutes deal adequately with
the problem of due process in the decision to seek the death pen-
alty. The individual determination made by prosecutors is
fraught with inconsistent criteria, they vary from case to case,
they'll vary from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction.
Prosecutors are subject to the vagaries of publicity and undue
influence from community pressure.
-Assemblywoman Deborah Glick 172
A first-degree murder conviction does not automatically
trigger a death-penalty hearing. The prosecution is under no
obligation to seek a capital sentence even if the facts of a case
would allow the jury to consider imposing one. 173 However, the
state is precluded from pursuing a death sentence unless "the
people.. . , within one hundred twenty days of the defendant's
arraignment upon an indictment charging the defendant with
murder in the first degree, serve upon the defendant and file
with the court ... a written notice of intention to seek the death
penalty."174 A notice of intention to seek the death penalty may
be withdrawn, but once withdrawn it may not be refiled; the
prosecution thereafter is barred from defining the case as a cap-
ital one.17
The statute leaves prosecutors' decisions about whether to
seek the death penalty in first-degree murder cases wholly un-
regulated. Such lack of direction is not uncommon; indeed, in
other capital punishment jurisdictions, prosecutors' charging
172. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 35. See remarks of Assemblyman Ed-
ward Sullivan:
I'm just wondering what is the process under which a district attorney de-
cides that this person's life is going to be put in jeopardy. I don't think there
is any process. I think that's in violation of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. I think the district attorney can sit in his
office and ffip a coin and if it's heads, he goes for the death penalty, and
that's the process. And I don't know if a court in the land is going to accept
that as due process, but maybe they will, I don't know.
Id. at 453.
173. N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAw § 400.27(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
174. Id. § 250.40(2). "For good cause shown the court may extend the period
for service and filing of the notice." Id.
175. Id. § 250.40(4).
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decisions almost never are regulated by guidelines or subject to
a centralized review and approval process. There are some lim-
ited exceptions. A directive issued by the United States Attor-
ney General requires U.S. Attorneys to secure the Attorney
General's approval before initiating a capital prosecution in fed-
eral court.'76 At the strong urging of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, 177 New Jersey prosecutors voluntarily adopted a set of
"Guidelines for Designation of Homicide Cases for Capital Pros-
ecution," although these guidelines have been criticized as
vague, unenforceable, and ineffective. 78 Charging standards
176. Scott Christianson, Corrections Law: Federal Death Penalty Protocol-
Safeguard or Window Dressing?, 32 CRIM. L. BULL. 374, 375 (1996). Under revised
procedures, established by Attorney General Reno January 27, 1995, federal prose-
cutors who plan to seek a death sentence must outline all known aggravating and
mitigating circumstances associated with the alleged offense, and supply the race
of the defendant and victim. The racial information is removed "before it is re-
viewed at Main Justice, so the reviewer won't know the race when he considers the
recommendation." 5 DOJ Alert 8, In Brief (WL Mar. 20, 1995). Critics have
pointed out that race disparities have surfaced in federal capital prosecutions.
Although three-fourths of those convicted of participating in a drug enter-
prise under the general provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 848 are white, the death
penalty provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 have been used al-
most exclusively against minorities. Of the first 37 federal death penalty
prosecutions, all but 4 were against members of minority groups. Since she
became Attorney General, Janet Reno has approved 10 death penalty prose-
cutions, all against African-Americans. That is an even greater racial dis-
parity in seeking the death penalty than exists in Alabama, Georgia,
Mississippi, Texas, or any other state.
Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on
Crime," but Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 479, 481 (1995) (foot-
notes omitted). See generally Sandra D. Jordan, Death for Drug Related Killings:
Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 79, 89 n.43 (1991) (cit-
ing requirement that United States Attorney General give prior approval to fed-
eral death penalty prosecutions).
Under the Justice Department's procedures, a committee appointed by the
United States Attorney General reviews requests to seek the death penalty made
by U.S. Attorneys in individual cases. Defense counsel are given the opportunity
to present to the committee reasons why a capital sentence should not be sought.
The committee thereafter makes a recommendation to the Attorney General con-
cerning whether the prosecution's request to seek the death penalty should be ap-
proved. The Attorney General makes the final decision, and must give written
authorization before a federal case can be prosecuted capitally. See Christianson,
supra, at 375-77 (1996).
177. State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 258, 548 A.2d 939, 955-56 (1988).
178. State v. Jackson, 128 N.J. 136, 137-58, 607 A.2d 974, 974-85 (1992) (Han-
dler, J., dissenting) (describing, and criticizing prosecutors' capital charging
guidelines).
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and guidelines for potentially capital cases have been imple-
mented by other prosecutors, 179 but they are rare,180 and no ju-
risdiction requires or enforces capital charging procedures by
statute.
Prosecutorial decisionmaking is a major source of arbitrari-
ness in several states' administration of death penalty laws.18'
There is no reason to believe that New York will be any differ-
ent. To the contrary, the conditions that exist in New York
could hardly be more conducive to producing inconsistent
prosecutorial charging decisions. New York City, with its teem-
ing population and rich heterogeneity, differs dramatically from
the rest of the State. Although upstate New York has several
urban centers, it predominantly is populated by small cities and
towns, and it has comparatively modest racial and ethnic
diversity. 182
179. See Daniel E. Lundgren & Mark L. Krotoski, The Racial Justice Act of
1994-Undermining Enforcement of the Death Penalty Without Promoting Racial
Justice, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 655, 674 & n.90 (1995) (describing procedures used
in the Los Angles District Attorney's Office before decision is made about whether
to prosecute a murder charge capitally); Developments in the Law, Race and the
Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1472, 1550-51 (1988) (generally discussing
prosecutorial charging guidelines).
180. Cf McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 333-34 & n.9 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); with id. at 357-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing Georgia capi-
tal punishment law for having no guidelines to regulate prosecutorial charging
discretion in potentially capital cases).
181. See BARRY A. NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE
DEATH PENALTY 120-44 (1987); RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 178-80 (1991); Baldus et al., Symposium on Current Death Penalty Issues:
Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Expe-
rience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983) at 710 n.131 [hereinafter Baldus,
Comparative Review] ("the leading source of race-of-victim discrimination in Geor-
gia's death-sentencing system for defendants convicted of murder at trial is clearly
the [prosecutor's] decision to advance the case to a penalty trial."); Leigh B.
Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27 (1988); Raymond Paternoster,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based
Discrimination, 18 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 437 (1984); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L.
Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAw & Soc'y REV.
587, 591-92 (1985).
182. See THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, 1993 NEw
YORK STATE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 120 (18th ed. 1993) (reporting New York's
1992 population to be nearly 18,000,000, and showing racial and ethnic (non-His-
panic white, non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic) breakdown of pop-
ulation by congressional district, and reflecting relative diversity of population in
the New York City/Long Island area versus upstate New York).
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In other states, prosecutors located in rural areas generally
have been more likely to seek the death penalty than prosecu-
tors in urban centers. Homicides, unfortunately, are not rare
events in cities, and different community and criminal justice
system pressures often are at work than exist in smaller
towns.183 Studies also consistently have revealed racial dispari-
ties in the prosecution of capital cases, 84 although neither the
Supreme Court'8 5 nor most state courts 86 have been receptive
to systemic challenges to death-penalty laws based on such evi-
dence. Absent statewide charging policies or a centralized
mechanism for reviewing and regulating prosecutorial charging
discretion, idiosyncratic differences between prosecutors' offices
inevitably will produce uneven capital prosecution patterns
across the state.
For example, the five district attorneys serving in New
York City, where over eighty percent of the state's criminal
183. See Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of
Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 27, 64-66 (1984); William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and
Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY. 1067, 1072-75 (1983); Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of
Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY. 754 (1983); William J. Bowers & Glen Pierce, Arbitrariness and Dis-
crimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 601,
616-19 (1980).
184. Homicides involving white victims are most likely to be prosecuted as
capital crimes, and especially cases involving white victims and African-American
defendants. These race effects remain even after statistical controls are imposed
to take account of nonracial factors that could explain the differences. See Baldus,
Comparative Review, supra note 181, at 709-10 n.131; Gross & Mauro, supra note
183, at 54-92; Michael L. Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the
Death Penalty, 46 Am. Soc. REv. 918, 922-26 (1981); Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REV.
456 (1981).
185. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
186. David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Dis-
crimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention, Detec-
tion, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 375 n.69 (1994) [hereinafter
Baldus, Racial Discrimination] (collecting cases). "Two state courts, however,
have rejected McCleskey-New Jersey, in the death sentencing context, and Min-
nesota, in the context of noncapital sentencing. Also, a three-person minority of
the seven-member Florida Supreme Court has rejected it." (footnotes omitted) (cit-
ing State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1108-10 (N.J. 1992); State v. Russell, 477
N.W.2d 886, 888 n.2 (Minn. 1991); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 465-68 (Fla.
1992) (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 398 (1993)).
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homicides are committed, 8 7 have expressed widely divergent
views about their willingness to seek the death penalty in first-
degree murder cases. The Bronx District Attorney, citing his
involvement in a murder prosecution that resulted in the con-
viction of an innocent man, announced that he had no present
intention of asking for a sentence of death in the first-degree
murder cases prosecuted by his office. l88 The chief prosecutors
187. Between 1984 and 1994, the following numbers and proportions of
murders and nonnegligent manslaughters occurred in New York City and the rest
of New York State.
New York City Non-New York City Total NY State
1984 1,446(81.4%) 331(18.6%) 1,777
1985 1,384(82.0%) 304(18.0%) 1,688
1986 1,582(82.9%) 327(17.1%) 1,909
1987 1,672(83.3%) 335(16.7%) 2,007
1988 1,895(84.6%) 344(15.4%) 2,239
1989 1,904(84.5%) 349(15.5%) 2,253
1990 2,245(86.1%) 361(13.9%) 2,606
1991 2,154(84.2%) 403(15.8%) 2,557
1992 1,995(83.8%) 387(16.2%) 2,382
1993 1,946(81.6%) 440(18.4%) 2,386
1994 1,561(78.8%) 419(21.2%) 1,980
N.Y. STATE DMiSION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1994 CRIME AND JUSTICE AN-
NUAL REPORT 8 (1995); N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1993
CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1994).
188. Adam Nossiter, In New York City, a Mixed Response to Law from Prose-
cutors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at B5; Rayner Pike, DA Vows Not to Seek Death
Penalties, TIMES UNION (Albany), Mar 9, 1995 at B-4; Adam Nossiter, Balking
Prosecutors: Door Opens to Death Row Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at
27. About 21.5% of murders and manslaughters committed in New York in 1993
occurred in the Bronx. Nossiter (Mar. 8, 1995), supra. The Bronx District Attor-
ney is Robert T. Johnson. After a police officer was shot to death in the Bronx in
March of 1996, Mr. Johnson announced that he would evaluate each first-degree
murder case carefully before reaching a decision about whether to pursue a capital
sentence. "[H]e said his opposition to the death penalty applied 'in general,' not
necessarily in every case." Jan Hoffman, Prosecutor in Bronx, Under Fire, Softens
Stance against Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at Al. Not satisfied that
Johnson in fact would exercise his discretion appropriately, Governor Pataki or-
dered him removed from the prosecution of the case involving the alleged murder
of the police officer, and replaced him with Attorney General Dennis Vacco. Rachel
L. Swarns, A Killing in the Bronx: Governor Removes Bronx Prosecutor From Mur-
der Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al. Johnson announced that his office
would assist the Attorney General's efforts to prosecute the case, but he declared
his intention "to challenge [the governor's] actions in a court of law on another
day." Excerpts From Messages by Governor and the District Attorney, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1996, at B2.
In July 1996, Bronx County Supreme Court Justice Howard R. Silver upheld
the Governor's authority to remove District Attorney Johnson from the case.
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in Brooklyn, 18 9  Manhattan, 90  and Queens' 91  have been
unenthusiastic about the new capital punishment law, although
each has left the door open to seek death sentences in appropri-
ate cases. Only the Staten Island District Attorney, who repre-
sents a district with just a fraction of the murders conmitted in
the other New York City districts, has supported the death pen-
alty without reservation for particular crimes. 192 Elsewhere in
the state, district attorneys show mixed support for the death
penalty,193 and considerable variation can be expected in their
decisions to seek death sentences in potentially capital trials.
Daniel Wise, Removal of Prosecutor Sustained: Bronx Capital Case In Vacco's Con-
trol, N.Y. L.J., July 11, 1996, at 1. See Matter of Johnson v. Pataki (Supreme
Court, 1st Judic. Dist., Bronx Co., July 10, 1996, (reprinted in N.Y. L.J., July 12,
1996, at 27)). The defendant, Angel Diaz, was indicted for first-degree murder,
and Attorney General Vacco announced that a death sentence would be sought.
See Wise, supra, at 1. Mr. Johnson declared his intention to appeal the Supreme
Court's ruling that authorized his removal. Id. at 4. However, on September 5,
1996, Angel Diaz was found hanged in his Rykers Island jail cell, the victim of an
apparent suicide. Rayner Pike, Suspect in Cop Murder Hangs Self in Jail, TIMES
UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Sept. 6, 1996, at B2.
189. In Brooklyn, a spokesman for District Attorney Charles J. Hynes said
that Mr. Hynes opposed the death penalty but that he was "prepared to ful-
fill his responsibilities," adding that "he will follow the law." Mr. Hynes
thinks the "appropriate" penalty for murder is life in prison without parole,
said the spokesman, Patrick Clark.
Nossiter (Mar. 8, 1995), supra note 188, at B5. Approximately 30.1% of New
York's murders and manslaughters in 1993 were committed in Brooklyn. Id.
190. "District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau of Manhattan, commenting on
the new law through a spokeswoman, would only say: 'I understand that it gives
the district attorney the option of either seeking the death penalty or life imprison-
ment without parole. I intend to exercise that discretion wisely.'" Id. "In the past,
[Morgenthau] has written strongly worded denunciations of the death penalty."
Nossiter (Mar. 11, 1995), supra note 188, at 27. See also Pike, supra note 188, at
B4. In 1993, roughly 17.5% of the state's murders and manslaughters were com-
mitted in Manhattan. Nossiter (Mar. 8, 1995), supra note 188, at B5.
191. "District Attorney Richard A. Brown of Queens... expressed doubt about
the death penalty's usefulness as a deterrent, and its cost. But he also said that
'whether one is for or against it is no longer the issue,' adding that 'the Legislature
has spoken and I have a responsibility to carry out their mandate."' Id. Queens
accounted for about 11.4% of the murders and manslaughters committed in New
York in 1993. Id.
192. "Of the top prosecutors in the city, only District Attorney William L.
Murphy of Staten Island expressed a firm desire to make use of the new [death
penalty] law 'in an appropriate case.'" Id. About 25 murders and manslaughters,
or just 1% of the state's total, were committed in Staten Island in 1993. Id.
193. New York Enacts Capital Punishment, THE NAT'L L. J., Mar. 20, 1995, at
A8 ("A March 3 New York Law Journal survey showed that 44 of the state's 62
DAs favored the death penalty, though half either said it will not deter crime or
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2. Guilty Pleas
I was just saying that of the options that are offered in your
bill, one is that the person would declare him or herself guilty. In
doing so that person would be... escaping the death penalty.
-Senator Olga Mendez 194
fflou can not pled [sic] guilty to the death penalty; but if you
are going to plead guilty to anything else, you've got to get the
consent of the D.A. The D.A. does not have to accept your plea of
guilty to 20-25 years to life or to life without parole. He doesn't
have to accept it.... [T]he person under law can not plead guilty
to the death penalty. But other than that, you have to have the
consent of the D.A.
-Senator Dale Volker 195
So, the ordinary life sentence is available in a murder one
case under this bill only if the jury, in essence, fails in its task of
selecting one of the other two sentences, . . . or if the defendant
forgoes his or her right to a trial by jury and pleads guilty....
So, in order for one of the three lawful sentencing options to
come to pass, the jury, in whom we place such trust, has to fail in
its task or the defendant has to give up his or her Constitutional
right to defend himself or herself at trial.
This, I submit, is a serious distortion of the sentencing pro-
cess. I would submit it deprives the defendant of due process....
it deprives the defendant of a fair trial.. . , and I would argue, my
colleagues, it is a serious defect in this bill.., that will ultimately
result in its being declared unconstitutional.
-Assemblyman Richard Gottfried196
were unsure whether it will."); Michael Hill, Death Penalty a Political Hot Potato,
ASSOCIATED PRESS release, Apr 17, 1995) (on file with author) (providing list of
New York's district attorneys and their personal views about the death penalty);
Michael Hill, Upstate Prosecutors Support Death Penalty; But Might Lack Oppor-
tunity, ASSOCIATED PRESS release, Apr. 17, 1995 (on fie with author).
With his two co-authors, retired New York Court of Appeals Judge Stewart F.
Hancock, Jr., has argued that the lack of regulation of capital charging discretion
is a fatal flaw in the New York statute under the state constitution. Stewart F.
Hancock, Jr. et al., Race, Unbridled Discretion, and the State Constitutional Valid-
ity of New York's Death Penalty Statute-Two Questions, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1545
(1996).
194. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1999.
195. Id. at 2000.
196. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 204.
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The New York Constitution forbids criminal defendants
from waiving a jury trial in all cases "in which the crime
charged may be punishable by death... ."197 In keeping with
this constitutional provision, prior law flatly prohibited guilty
pleas to first-degree murder.198 The new law creates an excep-
tion to this general prohibition: "provided, however, that a de-
fendant may enter such a plea with both the permission of the
court and the consent of the people when the agreed upon sen-
tence" is other than death, i.e., a prison sentence of twenty to
twenty-five years to life, or life without possibility of parole.199
It is questionable whether this exception can be reconciled
with the state constitutional bar against waiving trial by jury.
Even if the parties and the judge agree that a sentence other
than death will be imposed, a defendant who pleads guilty to
first-degree murder nevertheless does forgo a jury trial for a
charged "crime" that "may be punishable by death." The consti-
tutional prohibition against waiving a jury trial relates to capi-
tal crimes, and not just to cases involving capital crimes that
actually result in a death sentence. Hence, a literal reading of
the constitutional provision would forbid all pleas of guilty to
first-degree murder. But even if the state constitution is con-
strued to permit guilty pleas to first-degree murder as long as
the defendant actually is not punished by death, other constitu-
tional problems plague the statute's guilty plea provisions.
The sentencing options in first-degree murder cases differ
according to whether a defendant enters a plea of not guilty,
197. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. This constitutional prohibition applied to all fel-
ony cases until 1938, when the state constitution was amended to permit the
waiver of jury trials in all criminal cases except those in which the crime may be
punishable by death:
Prior to the adoption.., of this provision, it was not possible for a defendant
in a criminal case to waive his right to a trial by jury .... The basis of these
decisions was that the right to a trial by jury was so fundamental and so
essential to the protection of the defendant's rights that it could not be
waived. Indeed, the present constitutional amendment carries forth that
philosophy to the extent that it makes no provision for waiver of a right to
trial by jury in capital cases.
People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297, 300, 229 N.E.2d 419, 420, 282
N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (1967) (citations omitted). See also N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAw
§ 320.10 Commentary (McKinney 1993).
198. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney Supp.
1996).
199. Id. §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(viii).
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whether the prosecution files a notice of intention to seek the
death penalty, and whether a plea of guilty is tendered and ac-
cepted. If a defendant pleads not guilty, and the prosecutor opts
not to seek a death sentence, then the trial judge must impose
one of two sentences on the defendant's conviction for first-de-
gree murder: regular life (twenty to twenty-five years to life), or
LWOP. 200 When a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder
following a plea of not guilty and the death penalty is sought,
the jury is instructed that it may return one of two sentencing
verdicts: death or LWOP. If the jury is unable to arrive at a
unanimous sentencing verdict, then the judge must sentence
the defendant to regular life. 20 1 Finally, a defendant who pleads
guilty to first-degree murder cannot be sentenced to death; only
a sentence of regular life or LWOP may be imposed. As previ-
ously noted, a defendant's guilty plea may be accepted only with
the concurrence of the prosecutor and the approval of the
court.
20 2
As a result of these sentencing provisions, only defendants
who plead not guilty, and thereby exercising both their right to
be tried by a jury of their peers and their right against self-
incrimination, expose themselves to the risk of capital punish-
ment. The statute guarantees that defendants convicted on
pleas of guilty will not be punished by death. The Supreme
Court declared a similar sentencing scheme unconstitutional in
United States v. Jackson.20 3 The Federal Kidnapping Act,
which was at issue in Jackson, authorized capital punishment
for the crime of kidnapping whenever the victim was not re-
leased unharmed, but only "if the verdict of the jury shall so
recommend .... " 204 As the Court explained, "[t]he statute sets
200. Id. § 400.27(1).
201. Id. §§ 400.27(10), 400.27(11)(c)-(e). These sentencing options are dis-
cussed in greater detail infra notes 362-86 text and accompanying notes.
202. N.Y. CRiM. Paoc. LAw §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii).
203. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
204. Id. 570 (quoting the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)). The
Federal Kidnapping Act... provides:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate commerce, any person who
has been unlawfully ... kidnaped ... and held for ransom.., or otherwise
... shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been liber-
ated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not
imposed.
[Vol. 17:41
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forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty upon a de-
fendant who waives the right to jury trial or upon one who
pleads guilty."205 These sentencing provisions created the fol-
lowing problem:
[Tihe defendant who abandons the right to contest his guilt before
a jury is assured that he cannot be executed; the defendant ingen-
uous to seek a jury acquittal stands forewarned that, if the jury
finds him guilty and does not wish to spare his life, he will die....
The inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to discour-
age assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty
and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a
jury trial.20 6
In one respect, the New York sentencing scheme can be
even more disadvantageous for defendants who plead not guilty
than was the legislation at issue in Jackson. Defendants con-
victed of first-degree murder on guilty pleas under New York
law can be sentenced either to regular life or LWOP, and never
can be sentenced to death. Yet, when the prosecution seeks the
death penalty following a defendant's plea of not guilty to first-
degree murder, not only is the maximum authorized punish-
ment death, but the jury is denied the option of returning a reg-
ular life sentence; the alternative authorized sentencing verdict
is LWOP.27 Thus, not only is the statutory maximum sentence
Id. at 570-71.
205. Id. at 571.
206. Id. at 581 (footnote omitted). The Court further explained that "the evil
in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers
but simply that it needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be inherently
coercive in order that it be held to impose an impermissible burden upon the asser-
tion of a constitutional right." Id. at 583 (emphasis added).
Various state death penalty schemes have been invalidated under the author-
ity of Jackson. See Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) (summarily re-
versing judgment upholding death sentence in State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245
A.2d 181 (1968)); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v.
Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469, 627 P.2d 922 (1981). See also Commonwealth v. Co-
lon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150, 163, 470 N.E.2d 116, 124 (1984) (relying on state consti-
tutional principles analogous to Jackson rule to invalidate Massachusetts' death
penalty legislation, under which "the death penalty may be imposed, if at all, only
after a trial by jury. Those who plead guilty in cases in which death would be a
possible sentence after trial thereby avoid the risk of being put to death. The inev-
itable consequence is that defendants are discouraged from asserting their right
not to plead guilty and their right to demand a trial by jury.").
207. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. A regular life sentence
can be imposed when the prosecutor seeks the death penalty and the defendant
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enhanced from LWOP to death for defendants who plead not
guilty in first-degree murder prosecutions in which the death
penalty is being pursued, but the minimum verdict option in-
creases from regular life to LWOP.208
This sentencing scheme clearly imposes a cost on defend-
ants charged with first-degree murder who plead not guilty and
exercise their right to trial by jury. In a case involving a related
issue, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated a statute that
required a defendant to consent to a trial without a jury in order
to become eligible for youthful offender treatment. In reliance
on Jackson, the Court observed that "a procedure which offers
an individual a reward for waiving a fundamental constitu-
tional right, or imposes a harsher penalty for asserting it, may
not be sustained."20 9
has pleaded not guilty to first-degree murder only when the jury is unable to reach
unanimous agreement on one of the two sentencing verdicts available to it: death,
or LWOP.
208. The increased maximum sentence of death which is available to defend-
ants who do not plead guilty may pose the more serious constitutional problem
than the increased minimum sentence. In Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212
(1978), the Supreme Court distinguished Jackson on several grounds, and upheld
a state statute that prohibited guilty pleas to murder indictments, but allowed
pleas of non vult or nolo contendere. On acceptance of one of the latter pleas, the
judge could sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or a term of up to 30
years. Defendants convicted of first-degree murder following pleas of not guilty
and trials by jury faced mandatory life imprisonment. The defendant in Corbitt
relied on Jackson to argue that the statutory sentencing scheme prejudiced de-
fendants who pleaded not guilty and were convicted of first-degree murder. The
Supreme Court identified:
substantial differences between this case and Jackson .... The principal
difference is that the pressures to forgo trial and to plead to the charge in
this case are not what they were in Jackson. First, the death penalty, which
is "unique in its severity and irrevocability," is not involved here.... Fur-
thermore, in Jackson, any risk of suffering the maximum penalty could be
avoided by pleading guilty. Here, although the punishment when a jury
finds a defendant guilty of first-degree murder is life imprisonment, the risk
of that punishment is not completely avoided by pleading non vult because
the judge accepting the plea has the authority to impose a life term. New
Jersey does not reserve the maximum punishment for those who insist on a
jury trial.
Id. at 217 (citation and footnote omitted).
209. People v. Michael A.C., 27 N.Y.2d 79, 85, 261 N.E.2d 620, 624, 313
N.Y.S.2d 695, 701 (1970). See also People v. Black, 34 A.D.2d 999, 312 N.Y.S.2d
658 (1970), affd 30 N.Y.2d 593, 281 N.E.2d 849, 330 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1972). In
Black, the defendant pleaded guilty to murder in 1968, and was sentenced to 15-
years to life imprisonment. He subsequently challenged the validity of his guilty
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This principle remains implicated even though the statute
conditions the defendant's ability to tender a guilty plea to first-
degree murder on "both the permission of the court and the con-
sent of the people when the agreed upon sentence is either"
LWOP or regular life.210 Arguably, this condition creates a stat-
utory analogue to the plea-bargaining discretion that prosecu-
tors enjoy in all cases: only when a prosecutor determines that
offense and offender circumstances make a case inappropriate
for capital punishment will defendants be given the option of
pleading guilty to first-degree murder. Under this construction,
defendants in cases that truly are death-worthy cannot com-
plain about not being given the choice to plead guilty, and de-
fendants who are offered the chance to plead guilty simply
benefit from the prosecutor's discretion to remove a case from
death-penalty eligibility. No defendant faces undue pressure to
plead guilty, or to forgo the right to trial by jury, because entry
of a guilty plea is a privilege conditioned on the prosecutor's
acquiescence.
But this argument is strained. In any particular case, a
prosecutor may insist on seeking the maximum punishment for
a crime or, if persuaded that the case circumstances are appro-
priate, may decline to seek the maximum punishment on the
condition that the accused pleads guilty. If a defendant relin-
quishes his or her rights to plead not guilty and to be tried
before a jury to gain more lenient treatment, these concessions
would involve only the normal "'give-and-take' of plea bargain-
ing."21" However, the Jackson problem is not so easily avoided
under the death penalty statute.
plea, alleging that since the death penalty could only be imposed following a plea
of not guilty, New York's capital punishment statute violated Jackson. The Appel-
late Division agreed that "[u]nder the terms of our statute the death penalty may
be imposed, when appropriate, only upon a jury verdict of guilty," and that "[i]n
Jackson the Supreme Court held that under such a statutory scheme the death
penalty is unconstitutional since it needlessly encourages the taking of guilty
pleas." Id. at 659. It nevertheless ruled that the defendant had failed to establish
that his guilty plea thereby was rendered involuntary. Cf Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief order. People v.
Black, 30 N.Y.2d 593, 281 N.E.2d 849, 330 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1972).
210. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney Supp.
1996).
211. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
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The sentencing provisions represent a legislative promise
that all defendants who plead not guilty-by virtue of that fact
alone-are ineligible for a regular life sentence, 212 and they face
the threat of capital punishment if the district attorney chooses
to seek that sanction. The legislation further guarantees de-
fendants that by tendering a guilty plea to first-degree murder
with the approval of the prosecutor and the judge, they not only
avoid the risk of capital punishment, but they also become eligi-
ble for consideration for a prison sentence of twenty to twenty-
five years to life. Individual case circumstances cannot alter the
maximum and minimum sentences available to defendants who
plead guilty and not guilty. The sentencing ranges are deter-
mined by the type of plea entered. In this respect the statute is
inflexible, and permits no "give and take." The Jackson issue is
not skirted simply because the prosecutor and the trial judge
must concur that an accused's plea of guilty to first-degree mur-
der should be accepted. 213 The statute still defines harsher pun-
ishment options for defendants who insist on pleading not
guilty. In operation with the state constitution, it also denies
defendants the option of pleading guilty in cases in which the
prosecution demands the death penalty. These provisions thus
prohibit defendants' formal acknowledgment of guilt and ad-
mission of responsibility from being considered by the sentenc-
ing jury in mitigation of punishment.
212. A regular life sentence of 20- to 25-years to life is not available to the jury
as a sentencing verdict; such a sentence can be imposed only if the jury is not able
to agree unanimously that a sentence of death or LWOP should be imposed. See
supra note 199 and accompanying text.
213. The Jackson court observed that "a criminal defendant has [no] absolute
right to have his guilty plea accepted by the court." United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570, 584 (1968) (quoting Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962)). In
Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436 P.2d 18 (1968), the Nevada Supreme Court relied
on Jackson to invalidate a capital sentencing statute which authorized the death
penalty for rape only if the jury so directed, meaning that defendants who were
convicted following pleas of guilty or following bench trials in which they waived
trial by jury could not be sentenced to death. The court acknowledged that the
statute at issue required both the consent of the prosecution and the approval of
the trial judge before a defendant was permitted to waive a jury and be tried before
a judge. Id., at 30 n.5, 436 P.2d at 23 n.5.
[ ol. 17:41
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3. The Aggravating Factors
Like the vast majority of death penalty laws across the
country,214 the New York statute requires that aggravating and
mitigating factors pertaining to the crime and the offender be
taken into account before a capital sentencing decision is
made.215 Unlike many other jurisdictions,216 only aggravating
circumstances defined by statute can be considered under New
York's capital sentencing law.21 7 Fourteen different aggravat-
ing factors can be considered for sentencing purposes. The sen-
tencing provisions incorporate by reference the twelve types of
first degree murder defined by the Penal Law.218 The jury is
allowed to consider as aggravating factors only "those [alleged
murder counts] proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial."21 9
To recap briefly, the elements of first-degree murder, which can
double as aggravating sentencing factors, involve different of-
fense and offender circumstances. The former category includes
214. James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The Sen-
tencing Provisions in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 CIUM. L. BULL. 19, 42-52
(1995)[hereinafter Sentencing Provisons]; James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Ag-
gravating Circumstances and Capital Punishment Law: Rhetoric or Real Re-
forms?, 29 CRIM. L. BULL. 467, 492 n.128 (1993)[hereinafter Aggravating
Circumstances].
215. See infra notes 387-402 and accompanying text on the specific provisions
regarding the jury's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors under the
New York statute.
216. Aggravating Circumstances, supra note 214, at 496 & n.145.
217. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw §§ 400.27(3), 400.27(7) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
The former provision unequivocally provides that, with the exception of the two
statutorily-defined sentencing aggravators (see infra notes 230-68 and accompany-
ing text), "the only aggravating factors that the jury may consider are those proven
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and no other aggravating factors may be con-
sidered." Other provisions of New York law authorize victim impact evidence to be
offered prior to sentencing in felony cases, including criminal homicide cases. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAw § 380.50(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). These provisions clearly are
not intended to apply in capital cases, and expressly contemplate that the trial
judge is the sentencing authority. Id. § 380.50(3). The Supreme Court has ruled
that victim impact evidence may be admitted at capital sentencing hearings.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). However, the admission of such evidence
would be wholly inconsistent with New York's capital sentencing statute, and the
limitation that the sentencing jury may only consider evidence of aggravating fac-
tors enumerated in the legislation.
218. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(i)-(xii) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra
notes 50-170 and accompanying text.
219. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 400.27(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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both victim characteristics (police officers, 220 designated peace
officers, 221 correctional employees, 222 crime witnesses and their
immediate families, 22 and judges 224) and other characteristics
of the crime (murder for hire,225 murder committed during
named felonies,226 the slaying of multiple victims during the
same criminal transaction,227 torture murder,228 and serial mur-
der 229). First-degree murders defined by offender characteris-
tics include intentional killings by life-term prisoners, 230 and by
individuals with a prior murder conviction.231
Two additional aggravating factors can be proven during
the penalty-phase trial, provided that the prosecution serves
appropriate notice "within a reasonable time prior to trial."232
The penalty-phase aggravators must be proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and established to the unanimous satisfaction of
the jury.233 Both the prosecution and the defendant may offer
evidence during the penalty trial concerning the existence of the
two penalty-phase aggravating circumstances, "subject to the
220. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra
notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
221. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(ii). See supra notes 65-72 and accompa-
nying text.
222. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(iii). See supra notes 74-77 and accompa-
nying text.
223. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(v). See supra notes 105-11 and accompa-
nying text.
224. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(xii). See supra notes 167-71 and accom-
panying text.
225. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(vi). See supra notes 112-15 and accompa-
nying text.
226. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(vii). See supra notes 116-28 and accom-
panying text.
227. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(viii). See supra notes 129-33 and accom-
panying text.
228. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(x). See supra notes 144-60 and accompa-
nying text.
229. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(xi). See supra notes 161-66 and accompa-
nying text.
230. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(iv). See supra notes 78-104 and accompa-
nying text.
231. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(ix). See supra notes 134-43 and accompa-
nying text.
232. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(7)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
233. Id. § 400.27(7)(c).
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rules governing admission of evidence in the trial of a criminal
action."234
One of the special penalty-phase aggravating factors ap-
plies to first-degree murder committed through an act of terror-
ism. 235 The other applies to offenders with two or more
qualifying criminal convictions within the ten-year period pre-
ceding the commission of the first-degree murder for which the
defendant is being sentenced. 23 6
The terrorism aggravating circumstance provides as
follows:
The people may present evidence at the sentencing proceed-
ing, to the extent such evidence could not have been presented by
the people at trial, to prove that the crime of murder in the first
degree for which the defendant was convicted was committed in
furtherance of and after substantial planning and premeditation
to commit an act of terrorism. For purposes of this section, "terror-
ism" means activities that involve a violent act or acts dangerous
to human life that are in violation of the criminal laws of this state
and are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, in-
fluence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
affect the conduct of a government by murder, assassination or
kidnapping. The defendant's commission of the crime of murder
in the first degree through an act of terrorism, shall, if proven at
the sentencing proceeding, constitute an aggravating factor.237
This provision is modeled closely after federal law defining an
"act of terrorism"238 and after a statutory aggravating factor
component of federal death penalty law.23 9 On its face, it suffers
from significant vagueness problems. Although an attempt has
been made to define "terrorism," the defining terms do little to
234. Id.
235. Id. § 400.27(7)(a).
236. Id. § 400.27(7)(b).
237. Id. § 400.27(7)(a) (emphasis added).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 3077(1) (Supp. 1995) (An "act of terrorism' means an activity
that - (A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a viola-
tion of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of
any State; and (B) appears to be intended - (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.").
239. Id. § 3592(c)(9) (Supp. 1995) ("The defendant committed the offense after
substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person or commit
an act of terrorism.").
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add precision or clarity.240 How criminal acts might be intended
to "intimidate" or "coerce" a "civilian population," or "influence"
the "policy of a government" by "intimidation" or "coercion," or
"affect" the "conduct of a government" by murder, assassination,
or kidnapping remains highly obscure. Even if the notable
vagueness problems can be surmounted, first-degree murders
"committed in furtherance of and after substantial planning
and premeditation to commit an act of terrorism" are likely to
occur very infrequently, so the terrorism aggravating circum-
stance almost certainly rarely will be invoked.
The same cannot be said about the penalty-phase aggravat-
ing factor relating to prior criminal convictions. That circum-
stance applies under the following conditions:
The people may present evidence at the sentencing proceed-
ing to prove that in the ten year period prior to the commission of
the crime of murder in the first degree for which the defendant was
convicted, the defendant has previously been convicted of two or
more offenses committed on different occasions; provided, that
each such offense shall be either (i) a class A felony offense other
than one defined in article two hundred twenty of the penal law, a
class B felony offense specified in paragraph (a) of subdivision one
of section 70.02 of the penal law, or a felony offense under the pe-
nal law a necessary element of which involves either the use or at-
tempted use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or the
intentionalinfliction of or the attempted intentional infliction of se-
rious physical serious injury or death, or (ii) an offense under the
laws of another state or of the United States punishable by a term
of imprisonment of more than one year a necessary element of
which involves either the use or attempted use or threatened use of
a deadly weapon or the intentional infliction of serious physical
injury or death. For the purpose of this paragraph, the term
"deadly weapon" shall have the meaning set forth in subdivision
twelve of section 10.00 of the penal law. In calculating the ten
year period under this paragraph, any period of time during
which the defendant was incarcerated for any reason between the
time of commission of any of the prior felony offenses and the time
of commission of the crime of murder in the first degree shall be
excluded and such ten year period shall be extended by a period or
240. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes
151 and 156-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of vagueness in the context
of capital sentencing statutes.
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periods equal to the time served under such incarceration. The
defendant's conviction of two or more such offenses shall, if
proven at the sentencing proceeding, constitute an aggravating
factor.241
This aggravating circumstance requires proof of two or
more convictions of the designated crimes within the ten-year
period preceding the offender's commission of (not conviction
for) the first-degree murder for which sentence is being consid-
ered. The prior crimes must have been committed on different
occasions. All time the offender spent incarcerated between the
convictions for the prior offenses and the commission of the
first-degree murder is excluded from the ten-year limitation pe-
riod. The prior convictions must involve the following classes of
crimes:
(1) A class A felony other than a controlled substance of-
fense defined under article 220 of the Penal Law. Class A felo-
nies carry a maximum punishment of life imprisonment or
death.2 42 Minimum sentences range between 3 to 8 years for
class A-II felonies, 24 and 15-years to life for class A-I felonies
other than first-degree murder, which has a mandatory mini-
mum sentence of 20- to 25-years. 24 Convictions for class A fel-
ony controlled substances offenses are not considered under this
provision, 245 nor, presumably, are first-degree conspiracy 246 or
attempts247 to engage in class A felony controlled substance of-
241. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(7)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (emphasis
added).
242. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 60.05(2), 60.06, 70.00(2)(a) (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
1996).
243. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(3)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1987).
244. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(3)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
245. Controlled substances offenses that are included in article 220 of the Pe-
nal Law, and which are class A felonies, include criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the second degree and first degree (Id. §§ 220.18, 220.21), and crimi-
nal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree and first degree (N.Y. PENAL
LAw §§ 220.41, 220.43 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996)).
246. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 105.17 (McKinney 1987). ("A person is guilty of con-
spiracy in the first degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a class A
felony be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more
persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such
conduct. Conspiracy in the first degree is a class A-I felony.").
247. Id. § 110.05 (-An attempt to commit a crime is a: (1) Class A-I felony
when the crime attempted is the A-I felony of murder in the first degree, criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree or criminal sale of a con-
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fenses. 248 In addition to convictions for first-degree conspiracy
and attempts to commit class A felonies, the other convictions
that qualify under this section include first-degree murder,249
second-degree murder,25o first-degree kidnapping, 251 and first-
degree arson.252
(2) A class B violent felony offense specified in Penal Law
section 70.02(1)(a). Convictions for the following crimes are in-
cluded within this category: attempted second-degree murder,
attempted first-degree kidnapping, attempted first-degree ar-
son, first-degree manslaughter, first-degree rape, first-degree
sodomy, first-degree aggravated sexual abuse, second-degree
kidnapping, first-degree burglary, second-degree arson, first-de-
gree robbery, first-degree criminal possession of a dangerous
weapon, first-degree criminal use of a firearm, aggravated as-
sault upon a peace officer, and first-degree intimidating a victim
or witness.253
(3) A felony under New York law (or a crime under the laws
of another state or the United States punishable by imprison-
ment of more than one year) "a necessary element of which in-
volves either the use or attempted use or threatened use of a
deadly weapon or the intentional infliction of serious physical
injury or death." This provision includes convictions for crimes
"a necessary element of which" involves the actual, attempted,
or threatened use of a deadly weapon,254 or the intentional in-
trolled substance in the first degree; (2) Class A-II felony when the crime at-
tempted is a class A-I felony.").
248. The statute does not explicitly exclude conspiracy to engage in controlled
substances offenses, nor attempts to commit controlled substances offenses, but
this presumably was the legislative intent. See BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43,
at 8 (indicating that the class A felony convictions excluded from consideration for
this aggravating factor are "a drug offense as defined in Article 220 of the Penal
Law or any attempt to commit or conspiracy to commit such an offense").
249. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
250. Id. § 125.25.
251. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.25 (McKinney 1987).
252. Id. § 150.20.
253. Id. § 70.02(1)(a).
254. The death penalty provision incorporates by reference the definition of
"deadly weapon" set forth in N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00(12) (McKinney Supp. 1996),
which is as follows: "'Deadly weapon' means any loaded weapon from which a shot,
readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be dis-
charged, or a switchblade knife, gravity knife, pilum ballistic knife, dagger, billy,
blackjack, or metal knuckles." See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(7)(b) (McKinney
Supp. 996).
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fliction of serious physical injury 255 or death. Accordingly, the
focus is on the statutory definition of the crimes, rather than on
how the crimes actually were committed.256 Several crimes re-
quire proof of the intentional infliction of serious physical injury
or death, including first-degree murder 257 and second-degree
murder 258 (which are also class A felonies, and, thus, are al-
ready accounted for under this aggravating circumstance 2 9),
first-degree manslaughter,260 aggravated assault upon a police
officer or peace officer, 261 specific subcategories of first-degree
assault 262 and second-degree assault,263 first-degree tampering
with a witness,264 and first-degree intimidating a victim or wit-
ness.265 Few crimes in New York appear to include as an ele-
ment that the offender actually, attempted, or threatened to use
255. "Serious physical injury" is defined in N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00(10) (Mc-
Kinney 1987) to mean: "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death,
or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impair-
ment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily or-
gan." This definition, unlike the definition of "deadly weapon," is not incorporated
by reference into the death penalty law. See supra note 254.
256. BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 8.
To be a "necessary element" of an offense, the specified conduct must appear
on the face of a subdivision of a Penal Law statute for which the defendant
had been previously convincted. To give just one example, a defendant con-
victed under subdivision (1) of Section 120.10 of the Penal Law (first degree
assault) could have that conviction included as a potential predicate convic-
tion for purposes of subdivision (7), since subdivision (1) of that statute in-
cludes, as a "necessary element" of the crime of assault in the first degree,
that the defendant intended to cause "serious physical injury" and did cause
such injury to a victim.
Id.
257. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
258. Id. § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1987). Some subcategories of second-degree
murder do not require the intent to cause death. Id. § 125.25(2)-(4) (McKinney
1987 & Supp. 1996).
259. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
260. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(1), (2) (McKinney 1987). Two varieties of first-
degree manslaughter would not qualify: causing the death of a woman more than
24 weeks pregnant by an unjustified abortion; and a person who is at least 18
years of age who with the intent to cause physical injury, causes the death of a
person less than 11 years old by recklessly engaging in conduct which creates a
grave risk of serious injury to such person. Id. § 125.20(3), (4) (McKinney Supp.
1996).
261. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.11 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
262. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.10(1), (2) (McKinney 1987).
263. Id. § 120.05(1), (2).
264. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 215.13(1), (2) (McKinney 1988).
265. Id. § 215.17(1), (2).
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a deadly weapon. Criminal use of a firearm in the first degree
and second degree, respectively, involve the commission of a
class B or class C felony by an offender who possesses a loaded
deadly weapon "from which a shot, readily capable of producing
death or serious injury may be discharged." 266
Whenever the prosecution intends to prove the prior crimi-
nal convictions aggravating factor, it must serve appropriate
notice, including "a statement setting forth the date and place
of each of the alleged offenses" on which it will rely.267 The de-
fendant may elect not to contest a statement of prior convictions
submitted by the prosecution, in which case the trial judge must
enter a finding that those convictions exist.268 Then, presuma-
bly, "a certificate of conviction would be published to the jury
and, in the event the jury unanimously determined beyond a
reasonable doubt that the requirements" of the aggravating fac-
tor had been established, the jury would consider that factor at
sentencing. 269 If the defendant chose to contest any aspect of
the prior convictions, a hearing would be held before the trial
judge, out of the presence of the jury, to determine the existence
of the prior convictions. 270 Upon the court's conclusion that the
prior convictions have been established as alleged, a certificate
266. Id. §§ 265.09(1), 265.08(1) (McKinney 1989). Although these offenses are
named criminal "use" of a firearm, they simply require proof of the possession of a
deadly weapon that is loaded and from which a shot readily capable of producing
death or serious injury could be discharged. Thus, it is uncertain whether convic-
tions for these crimes would qualify under the death penalty law aggravating cir-
cumstance, which requires that a necessary element of the crime "involves either
the use or attempted use or threatened use of a deadly weapon." N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 400.27(7)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Other subcategories of first-degree
and second-degree criminal use of a firearm almost certainly could not serve as
predicate felony convictions, because the offender needs simply to "display what
appears to be" a firearm during the commission of a class B or class C felony. N.Y.
PENAL LAw §§ 265.09(2), 265.08(2) (McKinney 1989). Various other subcategories
of crimes contain the element that the offender "display what appears to be" a
firearm. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 140.25(1)(d) (McKinney 1988) (second-degree
burglary); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.10(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (second-degree
robbery).
267. N.Y. CRlM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(7)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
268. N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAw § 400.15(4) (McKinney 1994). See N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAw § 400.27(7)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (referring to procedures for es-
tablishing prior convictions set forth in N.Y. CRIM. Poc. LAw § 400.15(3)-(8) (Mc-
Kinney 1994)).
269. BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 8.
270. N.Y. CalM. Poc. LAw § 400.15 (5)-(8) (McKinney 1994).
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of conviction would be made available to the jury for its consid-
eration, as in the case when the prior convictions are not
controverted. 271
Unlike the two penalty-phase aggravating circumstances,
any of the twelve aggravating factors that serve as elements of
the crime of first-degree murder and that have been proven at
the guilt-phase trial "shall be deemed established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt at the separate sentencing proceeding and shall
not be relitigated."272 The statute specifically provides that the
prosecution "shall not relitigate the existence of aggravating
factors proved at trial or otherwise present evidence [at the sen-
tencing proceeding], except ... in rebuttal of the defendant's
evidence."273 This prohibition does not apply if a new jury must
be impaneled to impose the sentence; under such
circumstances,
the people may present evidence to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to inform the jury of the nature and circumstances of the
count or counts of murder in the first degree for which the defend-
ant was convicted in sufficient detail to permit the jury to deter-
mine the weight to be accorded the aggravating factor or factors
established at trial.274
The defendant is specifically authorized to "present any evi-
dence relevant to any mitigating factors" identified in the
statute. 27 5
The statutory prohibition against "relitigating" guilt-phase
aggravating factors, which expressly applies to the prosecution,
has less certain application to the defendant.27 6 Depending on
the meaning of the word, "relitigate," this proscription could pit
the defendant's right to refrain from testifying at the guilt-
phase trial against his or her right to a fair sentencing hearing.
271. Id. See BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 9.
272. N.Y. ClM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
273. Id. § 400.27(6).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Although one subsection of the statute exclusively states that "the people
shall not relitigate the existence of aggravating factors proven at the guilt-phase
trial" (see supra note 270 and accompanying text), a different subsection provides
generally that "the aggravating factors proved at [the guilt-phase] trial ... shall
not be relitigated." N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(3). See supra note 268 and
accompanying text.
1071996]
67
PACE LAW REVIEW
For example, a defendant charged with the first-degree murder
of an employee of the state Division for Youth (a "peace of-
ficer"277) might elect to present no evidence during the guilt-
phase trial. If convicted of capital murder, the defendant may
wish to contest that he "knew or reasonably should have
known" that his victim was employed by the Division for Youth,
as is required by statute.278 If such offer of proof would consti-
tute "relitigating" this factor, in violation of the statute, the de-
fendant's only opportunity to contest the sentencing factor
would have been through his own testimony or the presentation
of other evidence at the guilt-phase trial. Alternatively, a de-
fendant, convicted of the first-degree murder of a Division for
Youth employee, who had denied his guilt, yet presented no evi-
dence at the guilt-phase trial, might seek an opportunity to
demonstrate that his victim was acting in such a cruel or irreg-
ular manner that the deceased was not "at the time of the kill-
ing engaged in the course of performing his official duties."279
In both of these examples, the tendered evidence, if ac-
cepted, would negate an essential element of the sentencing fac-
tor, making that factor inappropriate for the sentencing jury's
consideration. But it could also have additional value. Even if
such evidence were not credited to the extent of negating the
prosecution's proof of the existence of that factor, it could still be
relevant to the weight or moral significance given the aggravat-
ing factor.280 A juror who concludes that a defendant did not
actually know that his victim was a peace officer (even if he
277. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
278. Id. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
279. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (1)(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
280. The sentencing authority in a capital trial must be permitted to express
"its 'reasoned moral response' to" evidence relevant to whether a convicted offender
should be sentenced to death. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). See
generally Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 316-17 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting):
Just as a jury must be free to consider and weigh mitigating circumstances
as independently relevant to the defendant's moral culpabilitly, a jury must
also be able to consider and weigh the severity of each aggravating circum-
stance. The weight of an aggravating circumstance depends on the serious-
ness of the crime-a significant aspect of the defendant's moral culpability.
Thus, a reasoned moral response to the defendant's conduct requires the
consideration of the significance of both aggravating and mitigating factors.
Id. (citation omitted).
108 [Vol. 17:41
68http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/3
WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED
reasonably should have known), or who learns that a defendant
was being subjected to great cruelty by his victim when he
killed (even if his victim was acting within "his official duties"),
might legitimately attach different weight or moral significance
to the aggravating factor than if the defense was silenced from
presenting such evidence. Indeed, in another context the stat-
ute recognizes that sentencing evidence has significance beyond
establishing the mere existence of aggravating factors. When a
new sentencing jury must be impaneled at a capital trial, the
legislation expressly authorizes the prosecution to introduce ev-
idence "to the extent reasonably necessary to inform the jury of
the nature and circumstances of the count or counts of murder
... for which the defendant was convicted in sufficient detail to
permit the jury to determine the weight to be accorded the ag-
gravating factor or factors established at [the guilt-phase]
trial.2s1
In McGautha v. California,2 2 the Supreme Court upheld
legislation that permitted death penalty decisions to be made
contemporaneously with the jury's guilt-phase deliberations,
and without providing the accused offender any opportunity to
present evidence in addition to that introduced on the issue of
guilt.283 Justice Harlan's majority opinion rejected the claim
that failing to provide bifurcated guilt and sentencing triels in a
capital prosecution violated the accused's Fifth Amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination, 2s4 or a related due
process right to present evidence relevant to sentencing is-
sues.285 Although this aspect of McGautha has not specifically
been overruled, 286 subsequent rulings leave little doubt that bi-
281. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(6) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
282. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
283. The Ohio statute at issue in Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1971), a
companion case to McGautha, alone raised the issue described in the text. The
California statute challenged in McGautha provided for bifurcated guilt and sen-
tencing trials, and thus did not preclude a defendant who offered no evidence at
the guilt-phase trial from presenting evidence relevant to sentencing.
284. McGautha, 402 U.S. 183, at 213-17.
285. Id. at 217-20.
286. The McGautha Court also ruled that due process was not offended by
capital sentencing decisions made at the unregulated discretion of juries. Id. at
196-208. The very next year the Court, relying on the Eighth Amendment's cruel
and unusual punishments clause, ruled that standardless capital sentencing deci-
sions are unconstitutional. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
Although this feature of McGautha has not been explicitly overruled either, for all
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furcated guilt- and penalty-phase trials are constitutionally re-
quired in capital proceedings. 28 7 The rationale compelling
separate guilt and sentencing trials in capital cases is "so that
the jury can receive all relevant information for sentencing"2 8
without threatening the fairness of the guilt-phase trial. If the
New York death penalty statute's prohibition against relitigat-
ing aggravating circumstances proved by the prosecution at the
guilt-phase trial is intended to bar defendants from challenging
the application of those circumstances during the sentencing
proceeding, then the fundamental justification for bifurcating
the guilt- and penalty-phase trials is seriously compromised.
The statute does authorize the defendant to introduce all
relevant mitigating evidence during the penalty-phase proceed-
ings, 28 9 which indirectly provides an avenue for countermand-
ing evidence that the prosecution may have introduced in proof
of guilt-phase aggravating factors. But softening the blow of-
or "mitigating"-aggravating factors that have been conclu-
sively established is no substitute for being able to challenge
intents and purposes it no longer remains good law. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 195 n.47 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). See Robert Weis-
berg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 305, 315.
287. All of the statutes upheld by the Supreme Court when guided discretion
capital sentencing legislation was approved in the aftermath of Furman, shared
the feature of bifurcated guilt and penalty trials. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (per curiam). See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Gregg Court ex-
plained that:
Much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may
have no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely prejudi-
cial to a fair determination of that question. This problem, however, is
scarcely insurmountable. Those who have studied the question suggest that
a bifurcated procedure-one in which the question of sentence is not consid-
ered until the determination of guilt is made-is the best answer .... When
a human life is at stake and when the jury must have information prejudi-
cial to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of penalty in order to
impose a rational sentence, a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure
elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman.
Gregg, 428 U.S. 262, 190-92 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (footnotes
omitted). Since the defendant must be given the opportunity to present mitigating
evidence relevant to sentencing (Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978)), bi-
furcated guilt and sentencing trials are essential to the integrity of capital sentenc-
ing systems. See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 (1987); Pulley v.
Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983).
288. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 (1987).
289. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(6), (9) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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the very existence of those factors. If the jury does not accept
that an aggravating factor has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, then that factor cannot be considered at sentencing at
all.290 This is a vastly different proposition from a defendant's
attempting to neutralize, or diminish, the weight given to an
aggravating circumstance by establishing that countervailing
factors should be considered in mitigation of punishment.291
The New York statute stands virtually alone in providing
that the aggravating factors to be considered for capital sen-
tencing purposes are one and the same (with the exception of
the terrorism and prior-convictions penalty-phase aggravators)
as the elements of the crime of first-degree murder. The only
similar death penalty statute in the country is Utah's.2 2 Under
other death penalty legislation, there is considerable or com-
plete independence between the elements of capital murder and
the aggravating factors or special issues that are considered for
sentencing. 293 This idiosyncrasy is not necessarily a weakness
in the New York law. The Supreme Court has approved of the
practice of relying on guilt-phase aggravating factors to narrow
the class of death penalty-eligible crimes, 294 and there are
sound reasons procedurally for requiring proof of aggravating
factors at the guilt-phase trial rather than at the post-convic-
tion sentencing hearing.295 Moreover, providing that the ele-
290. Id. § 400.27(3).
291. The defendant bears the burden of establishing mitigating factors, by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 400.27(6).
292. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(3) (1995) (providing that the aggravat-
ing circumstances considered for sentencing "shall include those outlined in Sec-
tion 76-5-202," which defines approximately 17 different types of aggravated
(capital) murder. Utah's statute is significantly different from New York's, how-
ever, in that it also allows the sentencer to consider nonstatutory aggravating fac-
tors for capital sentencing purposes. Id. § 76-3-207(2). See also State v. Gardner,
789 P.2d 3 (Utah 1989), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1990).
293. See generally James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Capital Murder from
Benefit of Clergy to Bifurcated Trials: Narrowing the Class of Offenses Punishable
by Death, 29 CRIM. LAW BULL. 291, 298-302 (1993)[hereinafter Capital Murder];
Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 397.
294. Lowenileld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46 (1988). See also Tuilaepa v.
California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2635 (1994).
295. See Capital Murder, supra note 293, at 302-15 (suggesting several proce-
dures potentially affected by whether proof of aggravating circumstances is re-
quired at the guilt phase or the sentencing phase of a capital trial, including
whether a grand jury must review the aggravating factors for purposes of indict-
ment, the frequency with which juries are death-qualified in potential capital
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ments of first-degree murder proved during the guilt trial are
established as aggravating factors for sentencing purposes, and
may not be relitigated, has the commendable consequence of
prohibiting the prosecution from offering cumulative or duplica-
tive aggravating evidence during both the guilt and sentencing
phases of capital trials.
However, the uniqueness of the New York statute may
have resulted in the legislature's failing to anticipate the
problems associated with precluding offenders convicted of first-
degree murder from "relitigating" the sentencing factors consid-
ered in aggravation of their crimes. Capital defendants, espe-
cially those who present no evidence or do not testify during
their guilt trials, should not be prevented from disputing during
their sentencing hearings that crime elements previously estab-
lished automatically should be considered as aggravating fac-
tors for punishment. Such a conclusive presumption
unjustifiably imposes a cost on defendants who do not testify or
who present no evidence at their guilt-phase trials, and it is in-
consistent with the constitutional rationale for requiring bifur-
cated guilt and sentencing hearings in capital cases.
4. The Mitigating Factors
The Constitution requires that all relevant mitigating evi-
dence be admitted at capital sentencing hearings, 296 and that
the sentencer consider 297 and be given an opportunity to make
meaningful use of that evidence 298 before making a penalty de-
cases, whether the accused has a constitutional right to a jury determination of
aggravating factors, rather than a determination made by a sentencing judge, and
whether exclusionary rules and other trial rules of evidence govern proof of aggra-
vating factors).
296. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (ruling that
the sentencing authority in a capital case may "not be precluded from considering
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sen-
tence less than death.") (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). In a footnote ac-
companying this statement, Chief Justice Burger explained that "[niothing in this
opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evi-
dence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances
of his offense." Id. 438 U.S. at 604 n.12. See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
297. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104 (1982).
298. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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cision. New York's capital sentencing statute enumerates six
mitigating factors, 299 including a general "catch-all" provision,
for the jury's consideration. The statutory mitigating factors
are as follows:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior crimi-
nal convictions involving the use of violence against another
person .300
The Model Penal Code, after which many contemporary
death penalty statutes have been patterned, includes a more re-
strictive mitigating circumstance relevant to the offender's prior
criminal history than is reflected in New York's legislation. The
Model Penal Code's mitigating factor requires that "the defend-
ant has no significant history of prior criminal activity."30 1 New
York's provision is more forgiving in that it focuses on the ab-
sence of prior criminal convictions, rather than the more inclu-
sive domain of prior criminal activity.3 0 2 The New York law also
makes important the absence of a significant history of convic-
tions involving the use of personal violence, rather than the ab-
sence of criminal convictions generally. 30 3 Because this factor is
defined by the absence of a significant history of criminal con-
victions involving violence against the person, offenses result-
ing in juvenile delinquency adjudications would not apply.3 0 4
299. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(a)-(f) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Because
the Constitution requires the admission of all relevant mitigating evidence (see
supra note 296 and accompanying text), the enumeration of mitigating factors in a
capital sentencing statute does not necessarily constitute an exhaustive list. Sev-
eral states do not specifically identify mitigating factors that the sentencing au-
thority may consider in their death penalty statutes. See James R. Acker &
Charles S. Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy: Statutory Mitigating Factors in Capital
Punishment Laws, 30 CRIM. LAW BULL. 299, 339-40 (1994)[hereinafter Fairness
and Mercy].
300. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(9)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
301. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 210.6(4)(a) (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980).
302. New York thus joins a minority ofjurisdictions that make the absence of
prior criminal "convictions," and not just prior criminal "activity" of significance.
Fairness and Mercy, supra note 299, at 316.
303. Since most jurisdictions have adopted the Model Penal Code definition of
this mitigating circumstance almost verbatim, New York again is among a minor-
ity of states that require the prior criminal convictions (or activity) to involve per-
sonal violence. Id. 314-16.
304. In this respect, the New York statute follows the clear majority rule.
Statutory mitigating factors in only two jurisdictions, Ohio and Washington, ap-
pear to contemplate that the offender's record ofjuvenile offenses should be consid-
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The prosecution is precluded from offering "evidence or argu-
ment relating to any mitigating factor except in rebuttal of evi-
dence offered by the defendant."30 5 Although the scope of
"rebuttal" evidence that may be introduced under this provision
must await judicial clarification, it seems manifest that evi-
dence relating to an offender's violent criminal "activity" not re-
sulting in conviction, or to the offender's history of juvenile
offenses, would not be admissible.
(b) The defendant was mentally retarded at the time of the
crime, or the defendant's mental capacity was impaired or his
ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to
prosecution.306
The "diminished capacity" statutory mitigating factor ap-
plies to mentally retarded defendants and to defendants whose
"mental capacity" or ability to conform their conduct to the law
was "impaired" at the time of the offense. 30 7 Offenders who suf-
fer from such constraints arguably are not fully responsible
moral agents, and thus are less deserving of the death penalty,
even though they are guilty of their crimes. Indeed, New York's
law generally excludes mentally retarded offenders from death-
penalty eligibility, subject to the single exception that the kill-
ing occurred while the offender was confined in a state or local
correctional facility, and the intended victim was a corrections
employee in the performance of his or her official duties.308
Since the trial judge determines whether a defendant is men-
tally retarded and thus ineligible for capital punishment, 309 mit-
igating evidence regarding the offender's mental retardation is
admissible before the sentencing jury in all cases in which a
ered adversely. OHIo REV. CODE AN.N, § 2929.04(B)(5) (Anderson 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(1) (West Supp. 1996). See Fairness and Mercy, supra
note 299, at 317.
305. N.Y. CRiM. Puoc. LAW § 400.27(6) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
306. Id. § 400.27(9)(b).
307. Id.
308. Id. § 400.27(12)(d). "Mental retardation" is defined to mean "signifi-
cantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with defi-
cits in adaptive behavior which were manifested before the age of eighteen." The
exemption from death penalty eligiblity based on mental retardation is discussed
more fully at infra notes 414-46, and accompanying text.
309. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(12)(c), (e).
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judge rules that the defendant's mental retardation has not
been established. 310
Although the statute is vague about how the offender's
"mental capacity" must be "impaired" for this factor to apply, it
at least includes cases involving "imperfect" claims of in-
sanity.311 A successful insanity defense under New York law re-
quires that a "mental disease or defect" account for the
accused's lack of criminal responsibility,3 12 yet the mitigating
factor contains no such limitation. Nor does New York's in-
sanity defense recognize volitional impairment,3 13 although the
mitigating factor expressly encompasses impaired ability "to
conform ... conduct to the requirements of law." A significantly
broader range of impediments to an offender's responsibility for
conduct is recognized by this mitigating factor than is required
to excuse a defendant entirely from criminal responsibility
under the insanity defense.
310. Id. § 400.27(12)(e). The defendant has the burden of proving mental re-
tardation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 400.27(12)(a).
311. The Model Penal Code's analogous statutory mitigating factor provides:
"At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the crimi-
nality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication." MODEL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 301, § 210.6(4)(g). Several jurisdic-
tions have adopted "imperfect insanity" mitigating factors that resemble the Model
Penal Code proposal. See Fairness and Mercy, supra note 299, at 327-30.
312. New York law recognizes as an affirmative defense that the accused:
lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect. Such
lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of such [proscribed]
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capac-
ity to know or appreciate either: 1. The nature and consequence of such
conduct; or 2. That such conduct was wrong.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 1987).
313. Insanity defenses traditionally relate to deficiencies in cognitive capaci-
ties (e.g., the accused did not know or lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
nature and consequences of his or her conduct, or that such conduct was wrong),
and/or volitional capacities (e.g., the accused was unable to or lacked substantial
capacity to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law). See generally
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4.2, at 310-23 (2d ed.
1986). Since New York's insanity test applies only when an offender lacks sub-
stantial capacity to know or appreciate either the nature and consequences of his
or her conduct, or that such conduct was wrong (see supra note 312), it does not
excuse offenders who suffer from impaired control of volition. See People v. Ma-
whinney, 163 Misc. 2d 329, 622 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Bronx Co. Sup. Ct. 1994).
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(c) The defendant was under duress or under the domina-
tion of another person, although not to such a degree as to consti-
tute a defense to prosecution.314
This mitigating circumstance, which is a virtual replica of
the corresponding provision of the Model Penal Code,315 applies
when the defendant acted under duress or was under the domi-
nation of another person, to a degree that falls short of being a
complete defense. The defense of duress is recognized when a
defendant "engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was
coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent use of un-
lawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situa-
tion would have been unable to resist." 16 Being "under the
domination of another person" is not recognized as a defense by
the criminal law, and its meaning correspondingly is less
clear.317 Unlike the statutory mitigating factors in effect in sev-
eral other jurisdictions, an offender need not have acted under
"extreme" duress, or under the "substantial" domination of an-
other person for this circumstance to apply.318 In this respect,
New York's provision is much more consistent than those other
statutes with the constitutional requirement that the sentencer
not be restricted from considering all relevant mitigating
evidence. 319
314. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 400.27(9)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
315. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 301, § 210.6(4)(f)
("The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.").
316. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00(1) (McKinney 1987). However, the defense of
duress is unavailable "when a person intentionally or recklessly places himself in a
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress." Id. § 40.00(2).
317. This mitigating factor has been at issue in capital cases decided in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 661 So. 2d 1333 (La. 1995) (holding that
defendant's lawyer provided constitutionally ineffective assistance at the sentenc-
ing phase of a capital trial because, inter alia, no mitigating evidence was
presented that the defendant was under the domination of another person); State
v. Ryan, 534 N.W.2d 766 (Neb. 1995) (finding insufficient evidence to support miti-
gating factor that defendant was under the domination of another person, and
thus rejecting defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on de-
fense counsel's failure to argue applicability of that factor).
318. See Fairness and Mercy, supra note 299, at 326-27.
319. Cf. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 308 (1990) (since trial judge
instructed the sentencing jury that it could consider nonstatutory mitigating cir-
cumstances, Pennsylvania statute making "extreme" duress and "extreme" mental
or emotional disturbance mitigating factors did not unduly constrain jury's consid-
[Vol. 17:41
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(d) The defendant was criminally liable for the present of-
fense of murder committed by another, but his participation in
the offense was relatively minor although not so minor as to con-
stitute a defense to prosecution.3 20
This statutory mitigating factor substantially tracks the
Model Penal Code321 and statutes in several other jurisdic-
tions322 that make the defendant's relatively minor participa-
tion in a murder committed by another a mitigating
circumstance. However, this factor is not likely to figure as
prominently in capital trials in New York as it may elsewhere.
No offender can be convicted of first-degree murder or sentenced
to death under New York law without the specific intent to
kill.323 Moreover, murder convictions premised on accomplice li-
ability commonly arise from killings committed by one of two or
more coperpetrators of armed robbery, or other serious felo-
nies.324 The "relatively minor participation" mitigating factor
will rarely be at issue in such cases, because the New York law
limits death-penalty eligibility to the actual killer and to
cofelons who command another to kill.325 This mitigating factor
most likely will apply in a relatively narrow class of first-degree
murder cases in which accomplice liability involves circum-
stances other than the commission of a contemporaneous
felony.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was
mentally or emotionally disturbed or under the influence of alco-
eration of mitigating evidence). See generally Jeffers v. Lewis, 974 F.2d 1075, 1078
(9th Cir. 1992); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1167 (9th Cir. 1990).
320. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(9)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
321. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 301, § 210.6(4)(e)
("The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and
his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.").
322. See Fairness and Mercy, supra note 299, at 324.
323. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra notes 21-
30 and accompanying text.
324. Cf N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (defining accom-
plice liability for second-degree murder committed during identified felonies). The
Supreme Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment is not invariably offended
by the capital punishment of an offender whose guilt is predicated on a killing
actually committed by a coperpetrator during the commission of a felony. Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). See supra note 127.
325. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra
notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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hol or any drug, although not to such an extent as to constitute a
defense to prosecution.326
New York law recognizes as an affirmative defense to first-
degree murder that "[tihe defendant acted under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reason-
able explanation or excuse .... "327 And while "[i]ntoxication is
not, as such, a defense to a criminal charge," in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant may offer evidence of intoxication
"whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime
charged."328 Under most circumstances, killings that are a
product of mental or emotional disturbance, or that are commit-
ted by defendants under the influence of alcohol or another
drug, will not be affected by these formal rules. The related
mitigating factor will have much broader application. 29 It pre-
dictably will come into play regularly at capital sentencing
hearings.3o
326. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(9)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
327. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(2)(a) (McKinney 1987). The reasonableness of
the defendant's explanation or excuse "is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant be-
lieved them to be." Id.
328. Id. § 15.25.
329. The New York statute's definition of this mitigating circumstance is also
more expansive than the analogous provision in the Model Penal Code. The Model
Penal Code mitigating factor applies when "[t]he murder was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 301, § 210.6(4)(b) (emphasis
added). New York's mitigating circumstance applies even in the absence of "ex-
treme" mental or emotional disturbance. The Model Penal Code further requires
that, "[a]t the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law was impaired as a result of... intoxication." MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES, supra note 301, § 210.6(4)(g). New York's mitigating factor more
broadly applies when the offender was "under the influence of' alcohol or another
drug, and it does not require specific impairment of the defendant's cognitive or
volitional capacities. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 400.27(9)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
330. Forty-nine percent of all state prisoners in 1991 reported being under the
influence of drugs, alcohol, or both at the time they committed the offense for
which they were serving a sentence. Fifty percent of state prisoners convicted of
crimes of violence reported that they were under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or
both, when they committed their crimes. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUS-
TICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS, 1993 6
(1994). In addition, the quality of being "mentally or emotionally disturbed" at the
time of the killing, which also is recognized as a mitigating circumstance under the
provision at issue, doubtlessly will be raised by many defendants convicted of capi-
tal murder. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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(f) Any other circumstance concerning the crime, the de-
fendant's state of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or
the defendant's character, background or record that would be
relevant to mitigation or punishment for the crime.331
This "catch-all" mitigating factor serves the constitution-
ally required function of assuring that all relevant mitigating
evidence may be admitted at a capital sentencing hearing, even
if it is not associated with a statutorily defined mitigating cir-
cumstance. 332 Under Lockett v. Ohio, the sentencing authority
in a capital case may "not be precluded from considering as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or rec-
ord and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defend-
ant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."333 The
Lockett Court did not attempt to define the appropriate bounda-
ries of mitigating evidence. 334 At a minimum, the offender must
be able to introduce evidence bearing on his or her personal cul-
pability for the crime. 335 Yet, the notion of mitigating circum-
stances sweeps more broadly, and includes character evidence
and other factors that may not directly relate to the offender's
responsibility for a crime.336 In practice, the courts have admit-
331. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 400.27(9)(f) (McKiMnney Supp. 1996).
332. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
333. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
334. See Weisberg, supra note 286, at 324.
335. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989):
Underlying Lockett and Eddings [v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)] is the
principle that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpa-
bility of the criminal defendant. If the sentencer is to make an individual-
ized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty, "evidence
about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the
belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit acts that are
attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental
problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse."
• .. "Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a rea-
soned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime."
Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis in original)).
336. See Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing
Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323, 351 (1992):
The relevancy standard used in Lockett implies that the sentencing inquiry
must extend to an evaluation of what we might call the offender's general
"moral merit" or "general deserts." The sentencer may evaluate the of-
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ted a wide range of evidence offered by defendants in capital
sentencing proceedings in mitigation of punishment. 337
New York's death penalty statute could have enumerated
additional mitigating factors potentially relevant to juries' sen-
tencing decisions. For example, the offender's youth (or age),
which is a common mitigating circumstance in other death pen-
alty statutes,33s is absent from the New York law's list of miti-
gating factors.339 An expanded list of mitigating circumstances
would have been desirable as an expression that the Legislature
specifically recognized the potential significance of those cir-
cumstances to sentencing decisions, and to cue attorneys to con-
sider their relevance and to present evidence about them.340
However, since Lockett, and the catch-all provision, require that
evidence of additional mitigating circumstances must be re-
ceived, the statute's failure to itemize a more extensive list of
factors to be considered in mitigation of punishment is not un-
duly problematic.
fender's deserts based on all of his life works. In effect, the sentencer may
determine what punishment the offender deserves by judging his "soul."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
337. See Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and
the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 301-06 (1991). Justice
Scalia has called for overruling Lockett, in part because in his view requiring the
open-ended admission of mitigating evidence is impossible to reconcile with an-
other cardinal principle of capital punishment law, which is that death penalty
decisions must be nonarbitrary and circumscribed by legislative standards. Wal-
ton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 661-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). See also Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903-15 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing doubts about the continued viability of Lock-
ett). For a discussion and attempted refutation of Justice Scalia's thesis, see Scott
E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided
Mitigation In Capital Sentencing, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1147 (1991).
338. See Fairness and Mercy, supra note 299, at 330-33. The Model Penal
Code includes as a statutory mitigating factor "the youth of the defendant at the
time of the crime." MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 301 § 2.10.6(4)(h). Under the
Model Penal Code, as under New York law, offenders under age 18 are ineligible
for capital punishment. Id. § 210.6(1)(d).
339. The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that youth is a relevant mit-
igating factor for capital sentencing purposes. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 113 S.
Ct. 2658, 2668-69 (1993); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). Also,
the offender's advanced age could, in appropriate circumstances, serve as a mtigat-
ing factor. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(7) (Supp. 1995) (recognizing as a
mitigating factor "[t]he youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the
crime.").
340. For examples of additional mitigating factors that have been included in
other death penalty statutes, see Fairness and Mercy, supra note 299, at 333-37.
120
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The burden of establishing mitigating factors is on the de-
fendant, and proof is required by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.341 Many other death penalty statutes do not expressly
assign a burden of persuasion for establishing mitigating fac-
tors, and a few statutes require only that the defendant must go
forward with evidence to allow the sentencer to consider miti-
gating circumstances. New York joins at least five other juris-
dictions that statutorily require the defendant to establish the
existence of mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 342 The Supreme Court has strongly suggested, in dic-
tum, that there are no federal constitutional barriers to making
the defendant assume such a burden. 3
At the same time, the Court has definitively ruled that a
jury may not be required to find unanimously that a mitigating
341. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(6) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
342. See Fairness and Mercy, supra note 299, at 342. Maryland, New Hamp-
shire, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, and federal law require by statute that the defend-
ant prove the existence of mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.
21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g) (1996); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5(111) (1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9711(c)(1)(iii) (West 1982); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(d)(i)(B) (Michie 1996); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1995).
343. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651 (1990) (plurality opinion). The peti-
tioner in Walton had challenged his death sentence, inter alia, on the ground that
the statute imposed on defendants "the burden of establishing by a preponderance
of the evidence, the existence of mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial
to call for leniency." Id. at 649. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West 1995)
("The burden of establishing the existence of the [statutory mitigating] circum-
stances ... is on the defendant."); See also: § 13-703(E):
In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment
... the court shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances ... and shall impose a sentence of death if the court finds one or
more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in [the statute] ... and
that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency.
Id. Justice White's plurality opinion rejected that challenge, and further contin-
ued that:
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)] did not suggest that it would be
forbidden to require each individual juror, before weighing a claimed miti-
gating circumstance in the balance, to be convinced in his or her own mind
that the mitigating circumstance has been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. To the contrary, the jury in that case was instructed that it had to
find that any mitigating circumstances had been proved by a preponderance
of the evidence .... Neither the petitioner in Mills nor the Court in its
opinion hinted that there was any constitutional objection to that aspect of
the instructions.
Walton, 497 U.S. at 651 (citation omitted).
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factor has been proven before that factor can be considered for
sentencing purposes by individual jurors. Imposing a unanim-
ity requirement would arbitrarily allow a single hold-out juror
who did not believe that a mitigating circumstance had been
established to deny all other jurors the opportunity to consider
that circumstance. To invest such veto power in one or more
jurors by requiring unanimous agreement about the existence
of mitigating factors is inconsistent with the "high requirement
of reliability on the determination that death is the appropriate
penalty in a particular case."344 New York's capital sentencing
statute avoids this difficulty by providing that "[a]ny member or
members of the jury who find a mitigating factor to have been
proven by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence
may consider such factor established regardless of the number
of jurors who concur that the factor has been established."345
This aspect of the law is crucial to its fair administration,
although it also is a potential source of confusion to jurors. Dur-
ing their guilt-phase deliberations, jurors cannot convict a de-
fendant unless they unanimously agree that guilt has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The same standards bind
their deliberations about the aggravating factors they are au-
thorized to consider for sentencing.3 46 Even though they are in-
structed that mitigating factors must be established only by a
preponderance of the evidence, and that they are to determine
individually whether mitigating circumstances exist, rather
than by unanimous verdict, jurors in capital cases are prone to
transfer the familiar proof beyond-a-reasonable-doubt and una-
nimity requirements to their consideration of mitigating
factors.347
Another provision in New York's law could help produce or
at least reinforce such a misunderstanding. The statute pro-
344. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988). See also McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
345. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(11)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
346. Id. § 400.27(3), (7)(c).
347. James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing In-
structions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995) (reporting results of
interviews conducted with individuals who served as jurors in capital trials in
North Carolina). See also James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of Judges' Instruc-
tions in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial: Focus on Mitigating Circumstances,
16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 203 (1992).
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vides that "[i]f the jury directs imposition of either a sentence of
death or life imprisonment without parole, it shall specify on
the record those mitigating and aggravating factors considered
and those mitigating factors established by the defendant, if
any." 48 This section easily could be interpreted to mean that,
just as it is "the jury" that "considered" mitigating and aggra-
vating factors, so must mitigating factors be "established" to the
satisfaction of the jury, instead of in the minds of individual ju-
rors. Verdict forms that clearly indicate that mitigating factors
can be considered, and can be considered established by individ-
ual jurors, without the concurrence of the entire jury, would
help minimize the risk of jurors being confused about their duty
to come to individual conclusions about whether mitigating cir-
cumstances have been established.3 49
The defendant is authorized to present evidence relevant to
mitigating factors, "[s]ubject to the rules governing the admis-
sion of evidence in the trial of a criminal action ... ; provided,
however, the defendant shall not be precluded from the admis-
sion of reliable hearsay evidence."350 In contrast, penalty-phase
evidence is admissible in many other death penalty jurisdic-
tions under more liberal rules than generally apply to criminal
trials.351 The New York statute's exception regarding the ad-
missibility of reliable hearsay evidence is constitutionally re-
quired in keeping with the defendant's right to a fair capital
sentencing hearing.352 To be faithful to this constitutional prin-
ciple, opinion rules and other rules of evidence should be liber-
348. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(11)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
349. The statute directs that "[tihe court of appeals shall formulate and adopt
rules for the development of forms for use by the jury in recording its findings and
determinations of sentence." Id. § 400.27(15). The New York Court of Appeals has
published a proposed set of Uniform Rules for Capital Sentencing Forms which, at
the time of this writing, had not been approved in final form. Under the proposed
rules, the trial judge is to provide the jurors with a sentencing determination form,
on which the judge must list each mitigating factor for which the defendant
presented evidence. A box next to each such factor is to be provided, "for the jury
to check if the jury considered that factor." On an adjacent line, "the jury [is] to
record the number of jurors who found that the defendant established the factor."
NEw YORK COURT OF APPEALS, PROPOSED UNIFORM RULES FOR CAPITAL SENTENC-
ING FORMS § 218.1, 14 at 17 (Sept. 15, 1995).
350. N.Y. GRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(6) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
351. See Capital Murder, supra note 293, at 310 n.80.
352. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam). See BILL MEMO-
RANDUM, supra note 43, at 7.
1996] 123
83
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:41
ally construed in favor of admitting mitigating evidence offered
on behalf of capital defendants.353
Both the prosecution and the defense are given discovery
rights to penalty-phase evidence under the new statute.3 54
353. For example, lay witnesses may be asked to give opinions about an of-
fender's mental health, general propensities, or potential for rehabilitation or ad-
aptation to life in prison in mitigation of punishment at capital sentencing trials.
See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). When commenting on the
statuto's recognition that reliable hearsay evidence is admissible in mitigation of
punishment at capital sentencing proceedings, the Assembly Codes Committee Bill
Memorandum noted that, "state evidentiary rules also allow the liberal introduc-
tion of evidence by a defendant in a criminal case. In accordance with constitu-
tional requirements, this provision should allow defendants to present any reliable
evidence even where such evidence does not meet admissibility requirements."
BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 7.
354. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(14) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
(a) At a reasonable time prior to the sentencing proceeding or a mental re-
tardation hearing:
(i) the prosecutor shall, unless previously disclosed and subject to a pro-
tective order, make available to the defendant the statements and infor-
mation specified in subdivision one of section 240.45 and make available
for inspection, photographing, copying or testing the property specified
in subdivision one of section 240.20; and
(ii) the defendant shall, unless previously disclosed and subject to a pro-
tective order, make available to the prosecution the statements and in-
formation specified in subdivision two of section 240.45 and make
available for inspection, photographing, copying or testing, subject to
constitutional limitations, the reports, documents and other property
specified in subdivision one of section 240.30.
Id.
Under the provisions to which reference are made in this section, the prosecu-
tor must disclose written and recorded statements, the criminal record, and pend-
ing criminal charges pertaining to persons intended to be called as witnesses. N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 240.45(1) (McKinney 1993). The defendant has similar obliga-
tions, except insofar as the statements or information pertain to the defendant. Id.
§ 240.45(2). The prosecution further must make available statements made by the
defendant or a codefendant; transcripts of the defendant's or a codefendant's grand
jury testimony; reports of physical, mental, or scientific examinations or tests; pho-
tographs and drawings made by law enforcement personnel that will be introduced
at trial; photographs, photocopies or other reproductions made by or at the direc-
tion of law enforcement officers; property obtained from the defendant or a code-
fendant; tapes or electronic recordings that will be introduced at trial; material
that is subject to constitutional disclosure; and the date, time, and place of the
charged crime and the defendant's arrest. Id. § 240.20(1)(a)-(i). The defendant is
obliged to make available reports concerning a physical or mental examination, or
scientific test intended for introduction at the trial, and reports or documents cor-
responding to the defendant's notice of intent to offer psychiatric evidence; and
photographs, drawings, tapes, or other electronic recordings the defendant intends
to introduce at trial. Id. § 240.30(1)(a),(b).
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Since the prosecution's proof at the sentencing hearing is lim-
ited to the two penalty-phase aggravating factors that might be
at issue,35 5 and to the rebuttal of the defendant's evidence,3 56 as
a practical matter most discovery will flow from the defense to
the prosecution and will concern the defendant's mitigation evi-
dence. 357 One available remedy for nondisclosure of information
under the discovery requirements is preclusion of the evidence
from the penalty hearing.358 However, the constitutional nature
of the defendant's right to offer relevant mitigating evidence
likely "will result in courts rarely, if ever, precluding a defend-
ant from offering mitigating evidence as a sanction for the de-
fendant's failure to comply with discovery provisions."359
The statute gives special attention to psychiatric evidence
that may be offered at the penalty hearing.
"[P]sychiatric evidence" means evidence of mental disease,
defect or condition in connection with either a mitigating factor
defined in this section or a mental retardation hearing... to be
offered by a psychiatrist, psychologist or other person who has re-
ceived training, or education, or has experience relating to the
identification, diagnosis, treatment or evaluation of mental dis-
ease, mental defect, or mental condition.3 60
Although the prosecution is only permitted to offer evidence
in rebuttal of the defendant's mitigating evidence, the discovery
provisions governing psychiatric evidence are drafted to apply
to both parties. Pretrial notice of a party's intent to offer psy-
355. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(7)(a), (b) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See
supra notes 233-68 and accompanying text. The twelve aggravating factors that
also serve as elements of the crime of first-degree murder are not to be relitigated
at the penalty trial, and the prosecution is not otherwise to offer evidence about
them. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(3), (6). See supra notes 272-74 and accom-
panying text.
356. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(6).
357. Al O'Connor, New York's Death Penalty Law: An Overview, PUB. DEF.
BACKUP CENTER REP. 4, 6 (MarJApr. 1995).
358. N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(14)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
359. BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 13.
360. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(13)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Under
this definition, "psychiatric evidence" does not include testimony provided by lay
witnesses. See O'Connor, supra note 357, at 6, who also argues that: "The notice
requirement is further restricted to the statutorily defined mitigating factors in
subdivisions (a) through (e) of CPL § 400.27 (9), and does not apply to subdivision
(f), the undefined catchall mitigator which permits introduction of all other miti-
gating evidence." Id. (emphasis in original).
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chiatric evidence is required. If such notice is not given, the
other party is entitled to an adjournment for a reasonable pe-
riod after being notified that psychiatric evidence will be of-
fered.361 The sanctions for failure to give notice that psychiatric
evidence will be introduced include monetary penalties as-
sessed against the offending attorney, but the court "may not in
any event preclude" admission of such evidence. 62
Upon being notified about the defendant's intent to intro-
duce mitigating psychiatric evidence, the prosecution is entitled
to request a court order requiring the defendant to submit to an
examination by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or psychiatric so-
cial worker
designated by the district attorney, for the purpose of rebutting
evidence offered by the defendant with respect to a mental dis-
ease, defect or condition in connection with either a mitigating
factor defined in this section, including whether the defendant
was acting under duress, was mentally or emotionally disturbed
or mentally retarded, or was under the influence of alcohol or any
drug.363
Both the prosecutor and defense counsel are entitled to be pres-
ent at an examination of the defendant ordered under this pro-
vision.364 If the defendant fails to cooperate when ordered to
submit to such an examination, the prosecution is entitled to
have the court instruct the jury about the defendant's lack of
361. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(13)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
362. Id. Compare id. with N.Y. CruM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(14)(d). See supra
notes 353-54.
363. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(13)(c).
364. Id. Counsel's role at this examination is uncertain. Compare Executive
Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5 ("the role of counsel is that of an observer, and
neither counsel is permitted to take an active role in the examination") with BILL
MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 13 ("In contrast with the limitations on the role of
counsel at psychiatric examinations contained in Article 250 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Law, subdivision (13) contains no such limitations on the role of counsel at
the psychiatric examination."). The use of psychiatric evidence to establish affirm-
ative defenses to criminal charges is governed in N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 250.10
(McKinney 1993). This provision contains analogous requirements for court-or-
dered mental health examination of the defendant after the defendant serves no-
tice of intention to introduce such evidence, and specifies that "[the role of each
counsel at such examination is that of an observer, and neither counsel shall be
permitted to take an active role at the examination." Id. § 250.10(3). See generally
O'Connor, supra note 357, at 6-7.
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cooperation. 365 Statements made by the defendant during such
court-ordered psychiatric examinations are admissible only as
they are relevant to proof of mitigating factors or mental retar-
dation, and otherwise are inadmissible at the guilt-phase trial
or in other proceedings. 366
5. The Sentencing Options and the Sentencing Decision
Senator Dale Volker: ... The judge would instruct the jurors
that if they are unable to come to an agreement, a unanimous
agreement, for the death penalty and if they are unable to come to
a determination on life without parole, in that case the judge
would sentence the person to twenty to twenty-five years to life.
Senator Richard Dollinger: So if a jury, Senator, giving due
weight to the aggravating and mitigating factors, how does a jury
arrive at the fact - can the jury arrive at the third option?
Senator Volker: No. A jury can not arrive at the third option.
The third option would only actually be open to the judge.367
A defendant convicted of first-degree murder must receive
one of three sentences: death, life imprisonment without parole
(LWOP), or a prison term with a minimum sentence of twenty
to twenty-five years, and a maximum sentence of life (a "regular
life" sentence). If the offender pleads guilty to first-degree mur-
der, which is permitted only with the consent of the prosecutor
and permission of the court,36 8 or if the defendant pleads not
365. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(13)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See
O'Connor, supra note 357, at 7:
If the defendant refuses to submit, the only sanction available to the prose-
cution is a jury instruction "that the defendant did not submit to or cooper-
ate fully in such psychiatric examination." [CPL § 400.27(13)(c)]. This
"adverse inference" instruction is again more limited than the charge avail-
able under CPL § 250.10, wherein the court is authorized to additionally
instruct the jury that "the [defendant's] failure to submit may be considered
[by the jury] in considering the merits" of the defense.
Id.
366. N.Y. CriM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(13)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Cf. Es-
telle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (expert testimony based on court-ordered psy-
chiatric examination not initiated by defendant was admitted in violation of
accused's right to counsel and right against compelled self-incrimination, where
defendant was not advised of and did not waive his constitutional rights).
367. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1911 (remarks of Senator Dale Volker
and Senator Richard Dollinger).
368. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney Supp.
1996). See supra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
1996] 127
87
PACE LAW REVIEW
guilty and the prosecutor elects not to seek the death penalty,
then the trial judge is the sentencing authority, and the judge
must impose a sentence of either LWOP or regular life.36 9 If the
offender pleads not guilty, and the prosecutor seeks the death
penalty, then a separate sentencing hearing is conducted before
the jury that determined the defendant's guilt or, in exceptional
circumstances, before a newly constituted sentencing jury.3 70
Following the presentation of evidence and argument by
counsel:371
the court must instruct the jury that with respect to each count of
murder in the first degree the jury should consider whether or not
a sentence of death should be imposed and whether or not a sen-
tence of life imprisonment without parole should be imposed, and
that the jury must be unanimous with respect to either sentence.
The court must also instruct the jury that in the event the jury
fails to reach unanimous agreement with respect to the sentence,
the court will sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment
with a minimum term of twenty to twenty-five years and a maxi-
mum term of life.372
The sentencing options available when the jury is asked to
sentence the defendant to death are remarkable in two respects.
First, the jury is barred from deliberating about or returning a
verdict of regular life imprisonment. Second, the default sen-
tence when the jurors are unable to produce a unanimous ver-
dict regarding either of their lawful sentencing options, death or
LWOP, is a regular life sentence, and the jury is so instructed.
These features of the capital sentencing scheme raise serious
constitutional questions.
A capital jury lacks the authority to sentence a convicted
first-degree murderer to a regular life term of twenty to twenty-
five years imprisonment. When the prosecutor seeks a death
sentence, a regular life sentence can be imposed if and only if
the jury does not reach unanimous agreement about whether to
369. N.Y. CruM. PRoc. §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(6)(vii), 400.27(1).
370. Id. § 400.27(2). For further discussion of the sentencing jury, see infra
notes 442-76 and accompanying text. No separate sentencing proceeding is con-
ducted if the death penalty is not sought, and a sentence of either LWOP or regu-
lar life is to be imposed by a judge. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(1).
371. The prosecution is to make its sentencing argument first, followed by the
defendant. Id. § 400.27(10).
372. Id.
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sentence the offender to death or LWOP, the only two sentenc-
ing options it is instructed to consider. The jury will know that
it can cause a regular life sentence to be entered by failing to
agree on a sentence of death or LWOP, but this can hardly sub-
stitute for the prerogative of deliberating about and unani-
mously deciding whether the offender deserves a regular life
sentence. The law does not recognize the concept of a "negative"
verdict, or a verdict produced by a jury's lack of agreement.373
Under the statute, the jurors have no vehicle for structuring
their deliberations to produce an affirmative verdict of regular
life imprisonment.
The Legislature has determined that a term of twenty to
twenty-five years to life is an appropriate punishment for first-
degree murder. Such a sentence is authorized when a defend-
ant is convicted of first-degree murder on a plea of guilty,37 4 or
following a trial in which the prosecution has not sought a capi-
tal sentence. 375 Yet, only a judge, and never a jury, can affirma-
tively declare that a capital murder is sufficiently mitigated
that a regular life sentence should be imposed. The Supreme
Court has not required that juries make sentencing decisions in
capital cases, 376 nor that a regular life sentence must be a sen-
tencing option in addition to LWOP and death.3 7 Nevertheless,
in keeping with the vast majority of other jurisdictions, 378 New
373. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 300.10(4), 310.40, 310.60, 310.70 (McKin-
ney 1993) (generally specifying the form of verdicts authorized in criminal cases).
374. Id. at §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See
supra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
375. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. § 400.27(1). See supra notes 199-200 and accompany-
ing text.
376. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (1995); Hildwin v. Florida,
490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). In five
states, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska, a trial judge or a panel
of judges imposes sentence in capital cases without any participation by a jury. In
four additional states, Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana, juries render ad-
visory sentencing verdicts or make findings that are considered by a judge, but the
judge has ultimate sentencing authority. See James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier,
Law, Discretion, and the Capital Jury: A Review of Statutes and Proposals for
Reform, 32 CRIM. L. BuuL., 134, 138 n.18 (1996)[hereinafter Review of Statutes].
377. Several jurisdictions presently have only two sentencing options in capi-
tal cases: either death or LWOP, or death or life imprisonment with parole eligi-
bility. See Aggravating Circumstances, supra note 214, at 55-56.
378. Juries have the exclusive responsibility for making sentencing decisions
in capital cases in 29 of the 38 states with death penalty laws, and under the fed-
eral death penalty statute. Review of Statutes, supra note 376 at 138 n.18.
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York's statute does require jury sentencing in capital trials. It
also reflects the specific legislative judgment that any of three
different sentences: death, LWOP, or regular life, may be appro-
priate punishment for first-degree murder. Yet, the jury is sti-
fled from expressing that a regular life sentence should be
imposed in any first-degree murder case. Denying the jury the
regular-life sentencing option is inconsistent with the reasons
why juries traditionally have been empowered to determine
sentence in capital trials.
[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and cap-
ital punishment can do little more-and must do nothing less-
than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate
question of life or death....
[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in
making such a selection is to maintain a link between contempo-
rary community values and the penal system-a link without
which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society."379
The sentencing decisions made in capital cases are unique.
The sentencing authority must be "provided with a vehicle for
expressing its 'reasoned moral response'"380 to the evidence
presented at the penalty-phase trial. Under New York's stat-
379. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-20 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 80, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
380. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). See Assembly Debate, supra
note 1, at 29-30 (remarks of Assemblymen Jeffrey Dinowitz and Eric Vitaliano):
MR. DINOWITZ: Mr. Vitaliano, can the jury impose a sentence of life with
parole eligibility under this statute?
MR. VITALIANO: No, Mr. Dinowitz. The jury has only two sentencing op-
tions under the bill: either death or life imprisonment without parole. If
they should deadlock, then and only then, a sentence of 20 to 25 years mini-
mum to life maximum is imposed by the judge.
MR. DINOWITZ: But what if the case involves a 19-year-old first offender
where there is overwhelming mitigation evidence and the jury unanimously
reaches a reasoned, moral judgment that a life sentence with parole eligibil-
ity is an appropriate sentence, that all other sentences would be excessive,
what happens then?
MR. VITALIANO: The jury is not empowered to reach that conclusion. Un-
less the defendant pleads guilty, a regular life sentence is not an available
option for the jury to consider.
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ute, the jury is denied a voice, on behalf of the community, 381 to
decide that a sentence of regular life imprisonment, which the
legislature otherwise has made available for first-degree mur-
der, should be imposed on a defendant convicted of that crime.
There are several related adverse consequences of this aspect of
the statute.
As discussed previously, the sentencing structure makes
costly, or penalizes exercise of, the right of trial by jury.3 2 A
jury's two authorized sentencing verdicts are death and LWOP.
A sentencing judge's only sentencing options following a plea of
guilty are LWOP and regular life. Thus, defendants who plead
not guilty in capital cases risk both higher maximum and mini-
mum sentences.
By the same token, the sentencing scheme vests prosecu-
tors with charging discretion so profound that it borders on de
facto sentencing authority. A prosecutor unilaterally can define
the minimum and maximum sentencing options as LWOP and
death by filing a notice of intention to seek the death penalty in
a first-degree murder case. Conversely, the district attorney
can define the minimum and maximum sentencing range as
regular life and LWOP by proceeding to trial and not seeking
the death penalty. With the judge's concurrence, a prosecutor
381. See Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 202-04 (remarks of Assemblyman
Richard Gottfried):
The problem is... the jury has no authority, whatsoever, to select ordi-
nary life imprisonment as one of its sentencing options. The jury, who we
rely on as the voice of the community and the central player in this whole
process, the jury is prohibited from having as one of its options an ordinary
life sentence. Its only options are the death penalty or life without parole.
It's as if we can't trust the jury to have before it the full range of sentences.
So, the ordinary life sentence is available in a murder one case under
this bill only if the jury, in essence, fails in its task of selecting one of the
other two sentences, and the bill says that if they fail to impose one of the
other two sentences, or if the defendant forgoes his or her right to a trial by
jury and pleads guilty, then an ordinary life imprisonment sentence is
available.
So, in order for one of the three lawful sentencing options to come to
pass, the jury, in whom we place such trust, has to fail in its task or the
defendant has to give up his or her Constitutional right to defend himself or
herself at trial.
This, I submit, is a serious distortion of the sentencing process.... [Ilt
is a serious defect in this bill ....
Id.
382. See supra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
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can stipulate that a regular life sentence or a sentence of LWOP
is a condition of accepting a defendant's plea of guilty. Not only
is the prosecutor's discretion in this context unregulated,3 3 but
it provides district attorneys with powerful bargaining leverage.
Defendants who agree to plead guilty to first-degree murder
will escape the maximum sentence of death, and also will be-
come eligible for a regular life sentence. District attorneys thus
have the untrammeled charging and plea bargaining discretion
to expose a defendant to the risk of death, and also to remove
the lawful sentencing option of regular life imprisonment.
The second fundamental problem with the statute's sen-
tencing options arises when the jury is unable to reach unani-
mous agreement about whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole. Under
such circumstances, the statute provides that the defendant
must be sentenced to a regular life sentence. The trial judge
must instruct the jury accordingly at the outset of its sentenc-
ing deliberations. These provisions are irrational and will pro-
duce arbitrary sentencing decisions. They also are certain to
result in death penalty verdicts that do not reflect the reasoned
moral judgment of the jury.
The scheme is irrational because when the jury cannot
unanimously agree about either of its two verdict options, death
or LWOP, the regular life sentence that must be imposed is a
punishment that the jury was unable to consider, and it may be
that not a single member of the jury favors the option. For ex-
ample, the jury could be divided with eleven of its members vot-
ing for death, and one voting for LWOP. If the jurors are unable
to reconcile their differences, the lesser sentence of regular life
imprisonment is imposed. Alternatively, the jury could be split
with eleven in favor of LWOP, and one in favor of death. If the
one holdout for death stands firm, the will of all twelve jurors
again is frustrated, because a regular life sentence, and neither
death nor LWOP will be imposed.
A regular life sentence imposed under such circumstances
surely bears no relationship to the offender's culpability. De-
fendants in first-degree murder cases in which eleven jurors be-
lieve death is the appropriate punishment, and one insists that
383. See supra notes 173-93 and accompanying text.
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LWOP should be imposed, or in which the jurors otherwise are
divided irreconcilably between death and LWOP, will receive a
less harsh sentence (regular life) than is given in cases in which
no jurors favor death and all twelve favor LWOP. If a rational
basis exists for the default sentencing option of regular life im-
prisonment, it would appear to be the impermissible one of
pressuring jurors into relinquishing their views about what con-
stitutes a morally appropriate sentence for a crime in order to
ensure that the offender does not reap the benefits of a twenty
to twenty-five years to life sentence.
Jurors who are deadlocked between death and LWOP will
know, because they will have been instructed, that their failure
to reach a verdict will result in the offender's receiving a regular
life sentence. This information will exert enormous pressure on
jurors to produce a verdict. Jurors may be extremely anxious
about the prospect of an offender's being released from prison
after serving the minimum twenty to twenty-five years of a reg-
ular life sentence. Interviews with jurors confirm their common
fear that capital defendants may some day be paroled and re-
turn to the outside community.3 84 This very outcome becomes a
real possibility if jurors who are divided eleven-to-one in favor
of death over LWOP (or otherwise are divided) are unable to
resolve their differences and reach a unanimous sentencing ver-
dict. Not wanting to risk the possibility of the defendant's re-
lease from prison twenty years hence, or believing that such a
result would not be just, the jurors holding out for a sentence
less than death may conclude that a capital sentence is the only
acceptable alternative.
The legislature easily could have avoided the problems as-
sociated with this sentencing scheme. The most straightfor-
ward solution would be to give the jury three affirmative verdict
384. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror In-
structions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1994); William Bowers,
Research Note, Capital Punishment and Contemporary Values: People's Misgiv-
ings and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 157, 169-71 (1993). See
also Mark Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?": A Capital Defendant's Right to a
Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 327, 334-43 (1993). The
Supreme Court took note of some of these research results in Simmons v. South
Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2191 (1994).
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options: death, LWOP, and regular life.38 5 If a jury reported be-
ing unable to reach unanimous agreement about a sentence, the
judge could inquire of the foreperson whether one or more mem-
bers of the jury had voted for death. A negative answer would
necessarily mean that the jurors were divided between the
choice of LWOP and regular life. The judge then would impose
a regular life sentence as the least harsh verdict that one or
more jurors favored. On receiving an affirmative indication
that one or more jurors voted in favor of death, the judge could
inquire of the foreperson whether one or more members of the
jury voted in favor of a regular life sentence. A negative re-
sponse would reflect that the jurors were divided between death
and LWOP, and a sentence of LWOP would be imposed as the
least harsh verdict supported by one or more jurors. If the
judge received an affirmative response, the offender would be
sentenced to a regular life sentence, since one or more jurors
would have supported that verdict.38 6
385. Several death penalty jurisdictions use this straightforward method and
allow the sentencing authority to choose between the three verdicts of death,
LWOP, and life imprisonment with parole eligibility. See Aggravating Circum-
stances, supra note 214, at 55.
386. Of course, the judge also could simply inquire what the precise voting
split was among the jurors. Such a direct inquiry might be perceived as more
highly intrusive with regard to the jury deliberations, since it would reveal such
specific information as whether there was only a single holdout for a particular
sentencing verdict. Holdout jurors might feel undue pressure if they knew that the
ultimate verdict tally would be made a matter of record.
Some other jurisdictions in which three sentencing options are provided in
capital cases specify how a sentence is to be decided when the sentencing jury
hangs. For example, in Georgia, if the jury has found that at least one statutory
aggravating factor exists but is unable to arrive at a sentencing verdict, the judge
may sentence the defendant either to LWOP or life imprisonment with parole eligi-
bility. However, the judge may sentence the offender to LWOP
... only if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and the trial
court has been informed by the jury foreman that upon their last vote, a
majority of the jurors cast their vote for a sentence of death or for a sentence
of life imprisonment without parole ....
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31.1(c) (1990). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(k)(7)
(1996) (if sentencing jury determines not to sentence offender to death, it thereaf-
ter considers whether to impose sentence of LWOP; if the jurors are unable to
agree within a reasonable time about whether to sentence offender to LWOP, the
trial judge shall dismiss the jury and impose a life prison sentence); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150(2)(a) (1995) (if jury responds to special issues so that defendant is not
sentenced to death, judge imposes sentence of LWOP "unless 10 or more members
of the jury further find that there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to war-
94http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/3
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Alternatively, the legislature could have eliminated one of
the two noncapital sentencing options and provided that first-
degree murder must be punished by death or a fixed prison sen-
tence of either regular life or LWOP.387 Under such a frame-
work, the default punishment when the jury could not reach a
unanimous sentencing decision would at least be a prison term
that was an authorized sentencing verdict, and one that was
supported by some members of the jury. Although eliminating
a third sentencing option would solve the problems that exist
under the present statute, this solution would also transform
the statute radically by contradicting the range of sentences
that the Legislature has indicated should be available as pun-
ishment for first-degree murder. Another possible solution, re-
quiring the judge to declare a mistrial and to convene a new
sentencing jury,388 also would be problematic because it would
rant life imprisonment, in which case the trial court shall sentence the defendant
to life imprisonment"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(h) (1996):
If the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, the trial judge shall in-
quire of the foreman of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sen-
tence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, the judge
shall instruct the jury that in further deliberations, the jury shall only consider the
sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment
for life. If, after further deliberations, the jury still cannot agree as to sentence,
the trial judge shall dismiss the jury and such judge shall impose a sentence of
imprisonment for life. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys
be permitted to comment at any time to the jury, on the effect of the jury's failure
to agree on a punishment.
Id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4) (Supp. 1996):
If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sen-
tence of death.... the court shall instruct the jury to determine by unani-
mous vote whether the penalty of life in prison without parole shall be
imposed. If the jury is unable to reach a verdict, the court shall discharge
the jury and impose the sentence of life imprisonment.
Id. See also, 18 U.S.C. § 3594 (Supp. 1996) (If sentencing jury unanimously agrees
to sentence offender to death or LWOP, the judge shall impose sentence accord-
ingly. "Otherwise, the court shall impose any lesser sentence that is authorized by
law. ... [Ihf the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense is life imprison-
ment, the court may impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
release.")
387. In approximately 28 of the 39 capital punishment jurisdictions in this
country, the sentencing authority has only two verdict options: death or LWOP, or
death or life with the possibility of parole. See Sentencing Provisions, supra note
214, at 55-56.
388. California law authorizes such action when a capital sentencing jury
deadlocks. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (Deering Supp. 1996). In Nevada, a dead-
locked sentencing jury is discharged. The Nevada Supreme Court then appoints a
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effectively preclude a regular life sentence from ever being im-
posed on an offender whose case proceeded to a sentencing
hearing.38 9
The statute reflects the unambiguous legislative determi-
nation that three different penalties should be available for
first-degree murder: death, LWOP, and regular life.3 90
Although a jury is denied the opportunity to deliver a verdict
that an offender should receive a regular life sentence, the stat-
ute requires the jury to be instructed that such a sentence re-
sults if the jury fails to agree unanimously that the offender
should be sentenced either to death or LWOP. There is no good
reason not to give the jury the power to accomplish directly
what it now can do only by default and indirectly. The statu-
tory sentencing options would be preserved, and the statute's
administration improved, if the jury were authorized to con-
sider sentencing a convicted murderer to a twenty to twenty-
five year to life prison sentence. The inexplicable failure391 of
three-judge panel, consisting of the trial judge and two additional judges, and this
panel conducts a new penalty hearing and determines sentence. A death sentence
can be imposed only by unanimous vote of the three-judge panel. A sentence of
LWOP or life imprisonment can be imposed by majority vote. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 175.556 (Michie Supp. 1995).
389. A controversy exists over whether "dynamite charges," see Allen v.
United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), which encourage deadlocked juries to attempt
to resolve their differences and reach a verdict, ever are permissible in the context
of a capital sentencing trial. Unlike a hung jury at the guilt-phase trial, a dead-
locked sentencing jury usually does not result in a mistrial, with the consequent
expense and time required for a retrial. Even when a sentencing jury deadlocks, a
new sentencing proceeding typically is not required because a default sentencing
verdict of LWOP or life imprisonment with parole eligibility is available. See Re-
view of Statutes, supra note 376, at 168-73.
390. See also BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 1, 5.
391. Consider the remarks of Senator Dale Voker, the principal sponsor of the
death penalty bill in the State Senate, on this issue. Senator Volker's remarks are
in response to a question posed by Senator Richard Dollinger regarding the jury's
sentencing options:
There was a thought to have all three options open to the jury. There
was another point at which there was a discussion that would give the judge
the option of enacting life without parole or 20 (twenty) to 25 (twenty-five)
years to life, but the decision was made that the jury should make the deci-
sion on the most serious of sentences, obviously the most serious sentence
being the death penalty.
And I will be very honest with you, I have received some-I don't want
to say criticism but some flak from some people because of the unanimous
verdict. You know, there have been several Supreme Court cases that said
you do not have to have a unanimous verdict for the death penalty. But our
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the statute to invest the jury with such authority raises grave
doubts about the constitutionality of the sentencing provisions.
The statute regulates the jury's sentencing determination
as follows: "The jury may not direct imposition of a sentence of
death unless it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt
that the aggravating factor or factors substantially outweigh
the mitigating factor or factors established, if any, and unani-
mously determines that the penalty of death should be im-
posed."392 This provision makes clear that death penalty
decisions are to be the product of a two-step process. The jurors
first are to assess the relative weight of the aggravating factors
and the mitigating factors. Only statutory aggravating factors
can be considered.393 These are limited to the elements of first-
degree murder proven during the guilt-phase trial3 94 and the
two sentencing factors that must be alleged and proven beyond
a reasonable doubt during the penalty-phase trial.3 95 The de-
fendant must prove mitigating factors by a preponderance of
the evidence, 396 although each individual juror-rather than
the jury acting as a body-determines the existence of mitigat-
ing circumstances. 397 The sentencing jury takes its first step to-
ward imposing a death sentence only if its members
unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggra-
vating factor(s) established substantially outweigh any mitigat-
ing factors that have been established (to the satisfaction of one
or more jurors). The balancing of aggravating and mitigating
feeling was if you are going to have a jury enact something as serious as the
death penalty, you ought to have a unanimous jury; and, very honestly,
when we discussed this thing with the Governor's people, with the Assem-
bly, the decision was to give the jury the option for the most severe penalties
and let them know that if they couldn't choose one of those more severe
penalties then the judge would enact the lesser penalty, which is 20 (twenty)
to 25 (twenty-five) years to life.
Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1915-16 (remarks of Senator Dale Volker).
392. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(11)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
393. Id. § 400.27(3). See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
394. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. § 400.27(3) See supra notes 218-31 and accompanying
text.
395. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(7). See supra notes 232-70 and accompa-
nying text.
396. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(6). See supra note 341 and accompanying
text.
397. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(11)(a). See supra notes 344-49 and ac-
companying text.
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factors required under the statute is explicit,398 and the prose-
cution plainly must satisfy a substantial burden if the jury is to
get to the second step in the death-sentencing process. 399
Even if the jury unanimously concurs that the aggravating
factors substantially outweigh mitigating factors, before an of-
fender is sentenced to death the jurors must additionally deter-
mine, unanimously, that a capital sentence should be imposed.
In other words, the decision that aggravating factors substan-
tially outweigh mitigating factors is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, condition for imposing a capital sentence. In some
jurisdictions, the sentencer's only task is to compare the weight
of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that have been
proven. If the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating fac-
tors, or if one or more aggravating circumstances have been
proven but no mitigating factors have been established, the sen-
tencing authority has no further discretion: a death sentence
must be imposed.400 New York's statute, like many others,40 1
permits but does not require that an offender be punished by
death when aggravating factors outweigh mitigating
circumstances.
Permissive balancing schemes are preferable to automatic ones,
because they require the sentencer to directly confront the moral
question of whether an offender deserves to die in punishment for
a crime. This judgment is not concealed behind a surrogate deci-
sion-which appears to be more formally legal, and hence more
clinical-that one or more statutory aggravating factors have
been proven and that they outweigh mitigating circumstances. 40 2
398. In this respect, the New York statute is distinguished from capital sen-
tencing statutes that simply direct the sentencing authority to "consider" aggra-
vating and mitigating factors, without explicitly requiring that those factors be
compared against one another and balanced. See Sentencing Provisions, supra
note 214, at 47-49.
399. Obviously, the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors requires
more than tallying and comparing the respective number of each. The moral
weight or significance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be as-
sessed and evaluated. Id. at 45-46.
400. See id. at 27-30. The Supreme Court has upheld such "automatic" death
sentencing statutes against constitutional challenge. Blystone v. Pennsylvania,
494 U.S. 299 (1990).
401. Sentencing Provisions, supra note 214, at 30-33.
402. Id. at 31-32. See generally Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 318-
22 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at
10.
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Murders occasionally will involve more than one of the ag-
gravating factors that define first-degree murder. For example,
an offender who intentionally kills a police officer during the
commission of an armed robbery would be guilty of first degree
murder under two different provisions of the statute.4 3 If an
offender is charged with two separate, concurrent counts40 4 of
first-degree murder, the trial judge is required to submit every
such count to the guilt-phase jury.405 This procedure is required
because the sentencing jury is allowed to consider only those
aggravating factors based on the definition of first-degree mur-
der that have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the
guilt-phase trial.40 6 At the penalty trial, "the court must in-
struct the jury that with respect to each count of murder in the
first degree the jury should consider whether or not a sentence
A decision by the jury with respect to the initial step in the decision making
process is not determinative of the jury's determination as to whether to
impose a death sentence. Each juror must not only weigh all relevant evi-
dence: they must make the ultimate reasoned moral choice as to whether
the defendant shall be sentenced to death.
Id.
403. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(i), (vii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
404. "Concurrent counts' means two or more counts of an indictment upon
which concurrent sentences only may be imposed in case of conviction thereon."
N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW § 300.30(3) (McKinney 1993). A concurrent count is to be
distinguished from a consecutive count in an indictment. "'Consecutive counts'
means two or more counts of an indictment upon which consecutive sentences may
be imposed in case of conviction thereon." Id. § 300.30(2). A murder involving a
single victim, based on alternative provisions of the first-degree murder statute,
could not result in consecutive sentences, and hence would involve concurrent
counts in an indictment. See N.Y. CraM. PRoc. § 300.30 commentary (McKinney
1993).
405. See id. § 300.40(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
406. See id. § 400.27(3). See also id. § 300.40 (Practice Commentaries, Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1996):
The rationale for [the amendment requiring the court to submit all concur-
rent counts of first-degree murder to the jury] is that each of the concurrent
counts would allege a different aggravating circumstance-i.e., a separate
crime-founded upon the basic element of intentional killing.. . and, under
the statutory structure for determining whether the sentence shall be death
or life imprisonment without parole, the jury cannot consider any of the ag-
gravating circumstances set forth in the various subdivisions of the murder
in the first degree statute unless it has found the defendant guilty thereof in
the guilt phase.
N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. § 300.40 (Practice Commentaries, McKinney Supp. 1996).
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of death should be imposed and whether or not a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole should be imposed.. .. "407
This provision is likely to cause confusion and may preju-
dice the defendant. Jurors justifiably will wonder why they are
being asked to consider separate and multiple sentences for the
offender's murder of a single victim. In the above example, the
jury will be instructed to impose one sentence based on the de-
fendant's conviction for the murder of a police officer, after con-
sidering the aggravating sentencing factors involving the
killing of a police officer and the commission of a murder during
a robbery. The jury will be instructed to impose another sen-
tence for the same killing, based on the defendant's conviction
for murder perpetrated during a robbery, and it will consider
the same aggravating sentencing factors involving the killing of
a police officer and the commission of a murder during a rob-
bery. These sentences are, and will appear to be, cumulative.
The jury well may infer that the law ordains that the defendant
deserves multiple punishments, based on the peculiar require-
ment that it return separate sentences of death or LWOP for
different counts of the same killing.
A jury's determination that an offender should be sen-
tenced to death or life imprisonment without parole is binding
on the court,408 although the trial judge may set aside a death
sentence for reasons specified under law.409 When a trial judge
407. N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(10) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
408. Id. § 400.27(11)(d),(e).
409. Id. § 400.27(11)(d). This provision authorizes the trial judge to set aside
a death sentence "upon any of the grounds set forth in [N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law]
section 330.30." The latter section permits a judge to set aside or modify a verdict
on the following grounds:
1. Any ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal
from a prospective judgment of conviction, would require a reversal or modi-
fication of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court.
2. That during the trial there occurred, out of the presence of the court,
improper conduct by another person in relation to a juror, which may have
affected a substantial right of the defendant and which was not known to
the defendant prior to the rendition of the verdict; or
3. That new evidence has been discovered since the trial which could
not have been produced by the defendant at the trial even with due diligence
on his part and is of such character as to create a probability that had such
evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant.
N.Y. CRM. PRoc. LAW § 330.30 (McKinney 1994).
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sets aside a death sentence, the ordinary relief granted is a new
sentencing hearing, although under appropriate circumstances
the death sentence can be vacated, and a lesser sentence en-
tered.410 The prosecution may appeal a judge's decision to set
aside a death sentence, 41' and the defendant likewise may ap-
peal from the judge's refusal to do so.412 Either party is entitled
to poll the jury regarding its sentencing verdict. 41 3
6. The (Partial) Exclusion of Mentally
Retarded Offenders
I would prefer a much tighter bill on the issue of retardation.
-Assemblyman James Brennan414
Both substantively and procedurally, the death penalty
statute's treatment of mentally retarded offenders smacks of
compromise. Most, but not all, first-degree murderers who
demonstrate that they were mentally retarded when they com-
mitted their crimes are excluded from death-penalty eligibil-
ity.415 The statutory exemption does not apply when a state or
local correctional employee is murdered by a mentally retarded
defendant who is confined in a correctional facility.41 6 The stat-
410. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(11)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See id.
§ 330.50(1) (McKinney 1994):
Upon setting aside or modifying a verdict or a part thereof upon a ground
specified in subdivision one of section 330.30, the court must take the same
action as the appropriate appellate court would be required to take upon
reversing or modifying a judgment upon the particular ground in issue.
Id.
411. Id. §§ 400.27(11)(d), 450.80(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
412. Id. § 450.70(4). Professor Preiser's Practice Commentary suggests that
"it is difficult to understand the rationale for" allowing the defendant to appeal
from the trial judge's decision to refuse to set aside a death sentence, "since the
defendant will automatically be appealing the entire judgment, including of course
the sentence, and such review cannot be waived." N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27
commentary (McKinney 1996).
413. N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(11)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
414. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 286.
415. N.Y. CRIm. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(12)(c),(e) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Sub-
ject to the exception discussed below, mentally retarded first-degree murderers are
sentenced by the trial judge to a regular life sentence or to life imprisonment with-
out parole. Id.
416. Id. § 400.27(12)(d). This section provides:
In the event that a defendant is convicted of murder in the first degree
pursuant to subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section
125.27 of the penal law, and the killing occurred while the defendant was
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ute's dual, and in some respects mystifying, procedures that
govern proof of mental retardation also reflect the back-stage
differences of opinion that eventually gave birth to these
provisions.
The federal Constitution does not prohibit the execution of
mentally retarded persons convicted of capital murder.417 By
statute, at least ten other states and the federal government
exempt mentally retarded offenders from death penalty eligibil-
ity.418 New York's policy of partial exclusion is unique. In all
other jurisdictions mental retardation either is an absolute bar
to capital punishment, or it simply is a factor to be considered in
possible mitigation of punishment.
The presumed justification for New York's policy is to
protect correctional employees from the threat of murder by
mentally retarded prisoners.419 It is unclear whether incapaci-
confined or under custody in a state correctional facility or local correctional
institution, and a sentence of death is imposed, such sentence may not be set
aside pursuant to this subdivision upon the ground that the defendant is
mentally retarded. Nothing... shall preclude a defendant from presenting
mitigating evidence of mental retardation at the separate sentencing
proceeding.
Id.
Since N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27(l)(a)(iii) applies when the intended murder vic-
tim was an employee of a state correctional institution or a local correctional facil-
ity (engaged in the performance of official duties, and whom the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known was so employed), a mentally retarded offender
technically could be executed for killing someone other than a correctional em-
ployee. See supra note 65. See generally supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text
(discussing first-degree murder under the above-cited statutory provision).
417. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). In Penry, the Court ruled by vote
of 5-4 that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not prohibit the execution
of a convicted murderer whose IQ was "between 50 and 63, which indicated mild to
moderate retardation." Id. at 307-08 (footnote omitted). At the same time, the
Court acknowledged the common law prohibition against the execution of "idiots"
and "lunatics" which was effective when the Eighth Amendment was adopted, and
suggested "that it may indeed be 'cruel and unusual' punishment to execute per-
sons who are profoundly or severely retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions." Id. at 333.
418. 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (Supp. 1995); 21 U.S.C. § 848(1) (Supp. 1995); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(b) (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-403 (Supp. 1995);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(a) (Michie Supp.
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(d) (Supp. 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.140
(Michie Supp. 1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(f) (Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(B) (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (Supp. 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2) (West Supp. 1996).
419. See Executive Memorandum, supra note 12, at 3.
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tation, through execution, or general deterrence by the threat of
execution is the motivating factor.420 Nor is it evident why only
correctional employees and not other prisoners or visitors to
correctional facilities merit the protection that this section pre-
sumably affords. It is further puzzling why mentally retarded
pretrial detainees, who may be in jail awaiting trial on minor
charges, and long-term prisoners who are mentally retarded are
equally eligible for the death penalty under this section. But
what is most troublesome about this provision is that it is
squarely at odds with the fundamental reason justifying the
general exclusion of mentally retarded offenders from capital-
punishment eligibility: their diminished moral responsibility or
culpability, which is attributable to greatly subnormal mental
capabilities.421 The following colloquy that transpired during
the Assembly debate of the death penalty bill exposes this
problem.
MR. BRENNAN: Can you explain to me the distinction be-
tween or the rationale for-if we have someone who is mentally
retarded and we determine that they are mentally retarded in one
circumstance, they can be executed, but in another circumstance,
they cannot be executed?
MR. VITALIANO: ... [Tihe fact that a person who is men-
tally retarded commits murder while serving a sentence in a cor-
rectional institution has established a greater propensity or
To protect the lives of correctional employees, and of other inmates, the bill
stipulates that a sentence of death may not be set aside on the ground that
the defendant is mentally retarded if the murder was committed while the
defendant was under custody in a State or local correctional facility.
Id. The Governor's memorandum errs when it suggests that mentally retarded
prisoners or jail inmates who murder someone other than a correctional employee
(e.g., another inmate) are eligible for the death penalty under this section.
420. "Incapacitation is the effect of isolating an identified offender from the
larger society, thereby preventing him or her from committing crimes in that soci-
ety." DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 3 (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel
Nagin eds., 1978) (emphasis in original). Incapacitation, or isolation, differs from
general deterrence. General deterrence is "defined in a legal context as an in-
stance where an individual refrains from a criminal act or somehow limits its com-
mission because of fear that otherwise someone will be legally punished." Jack
Gibbs, Preventive Effects of Capital Punishment Other than Deterrence, 14 CRIM. L.
BULL. 34, 36 (1978).
421. See generally Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 343-48 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to
Death: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REv. 725, 743-46 (1988).
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danger to correctional officers, thereby making that mentally re-
tarded defendant eligible for prosecution under the provisions of
the death penalty bill-
MR. BRENNAN: You're saying that the rationale is that the
defendant is more culpable in a case where they are already in a
correctional facility than if they are not, is that correct?
MR. VITALIANO: I don't think the-"culpable" really isn't
what subsection D is after .... Subsection D is after the threat to
correctional service personnel.
MR. BRENNAN: I see. In other words, we're trying to pro-
tect-the issue is not really related to the capacity of the defend-
ant or the culpability of the defendant, it's a distinction involving
seeking to protect correction officers, as compared to all other
citizens?
MR. VITALIANO: Based on the circumstances of that partic-
ular case, where there is a mentally retarded defendant incarcer-
ated in a correctional facility, that is something that elevates the
concern, and the threat exists to correctional personnel is what
motivates this particular subdivision .... 422
This troublesome provision is rarely likely to come into
play, but if and when it does, it harbors obvious equal protection
concerns. 423 The Supreme Court has ruled that mental retarda-
tion is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring
more exacting scrutiny than normally is accorded social and
economic legislation, under the rational basis test.424 However,
the classification created under New York's death penalty stat-
ute is not between mentally retarded and non-mentally re-
tarded offenders, but between incarcerated mentally retarded
murderers whose intended victims are corrections employees,
and all other mentally retarded murderers. This classification
422. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 277-78 (remarks of Assemblymen
James Brennan and Eric Vitaliano). Mr. Vitaliano was the principal sponsor of the
bill in the Assembly.
423. More fundamental arguments could be raised regarding whether any
mentally retarded offender can be executed, under the state constitution's cruel
and unusual punishments and due process clauses. Cf. Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d
473, 479-81 (Fla.), (Barkett, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 109 (1993)
(arguing that the execution of mentally retarded murderers violates the Florida
Constitution's prohibition against cruel or unusual punishments); Fleming v. Zant,
259 Ga. 687, 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989) (holding that the Georgia Constitution's cruel
and unusual punishments clause prohibits the execution of mentally retarded
offenders).
424. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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can be justified only if it is first assumed that the general ex-
emption of mentally retarded murderers from death penalty eli-
gibility is not based on a legislative judgment that mentally
retarded individuals lack sufficient culpability to be punished
by death. Surely, none would argue that capital punishment
should be imposed on a morally irresponsible agent, even
though other utilitarian goals, such as the protection of correc-
tions employees, might be promoted by using the capital
sanction.425
A second assumption that must be indulged is that capital
punishment for this narrow class of mentally retarded offenders
in fact does promote the protection of corrections employees.
For this assumption to hold, it must be accepted that mentally
retarded prisoners or jail inmates can be deterred from murder-
ing corrections employees by the threat of capital punish-
425. The death penalty cannot be used to promote the utilitarian objectives of
punishment unless the prior judgment is made that the offender is sufficiently cul-
pable to deserve to be punished by death. For example, in Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977), the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty is per se uncon-
stitutional for the crime of the rape of an adult. Justice White's plurality opinion
observed that: "Because the death sentence is a disproportionate punishment for
rape, it is cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment even though it may measurably serve the legitimate ends of punish-
ment and therefore is not invalid for its failure to do so." Id. at 592 n.4 (plurality
opinion). This same principle causes it to be unthinkable to make the death pen-
alty available for an offense such as double-parking, even though executing motor-
ists who double park well might deter the commission of that offense, and would
incapacitate violators. A threshold level of culpability is a prerequiste for the
death penalty even among those convicted of murder. See Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion) (death penalty is cruel and unusual punish-
ment for offender who was 15 years old when he committed murder, at least absent
legislation specifically authorizing capital punishment for such youthful defend-
ants); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (offender convicted of felony murder
not eligible for capital punishment when he was a minor participant in the under-
lying felony, and did not intend to kill, attempt to kill, or actually kill the homicide
victims).
In this same vein, consider the remarks of Assemblyman Edward Sullivan
during the legislative debate on New York's death penalty bill:
We know that a retarded person will be executed if that person, half in con-
trol of himself, kills in a prison, then we can say, "Well, we don't know what
do with you. We don't know how to handle you. So, we'll kill you. We know
you didn't know what you were doing, but well kill you anyway because we
don't know what else to do, and it might cost money if we don't. Of course, it
will cost more money to do it, but-"
Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 456-57.
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ment,426 or else that once they commit such a murder, their
execution is justifiable to incapacitate them, i.e., to ensure that
they will not kill another corrections employee. It further must
be postulated either that nonincarcerated mentally retarded in-
dividuals are not deterrable, or are not in need of incapacitation
by capital punishment, or that the class of victims-corrections
employees-deserves special protection that is not owed police
officers, witnesses, judges, prospective torture-murder victims
or rape-murder victims, or any other citizen who might be the
victim of a first-degree murder committed by a mentally re-
tarded individual. Only a rational basis test strained to the
breaking point will allow this classification to survive an equal
protection challenge.
The statute defines "mental retardation" as "significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concur-
rently with deficits in adaptive behavior which were manifested
before the age of eighteen."427 This definition is consistent with
the standard adopted by the American Association on Mental
Retardation.428 The defendant must prove his or her mental re-
426. But see BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 12 ("Public opinion data
indicate that 82% of New Yorkers oppose the execution of the mentally retarded.
The retribution and deterrence rationales which underly support for the death
penalty also have little if any force when applied to an individual who is mentally
retarded.").
427. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(12)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1996). The As-
sembly Codes Committee Bill Memorandum elaborates on this definition, as
follows:
With a slight modification, the universally acepted definition of mental re-
tardation established by the American Association on Mental Retardation
(AAMR) is used for determining mental retardation under the statute.
Under that definition, "mental retardation" means significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adap-
tive behavior which were manifested before the age of eighteen. This defini-
tion differs from the AAMR definition only in that the AAMR definition
specifies that mental retardation must be manifested during the develop-
mental period. Pursuant to AAMR standards, an individual is mentally re-
tarded when they [sic] have an intelligence quotient below 75, their [sic]
mental disability exists concurrently with behavioral difficulties, and their
[sic] disability occurred before the age of eighteen.
BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 12.
428. Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present func-
tioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual function-
ing, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the
following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home
living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, func-
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tardation by a preponderance of the evidence, 429 and the trial
judge determines whether this burden has been satisfied.430 If
the trial judge declines to find that the defendant is mentally
retarded, the sentencing jury still is entitled to consider mental
retardation as a mitigating factor. 431
Alternative procedures are available for deciding whether a
defendant is mentally retarded. The first option requires the
judge to conduct a hearing after the offender has been convicted
of first-degree murder, and before the penalty trial commences,
upon the defendant's motion and a showing of reasonable cause
to believe the defendant is mentally retarded. This hearing is to
be held before the court alone, or, on the consent of both parties,
it may be conducted in whole or in part in the presence of the
sentencing jury. The court is the finder of fact, but does not
announce at the conclusion of the hearing whether or not the
offender is mentally retarded. Instead, the judge is required to
"defer rendering any finding.., as to whether the defendant is
mentally retarded until a sentence is imposed ....
The sentencing hearing then is conducted, and the jury
may consider evidence of the defendant's mental retardation as
tional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before
age 18.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINI-
TION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992).
If an individual scores in or below the range of 70-75 on a standardized IQ
test, the first prong of the definition of mental retardation-that involving "signifi-
cantly subaverage intellectual functioning"-generally is considered to be satis-
fied. Id. at 25. For a helpful discussion of the meaning of mental retardation, see
James W. Ellis, Decisions By and For People with Mental Retardation: Balancing
Considerations of Autonomy and Protection, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1779, 1780-82 & nn.2-
7 (1992). See also Heidi A. Boyden, Comment, Heller v. Doe: Denying Equal Protec-
tion to the Mentally Retarded, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 437,
453-55 & nn.133-44 (1995).
429. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAw § 400.27(12)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996). New
York's law is consistent with the laws of most other jurisdictions in requiring the
defendant to establish mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 413.
430. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(12)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996). In most
jurisdictions that exclude mentally retarded offenders from death-penalty eligibil-
ity, the trial judge, rather than the jury determines whether the defendant is men-
tally retarded. However, in Georgia, the jury must return a verdict that the
offender is guilty but mentally retarded. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (1990). See
Dimensions of Capital Murder, supra note 23, at 413.
431. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 400.27(12)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
432. Id. § 400.27(12)(a).
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a mitigating circumstance. 433 If the jury does not sentence the
offender to death, the mental retardation issue presumably is
moot, and the judge enters no finding. 43 4 The trial court does
announce its finding regarding the offender's mental retarda-
tion if the jury sentences the defendant to death. An affirma-
tive finding results in the death sentence being set aside, and
the judge imposes a sentence of either LWOP or regular life.
The court simply accepts the jury's death penalty verdict if it
finds that the defendant is not mentally retarded.435 The de-
fendant presumably is entitled to include the trial judge's ad-
verse finding about mental retardation with other appeal
issues. The prosecution is not authorized to appeal a trial
court's finding that the defendant is mentally retarded under
these procedures. 436
The procedures have a surreal quality about them. Under
other circumstances, this quality would be intriguing, but in
this context the procedures also are unusually detrimental to
the administration of justice. One byproduct of the procedures
is tremendous inefficiency. The potential disillusionment of ju-
rors is another. Unnecessary emotional trauma for all parties
to the proceeding is another. Unless the parties agree to their
presence, the jurors will be required to sit idly for a substantial
period of time between the guilt-phase and the penalty-phase
trials while a hearing on the offender's mental retardation is
conducted.437 Alternate jurors cannot be discharged, 438 and the
jury may be sequestered.43 9 Then, even if the judge is convinced
that the evidence of the offender's mental retardation is over-
whelming, the judge is precluded from making such a finding.
A protracted sentencing hearing will ensue.
433. Id. § 400.27(9)(b).
434. Id. § 400.27(12)(b).
435. Id. § 400.27(12)(c).
436. Compare id. § 400.27(2)(f) (authorizing prosecutor's appeal of trial court's
finding that defendant is mentally retarded under alternative procedures). See in-
fra note 439 and accompanying text.
437. The hearing on mental retardation may be lengthy and involved. See
Denis Keyes & William Edwards, Documenting Mental Retardation by Thorough
Investigation, CAPITAL REPORT 1, No. 42, May/June 1995, at 1 (describing docu-
mentation of mental retardation in context of a capital case).
438. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 270.30(2).
439. Id. § 270.55.
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Jurors will anguish over the appropriate sentence to im-
pose, 440 and counsel, the defendant, and relatives of the defend-
ant and of the murder victim will experience similar emotional
upheaval." 1 Of course, the entire penalty-phase trial and delib-
erations may be completely unnecessary, since the trial judge
will know whether he or she is prepared to find that the defend-
ant is mentally retarded. It is as if the offender were only sev-
enteen years old, and too young to be sentenced to death under
New York law, yet the judge waited until after the penalty trial
and the jury's sentencing verdict to disclose that fact." 2
Under the alternative procedures provided by the statute,
the mental retardation hearing can be conducted, and the issue
resolved, on the defendant's written, pretrial motion.443 If the
judge finds that the defendant is mentally retarded, the prose-
cution has the right to an interlocutory appeal to the Appellate
Division, and the appeal is to be decided on an expedited basis
440. Capital trials are extremely stressful to jurors, because they are en-
trusted with the responsibility of deciding whether another human being should
live or die. See Leigh B. Bienen, Helping Jurors Out: Post-Verdict Debriefing for
Jurors in Emotionally Disturbing Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1333 (1993). See generally
Tori DeAngelis, Juror Stress Can Influence Final Verdict, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N
MONITOR, June, 1995, at 5-6; Theodore B. Feldmann & Roger A. Bell, Crisis De-
briefing of a Jury After a Murder Trial, 42 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 79
(1991).
441. See generally Margaret Vandiver, Coping with Death: Families of the
Terminally Ill, Homicide Victims and Condemned Prisoners, in FACING THE DEATH
PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 123 (Michael L. Radelet
ed., 1989).
442. See Harvy Lipman, Death Penalty Looks Like Done Deal, TIMES UNION
(Albany, NY), Feb. 16, 1995, at Al, A12 (remarks of Jonathan Gradess, Executive
Director of the New York State Defenders Association). See also Harvy Lipman,
Senate Republicans Put Democrats on the Spot by Passing a Bill to Restore State's
Death Penalty, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Feb. 28, 1995, at Al, A16:
"If a judge has already heard evidence and decided a person is mentally
retarded, why spend all this money on a sentencing trial, have the jury sen-
tence someone to death, and then have the judge say, 'Fooled ya, he's men-
tally retarded?'" said Ron Tabak, president of New York Lawyers Against
the Death Penalty. Tabak added that the "... . approach is unfair, because
judges would face enormous pressure not to rule someone is mentally re-
tarded after a jury has issued its verdict."
Id.
443. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1996). The mo-
tion must be filed "at a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial," and it
must allege "reasonable cause to believe the defendant is mentally retarded.. .
Id.
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"so that pretrial delays are minimized."" 4 If the finding on the
defendant's mental retardation is not appealed, or if it is af-
firmed on appeal, then no separate penalty trial is conducted
following a conviction for first-degree murder, and the defend-
ant must be sentenced to a regular life prison sentence or
LWOP. If the trial judge finds that the defendant is not men-
tally retarded, the case proceeds to trial. The defendant may
present mitigating evidence concerning his or her alleged
mental retardation at the penalty trial following a conviction for
first-degree murder.445 These procedures are infinitely more ra-
tional than the alternative ones, which apparently were
designed to provide the prosecution with the right to appeal a
trial court's finding of mental retardation in cases in which a
jury's sentence of death is set aside on that basis.446
C. The Capital Jury
Assemblyman Nick Perry: I am concerned that the death qualifi-
cation process might disproportionately exclude women and cer-
tain racial, ethnic groups from serving on juries. Are there
provisions in this bill to guard against that?447
Assemblyman Eric Vitaliano: Yes, Nick. The bill guards against
the situation you've described in a number of ways, including ex-
tensive jury selection provisions and the impaneling of a new jury
in extraordinary circumstances. But more importantly, current
444. Id § 400.27(12)(f). See also N.Y. Ct. Appeals Proposed Uniform Proce-
dures for Appeals from Pretrial Findings of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases
§§ 540.0-540.1; 1100.1-1100-3 (Sept. 15, 1995).
445. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(12)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
446. Id. §§ 450.20(10); 450.80(4). See Executive Memorandum, supra note 12,
at 3.
As an alternative, a hearing regarding mental retardation can be held after
a defendant is convicted. In that case, the hearing would be held either
prior to, or contemporaneously with, the separate sentencing proceeding. To
preserve the prosecution's right to take an appeal directly to the Court of
Appeals a determination regarding mental retardation would only be made
if the jury votes to impose the death penalty. If the jury does so and the
court determines that the defendant is mentally retarded, the court must
set aside the death sentence and impose a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole or a sentence with a minimum term of from 20 to 25 years
and a maximum term of life imprisonment.
Id.
447. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 17.
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law protects against such discrimination and our Court of Appeals
has so held.A
Assemblywoman Barbara Clark: [This] bill... [has] the potential
to disproportionately imperil people of color by a factor of four, a
multiple that is not diminished one bit by the Alice in Wonder-
land idea that private screening of potential death-penalty jurors
will compel those jurors to admit any and all racial bias and,
therefore, prevent a conviction based on color.44 9
The statute requires that jurors must be both "death-quali-
fied" and "life-qualified" in order to serve in cases where "[t]he
crime charged may be punishable by death."450 Specifically, a
prospective juror may be challenged for cause in a capital case
whenever he or she:
entertains such conscientious opinions either against or in favor
of [the death penalty].., as to preclude such juror from rendering
an impartial verdict or from properly exercising the discretion
conferred upon such juror by law in the determination of
sentence.
45
'
As a practical matter, the number of prospective jurors who
hold very strong views against the death penalty, and are not
death-qualified, will exceed the number whose very strong pro-
death penalty attitudes render them not life-qualified (i.e., im-
paired from giving a defendant charged with capital murder a
fair trial on guilt or innocence, or impaired from considering a
sentence other than death).452 Estimates vary regarding the
sizes of the respective groups of excludable jurors and are some-
448. Id.
449. Id. at 155.
450. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 270.20(1)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1996). The unique
provisions regarding capital juries certainly will apply only in first-degree murder
cases in which the prosecution has filed the required notice of intention to seek a
capital sentence, even though all cases of first-degree murder, in theory, "may be
punishable by death." See id. § 250.40(2). "A notice of intent to seek the death
penalty may be withdrawn at any time," even after a defendant's conviction for
first-degree murder. Id. §§ 250.40(4), 400.27(1). This feature raises the possibility
of abuse of capital sentencing provisions by prosecutors who perceive benefits in
impaneling a death-qualified jury, but who have no intention of requesting a death
sentence on the defendant's conviction for first-degree murder. See Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 188 n.4 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
451. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 270.20(1)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
452. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). There, the Supreme
Court recognized that
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what unstable because the legal standards for excusing jurors
for cause based on their death penalty attitudes have changed
over time, 453 and also because Americans' opinions about capital
punishment have not remained constant.45 4 No studies have
specifically examined prospective jurors in New York. Other re-
[a] juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will
fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances as the instructions require him to do.... [Biased on the require-
ment of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective
juror who maintains such views.
Id. at 729.
453. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Supreme Court
ruled in Witherspoon that excusing for cause from a capital trial all prospective
jurors who had "conscientious scruples" against the death penalty denied the de-
fendant a fair trial on the issue of sentencing. Id. In reaching this decision, the
justices announced that:
nothing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant
sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in
fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that
they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment
without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the
case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would
prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
Id. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original). Years later, in Wainwright v. Witt, the
Court explicitly modified Witherspoon's death-qualification standard. 469 U.S. 412
(1985). Under Witt, the "standard for determining when a prospective juror may
be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment . . .is
whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" Id. at
424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). Additionally, under the Witt
test the grounds for disqualifying a prospective juror no longer have to be "unmis-
takably clear," as Witherspoon had required. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424. A juror may be
excluded under Witt if the trial judge 'is left with the definite impression that a
prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law." Id.
at 426.
The Witt standard permits the disqualification of a larger class of prospective
jurors than does application of the Witherspoon test, and the results of research on
the effects of death qualification are affected by which legal standard has been
employed. See Craig Haney et al., 'Modern" Death Qualification: New Data on Its
Biasing Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 619 (1994); William C. Thompson, Death
Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart v. McCree, 13 LAW & Hum.
BEHAV. 185 (1989).
454. See Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty Opinion, 1936-1986: A
Critical Examination of the Gallup Polls, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CUR-
RENT RESEARCH 113 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991); Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R.
Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J.
Soc. ISSUES 19, 20 (1994) (reporting results of public opinion about capital punish-
ment over time, including that roughly 47% of Americans supported the death pen-
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search suggests that between 8.4% and 17% of citizens eligible
for jury duty are not death qualified,455 and between 1% and
8.6% are not life-qualified. 456
Not surprisingly, systematically disqualifying individuals
from jury service based on their death penalty views (or rather,
how those views impinge on their willingness to follow the law)
changes the demographic composition of capital juries, and also
can influence the decision of cases. Death qualification skews
both the racial and gender composition of capital juries. As a
group, African-Americans express dramatically less support for
the death penalty than do whites, and women support capital
punishment at measurably lower levels than men.457 Conse-
quently, death-qualified juries tend to underrepresent African-
Americans and women compared to their prevalence in the cor-
responding community. 458
alty in 1967, compared with 70-75% who supported the death penalty in the 1980s
through the mid-1990s).
455. See Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Con-
trol: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 31, 42 (1984)
(17.2% of respondents not death qualified); Haney et al., supra note 453, at 624-25
(8.4% of respondents not death qualified under Witt standard); Thompson, supra
note 453, at 209 (11% to 17% of respondents not death qualified); Grigsby v. Ma-
bry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1308 (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd in part en banc 758 F.2d 226
(8th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (over 14%
of Arkansas respondents not death qualified); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162,
187 & n.3 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (estimating 11%-17% of potential jurors
are not death qualified, and citing studies).
456. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1307-08 (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd
in part en banc 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162 (1986) (reviewing studies suggesting that less than 1% to 2% of re-
spondents are "automatic death penalty" jurors, or are not life qualified); Joseph B.
Kadane, After Hovey: A Note On Taking Account of the Automatic Death Penalty
Jurors, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 115, 116 (1984) (1% of respondents not life quali-
fied); James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors'Re-
sponses to Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 263, 274-76 (1988) (1% of respondents not life qualified); Haney et
al., supra note 453, at 625 (8.6% of respondents not life qualified).
457. See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 454, at 21-22 (presenting table that
reflects roughly 50%-60% of African-Americans favor death penalty, compared to
roughly 75%-80% of whites, and that men (roughly 80%) support the death penalty
more than do women (roughly 70%)); James A. Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in
the Post-Furman Years, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 499, 518-19 (1990-1991).
458. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 455, at 46. ("Blacks are more
likely than other racial groups to be excluded under Witherspoon (25.5% vs.
16.5%). Similarly, our data confirm the finding that death qualification removes
more women than men from capital juries (21% vs. 13%)."); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569
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Research studies further suggest that death-qualified ju-
ries are more conviction-prone than juries whose membership
has not been affected by the death-qualification process.459 Peo-
ple with strong views against capital punishment tend to hold
other attitudes about the criminal justice system that are rele-
vant to the tasks they would confront as jurors.460 Thus, pro-
spective jurors who are not death-qualified generally put
greater stock in the presumption of innocence than do death-
qualified jurors, are less likely to infer guilt from the defend-
ant's failure to testify at trial, are less willing to accept the tes-
timony of police officers uncritically, define proof beyond a
reasonable doubt at a higher threshold, evaluate aggravating
and mitigating evidence differently, and harbor other views
that directly bear on the assessment of evidence at a criminal
trial.461 Death-qualified juries tend to deliberate for less time,
discuss the evidence presented less extensively, and are more
apt to convict defendants and find them guilty of more serious
charges, than are juries that have not been death-qualified.4 2
F. Supp. 1273, 1294 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aft'd in part en banc, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.
1985) (en banc), rev'd sub non. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). Research
completed for this litigation reflected that
forty-five percent of Arkansas blacks indicated that they were strongly op-
posed [to capital punishment] compared to 10% of the whites. Twenty-one
percent of Arkansas women were strongly opposed compared to 8% of the
men.... [Elven after excluding "nullifiers" [jurors unable to decide guilt or
innocence fairly because of their death penalty views] 29% of the blacks
would never impose the death penalty compared to 9% of the whites. And
whereas only 8% of Arkansas men would be Witherspoon excludables (after
removing "nullifiers"), 13% of Arkansas women would fall into that classifi-
cation. These results are consistent with national surveys over the past 30
years.
Id. A more recent study, which took account of a larger segment of individuals who
would be excluded from capital jury service because of their strong pro-death pen-
alty views, as well as those who would be excluded because of their opposition to
capital punishment, also found that the disqualification process disproportionately
excluded minority group members. See Haney et al., supra note 453, at 629-30.
459. See Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1294.
460. See id.
461. See Cowan et al., The Effect of Dealth Qualification on Jurors'Predisposi-
tion to Convict and On the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 53
(1984).
462. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 199-202 (1986) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1287-1305 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (review-
ing studies), affd in part en banc, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Cowan et al., supra note 461, at 53;
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After reluctantly assuming the validity of such research
findings in Lockhart v. McCree,463 the Supreme Court rejected a
claim by a capital-murder defendant that he was denied his
rights to an impartial jury, and to a jury selected from a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community, as a result of the
death-qualification of his jury. McCree had been convicted of
capital murder, but he was not sentenced to death.464 He ar-
gued that it was unfair to excuse from the guilt phase of his
trial those prospective jurors whose attitudes about capital pun-
ishment would preclude them from sentencing him to death, but
who nevertheless were capable of deciding his guilt or innocence
impartially.465 The unnecessary death-qualification of jurors for
Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 455; Haney et
al., supra note 453; William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Con-
viction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes Into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 95 (1984).
463. 476 U.S. 162 (1986). Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion took pains "to
point out what we believe to be several serious flaws in the evidence... [regarding]
the conclusion that 'death qualification' produces 'conviction-prone' juries." Id. at
168 (footnote omitted). After criticizing the research studies, the Court neverthe-
less agreed to "assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both meth-
odologically valid and adequate to establish that 'death qualification' in fact
produces juries somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' ju-
ries." Id. at 173. For an assessment of the Court's criticisms of the social science
evidence regarding death qualification, see Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleasant
Facts: The Supreme Court's Response to Empirical Research on Capital Punish-
ment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE AP-
PROACHES 177, 189-205 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds. 1988). See
generally James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Re-
search Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 LAw & Soc'y
REV. 65, 76 n.9 (1993)[hereinafter Different Agenda].
464. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 166 (1986). Because the prosecu-
tor had sought the death penalty, the trial jury was death qualified. Eight pro-
spective jurors were excused for cause because they did not meet death-
qualification standards. Id.
465. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 167. Potential jurors whose strong anti-death
penalty views render them ineligible for jury service under Witherspoon v. Illinois,
or Wainwright v. Witt are generally known as "Witherspoon Excludables" or "Witt
Excludables," or simply as WE's. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968);
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); see supra note 453. The Witt Exclud-
ables, in turn, are comprised of two different groups. "Nullifiers" have such strong
beliefs against capital punishment that they could not in good conscience vote to
convict a defendant for a capital crime, since that conviction could result in a sen-
tence of death. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 172. "Guilt Phase Includables" (GPI's),
on the other hand, are capable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict at the guilt
phase of a capital trial, but could not vote to sentence a defendant to death and
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guilt-phase proceedings, he asserted, had resulted in a convic-
tion-prone jury, and a jury that did not reflect a fair cross-sec-
tion of the community.466 Relying in part on the state's
significant interest in not having to impanel two juries in capi-
tal cases that resulted in first-degree murder convictions-one
to determine guilt (which would not be death-qualified), and a
second to impose sentence (which would be death-qualified)467-
a majority of the Court ruled that the death-qualification pro-
cess violated none of McCree's Sixth Amendment rights to a
jury trial.468
Whether guilt-phase juries in first-degree murder trials
should be subjected to the death-qualification process is an es-
pecially interesting issue under New York law. The statute ex-
pressly contemplates that separate juries can be impaneled for
the guilt-phase and penalty trials in first-degree murder cases,
although "only in extraordinary circumstances and upon a
showing of good cause, which may include, but is not limited to,
a finding of prejudice to either party."469 It also requires that
after a jury has convicted a defendant of first-degree murder,
and before the penalty trial commences, the trial judge must
individually examine each juror outside of the presence of other
jurors, in order to "determine whether any juror has a state of
mind that is likely to preclude the juror from rendering an im-
partial decision based upon the evidence adduced during the
hence could not be impartial jurors for a penalty trial. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. at 421. McCree's argument focused solely on the exclusion of Guilt Phase
Includable jurors during the guilt-determination stage of his capital trial. See
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 172. He did not argue that Nullifiers could not be discharged
from the guilt-phase trial, nor that Witt Excludables could not be discharged if and
when the jury was asked to decide whether he, as a convicted capital defendant,
should be sentenced to death. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 170 n.7.
466. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168.
467. The Court recognized "the State's entirely proper interest in obtaining a
single jury that could impartially decide all the issues in McCree's case." Lockhart,
476 U.S. at 180. It acknowledged that the guilt and sentencing decisions often are
interrelated, and it suggested that any "residual doubt" that the jury maintained
about guilt might work to the defendant's benefit at sentencing. It also noted that
impaneling separate guilt-phase and sentencing-phase juries would require the
duplication of much testimony. See id. at 181. In dissent, Justice Marshall charac-
terized the state interests based on "efficient trial management" as being "merely
unconvincing," and the interest based on the issue of residual doubt as being "of-
fensive." Id. at 204 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
468. See id. at 162.
469. N.Y. CmM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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[sentencing] proceeding."470 Any juror failing this test must be
discharged and replaced by an alternate juror.471 The law au-
thorizes the trial court to seat as many alternate jurors as it
deems appropriate, a significant departure from the maximum
of six alternate jurors that may be chosen in other criminal
cases.
4 7 2
These provisions reflect that the Legislature perceived no
overriding interest in ensuring that the same twelve jurors who
decide guilt in a first-degree murder trial must also decide the
defendant's sentence. Whatever interest exists in retaining
identical guilt-phase and sentencing-phase juries yields under
the statute whenever a prospective penalty-phase juror has a
state of mind at the conclusion of the guilt trial that is "likely to
preclude" that individual from rendering an impartial sentenc-
ing decision.473 This principle meshes neatly with the defend-
ant's position in Lockhart v. McCree.474 In that case, the
defendant argued that a juror who is capable of impartially de-
ciding guilt or innocence at a capital trial need not be disquali-
fied until the penalty hearing if his or her views about capital
punishment would preclude an impartial sentencing decision. 475
470. Id. See BiL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 6.
It is envisioned that in most cases, the jurors who sat at the guilt phase of
the trial will remain at the sentencing phase. A juror might be replaced if
the juror became grossly unqualified for further service, had legally im-
proper contact during the guilt phase proceedings or was otherwise legally
barred from continuing. However, a juror's reluctance or discomfort with
performing the weighty duty of determining whether the death penalty
should be imposed should not be grounds for replacing that juror with an
alternate juror.
Id.
471. See N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
472. See id. § 270.30(1). Alternate jurors are not to be discharged until the
completion of the sentencing proceeding in first-degree murder cases in which capi-
tal punishment is sought. See id. § 270.30(2).
473. N.Y. CPiM PRoc. LAW § 400.27(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Trial judges
will have to exercise great caution in applying this standard. The removal of ju-
rors who have a "state of mind that is likely to preclude" them from rendering an
impartial sentencing decision, (id. § 400.27(2)), would be improper when applied
against jurors who express reservations about imposing a death sentence, unless
their views would "prevent or substantially impair" their ability to render a sen-
tencing decision under the law. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)
(quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). See supra note 453.
474. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
475. Id.
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Consistent with this principle, the defendant's interests in se-
curing an impartial guilt-phase jury that reflects a fair cross-
section of the community should take priority over the objective
of having the same twelve jurors decide guilt and punishment.
It is simple enough, and requires no duplication of testimony or
other administrative costs, to replace nondeath-qualified guilt-
phase jurors with death-qualified alternate jurors for a sentenc-
ing hearing, if and when a penalty trial is necessary in a first-
degree murder trial.47 6
The argument against death-qualifying a guilt-phase jury
under the statute is especially compelling in light of New York's
strong tradition of protecting the right of trial by jury. In lan-
guage that is even more unyielding than the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee, 477 the New York Constitution promises that
"[t]rial by jury... shall remain inviolate forever."478 Moreover,
476. See Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in
Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 57 (1982).
[Clapital cases constitute a relatively small number of criminal trials.
Moreover, the number of these cases in which a penalty determination will
be necessary is even smaller. A penalty determination will occur only where
a verdict on guilt has been returned that authorizes the possible imposition
of capital punishment, and only where the prosecutor decides that a death
penalty should be sought. Even in cases in which a penalty determination
will occur, the impaneling of a new penalty jury may not always be neces-
sary. In some cases, it may be possible to have alternate jurors replace any
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors who served at the guilt determination
trial.
Id. See also Grisby v. McCree, 758 F.2d 226, 243 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 204-05 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
477. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
478. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has hereto-
fore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever....
[A] jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in
which the crime charged may be punishable by death .. " Id. See generally Mary
R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional Challenges to New
York's Death Penalty, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 161, 203-10 (1995). Different state court
judges have opined that the death qualification of capital jurors violates state con-
stitutional provisions, although such a view has not prevailed in any court. See
State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 345-48 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., dissenting); State
v. Avery, 261 S.E.2d 803, 811-12 (N.C. 1980) (Exum, J., dissenting) State v. Young,
853 P.2d 327, 388-93 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). See also James R.
Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under State Constitu-
tions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1350-53 (1989)[hereinafter State Constitutions].
158
118http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/3
WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED
jury service is a " 'privilege[ ] of citizenship' secured to the citi-
zens of this State by Article I, § 1 of the State Constitution."479
Since death qualification predictably will exclude African-
Americans and other minority-group citizens disproportionately
from jury service, 480 the unnecessary removal of guilt-phase ju-
rors because of their death penalty views may also compromise
the rights of potential jurors.
The distorting effects of the death-qualification process can
be magnified by the use of peremptory challenges. The prosecu-
tion and defense are each afforded twenty peremptory chal-
lenges under New York law.481 Both sides can be expected to
use their peremptory challenges against prospective jurors who
express strong views about the death penalty, but who never-
theless survive death qualification. 482 The combined toll taken
by challenges for cause and peremptory challenges may result
in a jury that is virtually purged of minority group
representation. 483
Elsewhere, the jury-selection procedures in the statute di-
rectly address the issue of race. The statute permits individual-
ized and sequestered voir dire,48 4 a process which is critically
important to help avoid some of the biasing effects of death
qualification,4 5 and which is intended to encourage potential ju-
479. People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 651, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d
647, 654 (1990). The New York Constitution provides: "No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws of the state or any subdivision thereof. No person
shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in
his civil rights...." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
480. See supra notes 457-58 and accompanying text.
481. See N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 270.25(2) (McKinney 1993).
482. See generally Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648,667-68 (1987) (describing
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges in a capital trial).
483. See generally Winick, supra note 476, at 53-55; S. Adele Shank & John
Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row and the Right of Access to a Consul, 26
ST. MARY's L.J. 719, 741-44 (1995); F. Thomas Schornhorst, Preliminary Screening
of Prosecutorial Access to Death Qualified Juries: A Missing Link, 62 IND. L.J. 295,
323 (1986-1987).
484. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 270.16(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). The op-
tion of individualized, sequestered voir dire is available on motion of either party.
See id.
485. See Review of Statutes, supra note 376, at 157-58.
[P]rospective jurors . .. may be impressed by the link between anti-death
penalty views and dismissal from jury service. From this association, they
are apt to infer the judge's and, more generally, the law's disapproval of
those who are reluctant to use capital punishment. The resulting assump-
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rors to express themselves candidly on sensitive issues relevant
to their qualifications to serve on a capital jury. 86 "Each party
shall be afforded a fair opportunity to question a prospective ju-
ror as to any unexplored matter affecting his or her qualifica-
tions, including without limitation the possibility of racial bias
on the part of the prospective juror."4s7 In a special effort to
encourage candid exchanges the statute authorizes the court to
direct that the record of the individualized voir dire proceedings
be sealed, for good cause shown, on the motion of either party.4s8
D. Defense Counsel, the Prosecution, and Their Resources
1. Defense Counsel and Assistance for the Defense
I suspect very strongly that there is probably not a bill in America
that provides any more enhanced protection for the defendant as
far as the defense attorney than this bill does.
-Senator Dale Volker 489
tion... may be that the death penalty is the preferred punishment for mur-
der. Additionally, repetetive questioning about attitudes toward
punishment, which is inevitable during a group voir dire involving death
qualification, conveys the message that choosing between a sentence of
death and life imprisonment will be the trial jurors' principal duty. This
focus on sentencing choices can subtly, yet powerfully, undermine the pre-
sumption of innocence by suggesting that the accused's guilt is a foregone
conclusion and will not seriously be in dispute at the trial.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The
Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 121
(1984); Craig Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the Pro-
cess Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984).
486. See Review of Statutes, supra note 376, at 158.
487. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 270.16(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). The Supreme
Court has recognized that capital defendants charged with interracial crimes have
a constitutional right to have prospective jurors advised of the alleged murder vic-
tim's race, and to have potential jurors questioned on the issue of racial bias dur-
ing the voir dire. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (plurality decision).
488. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 270.16(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). This pro-
vision has raised objections on First Amendment and public trial grounds. Harvy
Lipman, Death Penalty May Shackle Press, Attorney Says, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.), March 9, 1995, at B-4. The principal sponsor of the death penalty bill in the
State Senate, Senator Dale Volker, took great pains to emphasize that the provi-
sion authorizing the sealing of the record of the voir dire process would be appro-
priate only to advance a compelling government interest, such as the protection of
a juror, would require a narrowly drawn court order, and would require the trial
judge to consider and reject less drastic alternatives. Senate Debate, supra note
13, at 1842-43.
489. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1841.
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For 18 years on the floor of this House, the sponsors have told us
that there would be adequate counsel provided, but today... after
we have promised a right to counsel of adequate scope and dura-
tion, what we get is a bill that does not provide a paid lawyer up
to the time of execution .... What we get today is a bill that does
not provide appointed counsel for filing a federal habeas or for liti-
gating a federal habeas.
All that this bill does today is to pay for trial counsel, appel-
late counsel and one round of post-conviction representation....
So the promise of 18 years of a team defense, the historical
importance of having an adequate number of lawyers for these
cases to handle the complexity of them, that promise is also bro-
ken today....
We don't provide skilled lawyers for competency proceedings
and this bill does not provide counsel for clemency.
In sum, Mr. Speaker, what this bill does is fundamentally lie
on the promise that a State-paid lawyer will stand beside poor
people as long as this state decided to try someone and put them
to death....
-Assemblyman Roberto Ramirez490
Life hangs in the balance in capital prosecutions. In no
other context should defense lawyers be more diligent in pre-
paring their cases, or more vigorous in advocating on behalf of
their clients. Yet, throughout the country, the representation
provided defendants on trial for their lives too often has fallen
short of the adversarial ideal. Defense lawyers in capital trials
have come to court without ever having read the governing
death-penalty statute.491 They have conducted their represen-
tation while intoxicated and have fallen asleep in mid-trial.492
Sometimes they have interviewed no witnesses, raised no de-
fenses,493 or put on no mitigation evidence. 494 Some are hope-
490. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 170-72.
491. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyer-
ing in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV, L. & Soc. CHANGE 245, 246 (1990-91); Ste-
phen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1842 & n.49, 1843 & n.54 (1994);
Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt,
NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30; Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The
Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. LAW & Soc. CHANGE 797, 803-04 (1986).
492. See Bright, supra note 491, at 1843 & n.53.
493. See Berger, supra note 491, at 249; Tabak, supra note 491, at 805.
1996]
121
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:41
lessly inexperienced or ill-prepared for and overwhelmed by the
demands of trying a capital case. 495
Systemic factors have a direct bearing on the quality of
legal assistance provided capital defendants. Death-penalty lit-
igation is complex and time-consuming. 496 It can wreak havoc
with the other demands of a law practice. 497 Good lawyers are
difficult to recruit. Compensation can be woefully inade-
quate. 498 Skilled counsel may have little incentive to become in-
volved with capital cases. Defendants can and do pay with their
lives for the errors and omissions of counsel.499 An extensive
report completed by the American Bar Association concluded
that "the inadequacy and inadequate compensation of counsel
at trial" is one of the "principal failings of the capital punish-
ment systems in the states today."500
494. See Berger, supra note 491, at 247-49; Bright, supra note 491, at 1837;
Tabak, supra note 491, at 805-06; Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel
in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 346-52.
495. See Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses from the Death Penalty: "Old
Sparky's" Jolt to the Legal Profession, 14 PACE L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1994) (Bellacosa is
an Associate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals); Bright, supra note 491, at
1856, 1860; Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital
Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1, 52-56 (1992);
Tabak, supra note 491, at 801.
496. See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 554 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (characterizing the complexity of Supreme Court's death penalty jurispru-
dence as "byzantine"); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 27 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (calling Court's capital punishment doctrine "extremely complex");
Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 495, at 3-4 & n.16, 8-15; Thurgood Marshall,
Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Cir-
cuit, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1986). See generally Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the
Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER L. REV. 695 (1991);
White, supra note 494.
497. See Bright, supra note 491, at 1855; Friedman & Stevenson, supra note
495, at 26-27, 30.
498. See Bellacosa, supra note 495, at 13-15 (discussing compensation rates
for capital defense attorneys in several states, and suggesting that "[tihese statis-
tics reinforce the adage that 'capital punishment is for them who have no capi-
tal.'"); Bright, supra note 491, at 1853-55, 1867-68; Coyle et al, supra note 491;
Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 495, at 21-26, 40-52; Tabak, supra note 491, at
801-03; Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Serv-
ices and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995).
499. See Berger, supra note 491, at 248, 251-52; Bright, supra note 491, at
1839-40, 1859-60; Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 495, at 32-37; White, supra
note 494, at 325-29.
500. American Bar Association, Toward a More Just and Effective System of
Review in State Death Penalty Cases 40 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990). See also
Bright, supra note 491, at 1842 n.48 (collecting references).
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New York's death penalty legislation in many respects
adopts ambitious systemic measures designed to avoid
problems that have accompanied the appointment of counsel for
capital defendants in other jurisdictions. The statute creates a
Capital Defender Office (CDO), which is governed by a three-
member Board of Directors. ° 1 The Board of Directors appoints
the Capital Defender, who in turn is authorized (in consultation
with the Board), to hire Deputy Capital Defenders, investiga-
tors, and staff as "necessary to effectuate the purposes of" the
CDO,502 subject to funding appropriations. 503
The CDO performs numerous functions. It is authorized to
provide direct representation of defendants who are or become
"financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investi-
gative, expert or other reasonably necessary services" 5 4 in po-
tential capital cases. The statute authorizes the appointment of
counsel whenever a defendant is charged with first-degree mur-
der, or when a defendant is charged with second-degree murder
"and the district attorney confirms upon inquiry by the court
that the district attorney is undertaking an investigation to de-
termine whether the defendant can or should be charged with"
501. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35-b(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Each member of
the Board of Directors serves a three-year term. See id. One member is appointed
by the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, one is appointed by the
majority leader (the Temporary President) of the State Senate, and one is ap-
pointed by the Speaker of the Assembly. See id. Judges, prosecutors, and attor-
neys employed in a law enforcement capacity are excluded from Board
membership. See id. Some members of the Legislature expressed concern about
the political nature of this process of appointment. See Assembly Debate supra
note 1, at 172-73 (remarks of Assemblyman Roberto Ramirez); id. at 409-10 (re-
marks of Assemblywoman Barbara Clark). In 1995, Chief Judge Judith Kaye ap-
pointed Arthur Liman to the Board of Directors of the Capital Defender Office,
Senator Joseph Bruno appointed John Dunne, and Assemblyman Sheldon Silver
appointed Christopher Stone.
502. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 35-b(4)(a). The present acting Capital Defender is Ke-
vin Doyle.
503. See id. § 35-b(4).
504. Id. § 35-b(1).
Whenever it appears that a defendant is financially able to obtain adequate
representation or investigative, expert or other such services, or to make
partial payment for such representation or other services, counsel shall in-
form the court and the court may terminate the assignment of counsel or
authorize payment, as the interests of justice may dictate, to the capital de-
fender office or the state.
Id. § 35-b(10).
123
PACE LAW REVIEW
first-degree murder, "and the court determines that there is a
reasonable likelihood the defendant will be so charged .... 505
The district attorney must notify the CDO whenever a defend-
ant is charged with first-degree or second-degree murder, "by
telephone, facsimile, E-mail, or other prompt electronic means
.... "506 The legislative history of the statute emphasizes the
need for "early entry and prompt representation"5 7 of defend-
ants in potentially capital cases, and stresses that district attor-
neys must notify the Capital Defender "without delay"508
whenever a first-degree or second-degree murder charge is filed.
The CDO may provide, or arrange to provide, temporary legal
representation to a defendant charged with first-degree murder,
or with second-degree murder when the court has determined
there is a reasonable likelihood that first-degree murder will be
charged, if appointment of counsel has not yet occurred.50 9
Although the CDO is authorized to represent defendants in
potential capital cases, the CDO is not designed to be the exclu-
sive direct provider of legal representation. The statute identi-
fies two additional primary options for capital defense
representation.510 First, the CDO has the power to enter into
agreements with legal aid societies, public defenders' offices,
and other not-for-profit organizations, for those entities to rep-
resent capital defendants. 51' Second, two attorneys-one "lead"
505. Id. § 35-b(1).
506. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(6)(c). The prompt electronic notification must be
followed by notification by first-class mail within two business days of the charge.
However, "[tihe failure to give notice shall not affect the validity of any indictment,
conviction, judgment or order." Id.
507. BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 18.
508. Id.
509. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(7). "Any temporary representation . .. shall
cease upon the court's appointment of an attorney. . . ." Id.
510. See id. § 35-b(2), 35-b(4)(b)(vi).
511. See id. § 35-b(4)(b)(vi). The CDO may terminate such agreements on
serving 60 days notice. See id. It is authorized to require reports related to the
agreements, and to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreements. See id.
No entity which enters into an agreement with the CDO to represent capital de-
fendants may be "the exclusive provider of counsel within such society's, public
defender's or organization's jurisdiction." Id. "It is expected that staff lawyers rep-
resenting capital defendants through such offices will be at least equivalent in
skill, competence, and judgment to private lawyers approved by the CDO." BILL
MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 18.
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and one "associate" counsel-may be appointed from a list of
counsel qualified to serve in capital cases.512
The CDO plays a major role in identifying attorneys who
are eligible for appointment under the latter option. In consul-
tation with the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference
(the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the Presiding Jus-
tices of the Appellate Divisions of the state's four judicial de-
partments),513 the CDO proposes minimum standards for lead
and associate counsel in capital cases,514 which must be ap-
proved by the Court of Appeals. 51 5 Additionally, four-member
screening panels are established within each judicial depart-
ment to create and maintain a roster of attorneys qualified to
serve as lead and associate counsel in capital cases. 516 The
Board of Directors of the CDO appoints two members of each
screening panel, and the Presiding Justice of the judicial de-
partment appoints the two others.517 In consultation with the
Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference, and subject to
the approval of the Court of Appeals, each screening panel es-
tablishes and updates a schedule of fees for the compensation of
appointed counsel in capital cases. 518
Fee schedules shall be promulgated and approved after reviewing
the rates of compensation generally paid in the department to at-
torneys with substantial experience in the representation of de-
fendants charged with murder or other serious felonies and shall
512. See N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35-b(2).
513. See id. § 214 (McKinney 1983).
514. See id. § 35-b(4)(b)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1996). "In determining the mini-
mum standards," the CDO and the Administrative Board of the Judicial Confer-
ence are instructed to "consider among other factors both the needs of the state for
an adequate number of attorneys to represent defendants in capital cases and the
needs of defendants in capital cases for competent counsel." Id.
515. See id. The Court of Appeals has promulgated a set of Proposed Mini-
mum Standards for Lead Counsel and Associate Counsel in Capital Cases, and has
distributed them for public comment. (Copy on file with the author.)
516. See N.Y. Jun. LAw § 35-b(5)(a). The CDO, in consultation with the Ad-
ministrative Board of the Judicial Conference, is required to implement regula-
tions to ensure that attorneys who qualify for inclusion on such rosters and who
wish to provide representation in capital cases "are given fair opportunity to re-
ceive such appointments." Id.
517. See id.
518. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35-b(5)(a).
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be adequate to ensure that qualified attorneys are available to
represent defendants eligible to receive counsel.519
When a judge appoints lead and associate counsel from the
roster of qualified attorneys, a selection is made from one of four
proposed teams of lawyers submitted by the CDO.520 The CDO
need not submit a list of teams for the judge's consideration if it
has entered into an agreement with a legal aid society, public
defender's office, or other organization for any of those groups'
representation of capital defendants. 521 With the CDO's con-
sent, that office itself can be appointed to represent defendants
in potentially capital cases. 522 If representation is not provided
through any of these alternatives, and if none of the attorneys
from the roster are available, the court is authorized to appoint
"an attorney eligible for appointment pursuant to article eight-
519. Id. Adequate compensation is crucial to ensure that qualified counsel
will engage in the representation of defendants charged with capital crimes. See
supra notes 490-500 and accompanying text. "It is expected that, due to the com-
plexity and difficult nature of first degree murder cases, rates and fees paid to
defense counsel in capital cases will be sustantially higher than those paid when
lesser offenses are charged." BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 19. The gen-
eral fee standard quoted in the text is more equivocal than the standard included
in previous death penalty bills considered and passed by the Legislature. See
N.Y.S. 200, N.Y.A. 305, 214th Sess. (1991), proposed N.Y. County Law § 722-g(5):
Notwithstanding the rate and maximum limits generally applicable to crim-
inal cases and any other provision of law to the contrary, the court shall fix
the compensation to be paid to attorneys pursuant to this section... at such
rates or amounts as the court determines to be appropriate in order to pro-
vide such defendant with representation by counsel and other services as
nearly equivalent as possible to those available to defendants who are finan-
cially able to obtain such representation and other services for their defense
and appeal.
Id. (quoted in James R. Acker, New York's Proposed Death Penalty Legislation:
Constitutional and Policy Perspectives, 54 ALB. L. REV. 515, 616 (1990)).
520. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). "At least one of the
proposed teams of qualified lead and associate counsel on any list submitted...
shall regularly practice within the judicial department in which the defendant has
been charged." Id. This provision makes clear that the trial judge is not limited to
considering counsel who regularly practice within the judicial department in
which the trial is conducted. See id. The statute further provides that, "[i]n the
event that counsel is not appointed pursuant to the foregoing provisions . . ., the
court may appoint any attorney whose name appears on a roster established pur-
suant to [the statute] ... for appointment as lead or associate counsel." Id.
521. See id.
522. See id.
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een-B of the county law, who is competent to represent defend-
ants charged with murder and other serious felonies."523
The CDO is invested with other statutory duties in addition
to its direct representation of capital defendants. It provides
legal advice and back-up assistance, 524 as well as investigative,
expert and related services to other appointed counsel in capital
cases.525 It provides continuing legal education and training for
attorneys who represent or who may represent defendants in
capital cases. 526 Through the statutory provisions for prompt
notification of the CDO when an individual is charged with a
crime that is or may be defined as first-degree murder, 527 au-
thorization of the CDO to provide temporary representation to
such defendants in the early stages of a prosecution,528 involve-
ment of the CDO in the appointment process and in the devel-
opment of reasonable fee structures and standards for attorneys
who represent defendants in capital cases,529 and through the
assignment of the CDO to assist, educate, and train lawyers
who engage in capital defense work,530 the statute makes the
Capital Defender Office the critical hub for the state's system of
providing legal representation to indigent capital defendants.
Defendants qualifying for court-appointed counsel under
the statute are entitled to pretrial and trial representation, and
to representation on appeal in cases resulting in a sentence of
death. 531 They are also entitled to counsel appointed under the
special death penalty provisions on an initial post-conviction
motion to vacate judgment or set aside a death sentence, and on
the appeal of such motion.5 32 The Court of Appeals appoints
counsel for the original appeal and the appeal of a post-convic-
tion motion.53 3 The trial court assigns counsel in connection
523. N.Y. JuD. LAW §35-b(2). See also N.Y. CouNTY LAw §§ 722 et seq. (Mc-
Kinney 1991) (Article 18-B of the County Law, as referred to in the text).
524. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35-b(4)(b)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
525. See id. § 35-b(4)(b)(iii).
526. See id. § 35-b(4)(b)(v).
527. See id § 35-b(6)(a). See BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 10.
528. See N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35-b(7) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
529. See id. § 35-b(5)(a).
530. See id. § 35-b(4)(b)(v).
531. See id. §35-b(1).
532. See id.
533. See id. § 35-b(2).
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with the motion itself.53 The unique qualification requirements
and compensation rates for attorneys in capital cases continue
to govern.535 The statute directs the Court of Appeals to appoint
only lead counsel to appeal from a judgment including a sen-
tence of death, but, "for good cause shown,"5 36 the Court may
appoint associate counsel for the appeal. "With respect to an
initial [post-conviction] motion .. .and any appeal therefrom,
the appropriate court shall assign lead counsel only."537
No legal representation of indigents is authorized under
the death penalty provisions beyond the appeal of an initial
post-conviction motion.538 Assistance is specifically denied for
the preparation, filing, or appeal of writs of federal habeas
corpus.5 39 Legal assistance is not available for second or subse-
quent post-conviction challenges to conviction or sentence,540 for
raising the issue of a prisoner's incompetency to be executed, 541
or for clemency petitions. 542 This policy marks a significant de-
parture from earlier death penalty bills which had passed in the
Legislature, only to be vetoed, in which indigent capital defend-
ants were guaranteed the assistance of counsel at all stages of a
capital case through execution. 543 The enacted legislation ap-
534. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35-b(2).
535. See id. § 35-b(5)(a) (qualification requirements and fee schedules apply to
the appointment of all counsel "pursuant to the provisions of this section").
536. Id. § 35-b(2).
537. Id.
538. See id. § 35(b)(12).
539. See id.
540. See N.Y. JuD. LAw §35(b)(12). See also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1
(1989). In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that capital defendants have no
federal constitutional right to court-appointed counsel to pursue state post-convic-
tion challenges to their convictions or sentences. Id. at 10.
541. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35-b(12) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See infra notes
746-49 and accompanying text.
542. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35-b(12). See infra note 792 and accompanying text.
543. See, e.g., N.Y.S. 200, N.Y.A. 305, 214th Sess. (1991), proposed N.Y.
CouNTY LAw § 722-g(1), quoted in Policy Perspectives, supra note 4, at 615. This
proposed legislation provided that in all first degree murder cases:
[A] defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate repre-
sentation or investigative, expert or other reasonably necessary services at
any time either (a) prior to judgment, or (b) after entry of a judgment impos-
ing a sentence of death but before the execution of that judgment, shall be
entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of
such other services in accordance with ... this section.
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parently denies counsel beyond the appeal of the first post-con-
viction motion for different reasons. First is the premise that
defendants who are provided with high-quality representation
for their trial, their appeal, and their first post-conviction mo-
tion will have less need for representation at subsequent
stages. 544 Second is a concern for the cost of providing continu-
ing representation.545
The legislative history acknowledges that this statute does
not limit the courts' inherent discretion, or its authority under
other statutes, to appoint counsel to represent capital defend-
ants at stages not covered in the new death penalty legislation,
or to appoint a greater number of lawyers for trial, appellate,
and post-conviction litigation than is provided under the death
penalty provisions.546 Specifically, the principal sponsor of the
death penalty bill in the Assembly, Assemblyman Eric
Vitaliano, clarified during the debate on the bill that "the bill's
prohibition on the assignment of counsel in successive 440
[post-conviction] motions refers to assignments made under the
new Section 35(b) of the Judiciary Law. It is not intended to
544. See generally Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1931.
545. See id. at 1932. A colloquy between Senators Catherine Abate and Dale
Volker during debate of the death penalty bill is revealing.
SENATOR ABATE: But it is my understanding that this bill repre-
sents a criticial departure from the former Volker-Graber bill, which pro-
vided assigned counsel from arraignment all the way to the Supreme
Court.... [Written in the bill was assignment of counsel through the entire
appeal process. Why today does the bill represent a departure from the bill
that passed this floor for the past 18 years?
SENATOR VOLKER: [Olne of the things that we tried to make sure in
this bill-and it's true that the bill we sponsored many years ago before all
the changes occurred could have been interpreted... to say that a counsel
could represent a person all the way to the Supreme Court of the United
States, but the feeling was that the primary representation of that person
should be in the trial phase, in the appeal to the Court of Appeals and the
motions after that, and that what we are giving that defendant is the best
possible representation, and that there is no saying that he won't get repre-
sentation after that but that we are giving that person an enormous amount
of-if you want to call it high-paid talent or whatever in setting up the pro-
cess .... and that that is certainly sufficient, I think, under the circum-
stances to get that person to appoint where he or she has certainly been able
to plead their case. After that, they certainly have the right to go on from
there, but the feeling was that the State should not be-should not be man-
dated to pay the kind of costs that are being paid up to that point.
Id. at 1930-32.
546. See Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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impair the court's existing discretionary authority to assign
counsel under County Law Article 722-b."547 Senator Volker,
the principal sponsor of the bill in the Senate, alluded to the
same alternative statutory authority for the appointment of
counsel to capital defendants on second or subsequent post-con-
viction motions.548 Additionally, in response to a question about
whether "the court's discretionary authority to appoint the
number of lawyers it deems appropriate to fit any particular
case" was altered by the bill, 549 Assemblyman Vitaliano af-
firmed that, "the courts of this State have exercised the inher-
ent authority to appoint counsel under the State and Federal
Constitutions since the time we were a British colony, and noth-
ing in this bill interferes with that authority. It remains inher-
ent and plenary."550
Although Congress continues to consider reforms in federal
habeas corpus law, indigent state defendants sentenced to
death presently enjoy a federal statutory right to court-ap-
pointed counsel for pursuing federal habeas corpus relief.551 At-
torneys appointed under this statute must meet minimum
547. Id. at 18. See also BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 18.
New York courts have the inherent power to appoint compensated counsel.
This legislation provides explicit additional statutory authorization to ap-
point counsel in capital cases. At the same time, it does not restrict a court's
inherent authority to appoint counsel. Thus, for example, the provisions of
Article 18-b of the County Law would continue to apply with respect to any
motion for which counsel could not be appointed under the Capital Defender
statute.
Id.
548. See generally Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1928.
SENATOR ABATE: Other than those-that motion appeal and the di-
rect appeal to the Court of Appeals, it's my understanding that no attorney
will be assigned in addition to these two procedures.
SENATOR VOLKER: No, it's not true. What you are talking about is
that under the-under this bill, this represents, of course, a difference in the
law now. After the appeal and the motion and the appeal to that motion,
then you would revert back to the 18 B section so that-in other words, the
defendant then, if he wanted to go further. Remember, we're going to the
Court of Appeals. He has the right to that.
Id.
549. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 18 (remarks of Assemblyman Richard
Brodsky).
550. Id. at 18-19 (remarks of Assemblyman Eric Vitaliano).
551. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(q)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1995). See generally McFar-
land v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).
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qualifications that do not include any experience or expertise in
death penalty law.552 Nevertheless, as long as the federal legis-
lation remains intact, the New York statute's failure to provide
court-appointed counsel at state expense will not leave indigent
death-row defendants without legal assistance in federal
habeas corpus proceedings. 53 The same cannot necessarily be
said about other crucial litigation that may be required, includ-
ing successor state post-conviction motions,554 raising the issue
552. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(q)(6) (West Supp. 1995). "[Alt least one attorney so
appointed must have been admitted to practice in the court of appeals for not less
than five years, and must have had not less than three years experience in the
handling of appeals in that court in felony cases." Id.; see Sandra D. Jordan, Death
for Drug Related Killings: Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 79, 109-17 (1991) (criticizing the required qualifications as inadequate, and
specifically citing the example of New York attorneys "who have practiced exclu-
sively within the state and have no practical experience with the death penalty.")
(citation omitted).
553. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(q)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1995). The statute provides
that:
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of Title 28,
seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or
becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investiga-
tive, expert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the
appointment of one or more attorneys in the furnishing of such other serv-
ices in accordance with paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9).
Id. The counsel provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which creates a federal
death penalty for defined crimes, are ambiguous concerning the scope of federally
financed legal representation for state death row prisoners. Read literally, they
seem to create a federal statutory right to counsel for state capital defendants for
purposes of federal habeas corpus proceedings, as well as
[Elvery subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including ... ap-
plications for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and all available post-conviction process, together with applications for
stays of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures, and... in
such competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or other clem-
ency as may be available to the defendant.
Id. The courts have been reluctant to read the statutory right to counsel so expan-
sively. See Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451, 456-58 (5th Cir. 1995); Hill v. Lockhart,
992 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1993); In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502, 1506-07 (11th Cir.
1989).
554. See generally Falk & Cary, supra note 478, at 213. "[A] serious challenge
could be raised under the state constitution... to the denial of assigned counsel to
a capital defendant on a subsequent collateral proceeding." Id.
[Ilt is difficult to see why a capital defendant who has already exhausted his
one collateral proceeding should be denied counsel subsequently to raise, for
example, a well-founded claim of newly discovered evidence. Certainly an
argument could be made ... that the failure to provide a capital defendant
with counsel in such a situation violates the state constitution.
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of the defendant's competence to be executed, 5 5 and pursuing
executive clemency. 556 It surely is inadequate to suggest that
high-quality lawyering at the front stages of capital prosecu-
tions will completely obviate the need for legal representation
at these latter stages, 5 7 or that volunteer lawyers will fill the
void by coming forward on behalf of unrepresented death-row
prisoners. 58 Nor does denying counsel to condemned prisoners
seem defensible as a cost-saving measure. 559
Without adequate funding, the statute's elaborate provi-
sions regarding the creation of the CDO and the appointment of
counsel cannot be effective. Several legislators expressed con-
cern during the debate on the death penalty that there were no
assurances that sufficient funds would be appropriated to make
the counsel provisions meaningful. 560 An appropriation of
$750,000 for the CDO was made to cover start-up costs between
the passage of the bill and its September 1, 1995 effectiveness
Id. at 214. But see supra note 545 and accompanying text.
555. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 656(2), (3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Under the
provisions of the law that govern competency proceedings, a condemned prisoner is
not entitled to court-appointed counsel until after a petition has been filed alleging
the prisoner's incompetency for execution, which must be supported by the affida-
vit of a psychiatrist or a psychologist rendering the opinion that the defendant is
incompetent. Id. See infra notes 746-49 and accompanying text.
556. See infra note 797 and accompanying text. See generally Daniel T. Kobil,
Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Clemency, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 201 (1993).
557. See supra notes 544-45 and accompanying text.
558. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1901-03, 1928-30 (remarks of Senator
Dale Volker).
559. See supra note 545 and accompanying text. See also Senate Debate,
supra note 13 at 1929 (remarks of Senator Dale Volker).
In fact, one of the reasons that we're a little careful (regarding assigned
counsel), very honestly.., is that we are well aware of what some of the law
firms in New York City have been doing in some of the southern states in
piling on cases and motions, and so forth, and making a lot of money with
motions that in some cases could be considered to be some rather spurious
motions in delaying these cases forever.
Id.
560. See Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1958-59 (remarks of Senator Eman-
uel Gold); id. at 2011 (remarks of Senator Martin Solomon); Assembly Debate,
supra note 1, at 130, 415 (remarks of Assemblywoman Susan John); id. at 173-74
(remarks of Assemblyman Roberto Ramirez); id. at 239 (remarks of Assemblyman
Peter Rivera); id. at 373 (remarks of Assemblyman Vito Lopez); id. at 406-14 (re-
marks of Assemblywoman Barbara Clark); id. at 445 (remarks of Assemblyman N.
Nick Perry).
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date,561 and a total of $4.5 million was allotted for the entire
fiscal year.562 Governor Pataki's proposed budget would provide
$7.3 million for the first full year of the CDO's operation. 63
Early disagreements surfaced between the Administrative
Board of the Courts and the screening panels in three of the
four judicial departments regarding the compensation to be
paid attorneys appointed to represent capital defendants. The
Administrative Board recommended a statewide rate of $200
per hour for lead counsel and $175 per hour for associate coun-
sel.,5 4 Only the screening panel from the Fourth Department
concurred in those proposed rates. 565 In the Second and Third
Departments, the recommended hourly rates for lead and asso-
ciate counsel were $250 and $225 per hour, respectively, and in
the First Department, the proposed rates were for $300 and
.$250 per hour.566 These figures are in contrast to the $40 per
hour (in-court) and $25 per hour (out-of-court) fees normally
paid appointed counsel in noncapital cases.567
Further disagreements emerged about whether associates
and paralegals should be paid separately from the lead and as-
sociate counsel appointed in capital cases.5 68 The chairman of
the Board of Directors of the CDO supported the screening
561. See Daniel Wise, Pieces Fall in Place for Capital Defender Office, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 22, 1995, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Pieces Fall in Place].
562. See BiLL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 22; Daniel Wise, Doubts
Emerge Over Death Penalty Costs, N.Y. L.J., March 17, 1995, at 1, 4 [hereinafter
Doubts Emerge]; Pieces Fall in Place, supra note 561, at 1, 2.
563. See Gary Spencer, Pataki Backs Courts Budget of $1 Billion: Surcharge
on Awards Sought to Fund Increase, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1, 5.
564. See Daniel Wise, Proposed Capital Case Fees Diverge Widely, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 8, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Fees Diverge].
565. See id.
566. See id. at 2.
567. See id.
568. See Fees Diverge, supra note 564, at 1. The Administrative Board pro-
posed that associates and paralegals not be reimbursed separately from the ap-
pointed attorneys. See id. at 2. Once again, only the Fourth Department
concurred in that recommendation. See id. The Third Department's screening
panel proposed that the court award fees to associates and paralegals at its discre-
tion. See id. The screening panel for the Second Department recommended that
associates be paid half of the hourly rate of the attorneys with whom they are
working, and that paralegals be paid $75 per hour. See id. The First Department's
screening panel proposed that associates be paid between $75 and $100 per hour,
and that paralegals be paid $75 per hour. See id. See also N.Y. COUNTY LAW
§ 722-b (McKinney 1991) (fixing hourly compensation rate for assigned counsel in
noncapital cases).
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panels' proposals, arguing that the requested rates of compen-
sation were "necessary to ensure that the courts will be able to
recruit enough lawyers who 'have the skill and zeal to handle
capital cases."' 56 9 The New York Court of Appeals ultimately
advised the state's four capital defender screening panels that it
would approve compensation rates of up to $175 per hour for
lead counsel in capital cases, up to $150 per hour for associate
counsel, and it intimated that paralegals and other staff assist-
ing assigned counsel would be entitled to separate
compensation. 570
The statute further guarantees that defendants in potential
capital cases who are financially unable to obtain adequate "in-
vestigative, expert and other such reasonably necessary serv-
ices" 571 are entitled to such assistance. The CDO may help
supply these services when alternative counsel are appointed,
but it will not always do so. 572 Provisions are made for ex parte
proceedings authorizing defense counsel to obtain investigative,
expert, or other services.57 3 Arrangements are included for se-
curing such assistance when time exigencies do not permit prior
judicial authorization.574 Attorneys may apply to a Justice of
the Appellate Division to authorize them to secure the re-
quested assistance if a trial judge does not grant the request.57 5
"[Rleasonable fees and expenses" are to be paid for investiga-
tive, expert, and other services. 576
569. Fees Diverge, supra note 564, at 2 (quoting Mr. Arthur Liman).
570. See Daniel Wise, Defense Counsel Pay Set for Capital Cases, N.Y. L.J.,
June 11, 1996, at 1, 4.
571. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). For the purposes of this
article, potentially capital cases are those in which the defendant has been charged
with first-degree murder, or with second-degree murder when the district attorney
confirms that his or her office is investigating whether a first-degree murder
charge should be filed and the court determines that there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that the defendant will be charged with first-degree murder. See id.
572. See id. § 35-b(4)(b)(iii).
573. See id.
574. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(8). Before authorizing counsel to obtain inves-
tigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services, the trial court ordinarily
must find in an ex parte proceeding that such assistance is "reasonably necessary
for the representation of the defendant whether in connection with issues relating
to guilt or sentencing." Id. However, "[u]pon a finding that timely procurement of
such services could not practicably await prior authorization, the court may au-
thorize the provision and payment for such services nunc pro tunc." Id.
575. Id.
576. Id.
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All fees and expenses for counsel and related assistance are
paid for by the State, rather than from county revenues.577 The
system promises to be expensive to administer. All first-degree
murder cases and all second-degree murder cases that could be
redefined as first-degree murder will have to be treated as po-
tential death-penalty cases until the district attorney defini-
tively excludes the possibility that a death sentence will be
sought.578 Early notification of the CDO is required under the
statute, and early involvement of that office or other qualified
counsel is contemplated in all potentially capital cases.57 9 Since
the prosecution has until 120 days after arraignment on a first-
degree murder indictment to file a notice of intention to seek the
death penalty, 580 many cases ultimately may not amount to cap-
ital prosecutions. However, the defense will not be able to gam-
ble that any particular case will be removed from the death-
penalty track. Enormous amounts of time and money will be
invested by the CDO and other attorneys in all potentially capi-
tal cases, even if prosecutors will seek a death sentence in only
a fraction of those cases. 581 Defense resources may be spread
perilously thin, and the state's budgetary allocations for capital
defense representation are likely to be strapped by operation of
these charging provisions. 582
2. Assistance for Capital Prosecutions
The New York State District Attorneys Association played a
particularly significant role in developing the bill. [Als a result,
the bill contains various provisions that are essential to its effec-
tiveness. Among them are the provisions... relating to financial
577. See id. § 35-b(9). Payment for assigned counsel normally is a county ex-
penditure. See N.Y. CouNTY LAw §§ 722, 722-e (McKinney 1991).
578. See Russell Neufeld, Problems Defending Under New York's New Death
Penalty Law, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 143, 144-46 (1995).
579. See supra notes 506-09 and accompanying text.
580. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
581. See Daniel Wise, Financial Shortfall Looms For Capital Defender Unit,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 23, 1995 at 1 [hereinafter Financial Shortfall].
582. See Neufeld, supra note 578, at 146. See also Financial Shortfall, supra
note 581, at 1. Moreover, representation by the CDO ceases within ten days of the
prosecutor determining that a case will not be prosecuted as a capital case. N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 35-b(11) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Thus, an established attorney-client
relationship between the CDO and a defendant may be disrupted when prosecu-
tors delay in announcing that they will not seek the death penalty in a case. See
Financial Shortfall, supra note 581, at 1.
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assistance to District Attorneys to meet the demands of capital
cases ....
Provisions of the bill reflect as well the advice and assistance
of the Attorney General, particularly bill section 34, which autho-
rizes the Attorney General upon a proper request to direct that
the resources and personnel of the Department of Law be used to
assist in the prosecution or appeal of most capital cases in which
the death penalty may be imposed ....
-Governor George Pataki58 3
There is an obligation incurred by the State of New York to
take as a State expense vouchers that are submitted to the State
of New York in connection with the prosecution of a death penalty
case. There is no similar obligation by the State to pay on vouch-
ers submitted in connection with a life without parole case or an-
other lesser penalty case. It is only in connection with when the
death penalty is sought.
-Assemblywoman Susan John 584
I think that this bill provides every possible economic incen-
tive to allow localities to make the number two murder cases into
capital murder cases. It is as much of an incentive as anything we
could have possibly done under any possible bill to ensure that we
convict and kill people.
-Assemblyman Roberto Ramirez 58 5
Capital punishment systems are extremely expensive to
maintain. Heightened costs are incurred in capital cases at vir-
tually every stage of the process, owing to factors including the
appointment of multiple counsel, who are compensated at
higher rates than attorneys in non-capital cases, the extensive
litigation of pretrial motions, unusual demands for investiga-
tive and expert assistance, protracted jury selection, the need
for separate guilt and penalty trials, which are often quite
lengthy, comprehensive appellate and post-conviction review,
the special conditions of confinement and supervision required
for condemned prisoners, and clemency proceedings. 58 6 Sys-
583. Executive Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5.
584. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 415.
585. Id. at 450.
586. See David J. Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in the Legislature: Some
Thoughts About Money, Myth, and Morality, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 443, 447-49, 461-
62 (1989); Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or
Life Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 45 (1989);
Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-
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temic costs are especially high because extraordinary invest-
ments must be made in all capital prosecutions, even though
only a fraction of those prosecutions may culminate in execu-
tions. Not all defendants charged with first-degree murder will
be convicted of that offense, juries will not sentence all con-
victed first-degree murderers to death, and only a minority of
those offenders sentenced to death ultimately are likely to be
executed.58 7 A penal system with life imprisonment or LWOP
as its maximum sanction is far less expensive in the long run
than one in which exceptional costs are incurred in a great
many cases to produce sporadic executions. 588
The lion's share of costs in a capital prosecution-costs that
will be realized whether or not a death sentence is imposed-
typically occur during pretrial proceedings and the trial itself.58 9
Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 59, 133-38 (1989);
Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the
Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221 (1985). See generally RICHARD C. Di-
ETER, MILLIONS MISSPENT: WHAT POLITICIANS DON'T SAY ABOUT THE HIGH COSTS
OF THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (A Report by the Death Penalty Information Center, rev.
ed. Fall, 1994).
587. A recent study of the costs of capital punishment in North Carolina pro-
jected that approximately 1 in 10 defendants sentenced to death will be executed.
Based on that assumption, the authors concluded that "[tihe extra cost per execu-
tion of prosecuting a case capitally is more than $2.16 million." PHILIP J. COOK &
DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA
98 (Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University 1993). More gener-
ally, the discrepancy between death sentences imposed and executions is well-rec-
ognized. For example, California has authorized capital punishment since the late
1970s, and presently has 422 prisoners on death row, yet the state has conducted
only two executions through 1995. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL
FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 10, 14 (Fall 1995).
From 1977, the year after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of revised state capital punishment laws, to 1993, a total of 4,259 persons
entered prison under sentence of death. During the 17 years, 226 persons
were executed, and 1,789 were removed from under a death sentence by ap-
pellate court decisions and reviews, commutations, or death.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN: CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 1993, at 9 (Dec. 1994).
588. See COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 587; DIETER, supra note 586; Spangen-
berg & Walsh, supra note 586; Tabak & Lane, supra note 586; Garey, supra note
586.
589. COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 587, at 99; DIETER, supra note 586, at 20-
21. See generally N.Y. STATE DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, CAPITAL LOSSES: THE
PRICE OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR NEW YORK STATE 19, Table 2 (1982) (estimating,
in 1982, that the total defense and prosecution costs for the guilt phase and pen-
alty phase of a capital murder trial in New York would be $1,498,100).
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In many death penalty jurisdictions, these costs are paid at the
local or county level, as they are in New York in non-capital
cases. 590 The extraordinary costs of capital trials have left local-
ities in some parts of the country near bankruptcy. Expendi-
tures of hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of dollars for
capital murder prosecutions can deplete county budgets, forcing
cutbacks in other services, 591 and create a convincing disincen-
tive for prosecutors to seek capital sentences.
New York's death penalty provisions in significant part
shift the costs of prosecuting a capital case from individual
counties to the State. They further authorize district attorneys
to seek assistance from the Attorney General in the prosecution
and appeal of capital cases. 592 A special state relief fund is cre-
ated to help financially strapped district attorneys seek the
death penalty in first-degree murder cases. 593 Supporters of
these measures view them as balancing the scales in light of the
resources devoted to the defense of capital cases. 594 Critics view
them as creating cost-saving incentives for district attorneys to
prosecute first-degree murder cases capitally, instead of seeking
regular life or LWOP prison sentences. 595 They also denounce
them as unjustifiably squandering precious state resources that
otherwise could be devoted to beefed up police forces, education,
health care, and other social programs that in their opinion
would reap far more handsome dividends to the quality of life in
New York, and would promote the fight against crime far more
significantly than will capital punishment. 596
590. Cf. N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 706 (McKinney 1991).
591. See DIETER, supra note 586, at 4-6, 21-23.
592. See id.
593. See id.
594. See generally Executive Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4-5; BILL MEMO-
RANDUM, supra note 43, at 16.
595. See Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 134 (remarks of Assemblywoman
Susan John).
596. See Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 134 (remarks of Assemblywoman
Susan John); id. at 447-50 (remarks of Assemblyman Roberto Ramirez); see Senate
Debate, supra note 13, at 1933 (remarks of Senator Catherine Abate); id. at 1985
(remarks of Senator Mary Ellen Jones); id. at 2004-05 (remarks of Senator Pedro
Espada, Jr.). See generally Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 63-70 (remarks of
Assemblyman Arthur Eve); id., at 104-06, 398 (remarks of Assemblyman Roger
Green); id. at 112-21 (remarks of Assemblyman Jeffrey Dinowitz); id. at 156 (re-
marks of Assemblywoman Barbara Clark); id. at 186-89 (remarks of Assemblyman
Gregory Meeks); id. at 212-14 (remarks of Assemblyman Scott Stringer); id. at
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The statute authorizes district attorneys to make ex parte
application for reimbursement of experts whose services are
"reasonably necessary" in capital prosecutions, including issues
relating either to guilt or sentencing. 597 Denials of such re-
quests may be appealed to the Appellate Division.598 "Any fee
or expense" paid for expert assistance for the prosecution of cap-
ital cases "shall be a state charge,"599 rather than a cost borne
by the county. The statute also creates a "capital prosecution
extraordinary assistance program," which distributes state
funds to district attorneys for the prosecution of capital cases.600
Such monies are released when the Commissioner of the Divi-
sion for Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) determines, on the
basis of a written certification by the applicant district attorney,
that due to the nature or number of capital cases being prose-
cuted by the district attorney a significant financial burden has
resulted and financial assistance is necessary ... to fulfill such
district attorney's responsibilities."60 1 DCJS also is authorized
to arrange for the development of continuing legal education
programs, and to contract with an organization to train, advise,
and assist district attorneys in the prosecution of capital
cases.
60 2
Local prosecutors also may request the assistance of the At-
torney General's office with the prosecution or appeal of capital
cases, including the use of such resources, services, and person-
nel as the Attorney General deems appropriate.603 Requests for
such assistance are routed through the Governor.60 4 They may
273-74 (remarks of Assemblyman John Murtaugh); id. at 321-24 (remarks of As-
semblyman Sam Hoyt); id. at 365-66 (remarks of Assemblyman Herman Farrell,
Jr.).
597. See N.Y. Coury LAW § 707(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). "Upon a finding
that timely procurement of such [expert] services could not practicably await prior
authorization, the court may authorize the provision and payment for such serv-
ices nunc pro tunc." Id.
598. See id. § 707(4).
599. Id. § 707(3).
600. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 837-1 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
601. Id. This section further provides that funds distributed under the pro-
gram "shall not be used to supplant existing resources." Funds also may be dis-
tributed "to a district attorney who, upon the request of another district attorney,
has provided assistance in the prosecution of a capital case." Id.
602. See id. § 837-a(7).
603. See id. § 63-d(1).
604. See id.
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be granted only when the defendant is represented by counsel
appointed under the special provisions of the death penalty leg-
islation (i.e., the CDO, roster attorneys, or an organization con-
tracted by the CDO), or receives expert, investigative, or other
services under those provisions,6085 or when the defendant is rep-
resented by privately retained or pro bono counsel, and "is able
to marshall substantially greater legal and investigatory re-
sources than those reasonably available to the district attor-
ney."6 06 District attorneys must file a certificate of need with
their requests for assistance from the Attorney General, attest-
ing that additional resources or personnel are required for the
prosecutor to fulfill his or her responsibilities in the prosecution
of a capital case.607
The legislature appropriated $750,000 in start-up costs for
prosecution services in capital cases608 , and an additional $1.8
million for such purposes during the first fiscal year in which
the statute was effective.60 9 The Governor's budget proposed
$3.5 million to support local prosecution of death penalty cases
for the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1996.610 These amounts
are substantially less than what some district attorneys have
suggested will be necessary for them to cope with the high costs
of prosecuting capital cases.6 11
605. See id. § 63-d(1)(i).
606. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63-d(1)(ii).
607. See id. § 63-d(2).
608. See Doubts Emerge, supra note 562.
609. See Pieces Fall in Place, supra note 561.
610. See Fees Diverge, supra note 564, at 1.
611. See Doubts Emerge, supra note 562, at 4. Looking at the long term,
Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J. Hynes said even the $5 million to $15 mil-
lion range discussed by the Legislature would not be enough. See id. Citing esti-
mates that total costs of capital cases could run $3.5 million per case or higher, he
pointed out that in Brooklyn there could be as many as 80 capital cases a year.
See id. Statewide it has been estimated that as many as 480 of the roughly 2,400
murder cases prosecuted annually involve crimes that would be classified as eligi-
ble for capital treatment under the new statute. See id. Erie County District Attor-
ney Kevin M. Dillon expressed some concern that additional funding would be
allocated, noting that about 5% of his offices' $8 million budget, which comes from
grants designated by individual members of the Legislature, is in "serious jeop-
ardy." Id.
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E. Appeals and State Post-Conviction Motions
1. The Appeal of Cases Resulting in a Sentence of Death
[A] defendant who has been convicted in a capital case cannot
waive his or her appeal. It's not waiveable. So that person with
the suicidal bent, "I don't want to appeal," has no choice but to
appeal, and when he or she appeals, they're going to get some
pretty damn good legal defense, because this bill is stacked to pro-
vide legal defense ....
-Senator Stephen Saland 612
Judgments involving a sentence of death are appealed di-
rectly to the New York Court of Appeals. 613 Appeals in death
penalty cases are mandatory,6 14 reflecting the implicit legisla-
tive judgment that the state has an interest in ensuring that
capital sentences are imposed and executed lawfully,615 even if a
defendant should choose to forego appellate review of his or her
612. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1880.
613. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996); id.
§ 450.70(1) (McKinney 1994). See also N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b) (giving Court of
Appeals direct appellate jurisdiction in cases involving a judgment of death).
614. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 470.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). "Wher-
ever a sentence of death is imposed, the judgment and sentence shall be reviewed
on the record by the court of appeals. Review by the court of appeals... may not
be waived." Id. The mandatory, nonwaivable review involves any "judgment in-
cluding a sentence of death." Id.; id. § 450.70(1) (McKinney 1994). A "judgment"
consists of both "a conviction and the sentence imposed thereon." Id. § 1.20(15).
615. See generally Richard J. Bonnie The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1363 (1988). Difficult issues arise in the context of condemned prisoners who
announce that they wish to relinquish their rights to plenary legal review of their
convictions or death sentences. See id. One of these issues is whether the auton-
omy of the individual sentenced to death, and his or her decision to accept that
punishment, should be superior to whatever independent interest the state has to
ensure that capital punishment is administered according to law. See id. Another
issue concerns the competency of condemned prisoners to waive the right of judi-
cial review of their sentences. See, e.g., G. Richard Strafer, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 860, 862. See Bonnie, supra; Melvin I. Urofsky, A Right to Die:
Termination of Appeal for Condemned Prisoners, 75 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
553 (1984).
New York joins the near-unanimous judgment of other jurisdictions by mak-
ing the appeal of a judgment resulting in a sentence of death mandatory and
nonwaivable. See James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Statutory Measures for
More Effective Appellate Review in Capital Cases, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 211, 228-29
(1995) [hereinafter Appellate Review], which identifies Arkansas as the only death
penalty jurisdiction that clearly allows death-sentenced prisoners to waive all ap-
peals in capital cases. The law regarding waivers of appeals is unclear under Ohio
law and federal law, but all other jurisdictions require appeals of death sentences
and/or convictions resulting in capital sentences. See id.
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conviction and sentence.6 16 The Court of Appeals has the same
broad authority to reach and decide issues in the appeal of
death penalty cases that the Appellate Division possesses in the
criminal appeals it hears.617 Specifically, the High Court is au-
thorized to consider and determine issues of fact, and not just
questions of law in the appeal of cases resulting in capital
sentences.61 8 It also retains "interests of justice" review powers
616. See Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PiTT. L. REV.
853, 853-54 (1987). In 1977, Gary Gilmore became the first person executed under
law in this country following a 10-year moratorium on the use of capital punish-
ment. See id. Gilmore waived all of his rights of appeal and died before a Utah
firing squad just three and one-half months after he was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. See id. See generally, Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
617. See N.Y. CiuM. PRoc. LAW § 470.30(1),(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). "Sub-
division (3) adopts, by referencing subdivision one of section 470.30, the broad
scope of appellate review and corrective action authority granted to the Court by
that subdivision's cross-reference to sections 470.15 and 470.20 of the Criminal
Procedure Law." BiLL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 15.
618. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 470.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996), referencing id.
§ 470.15(1) (McKinney 1994).
Upon an appeal to an intermediate appellate court from a judgment, sen-
tence or order of a criminal court, such intermediate appellate court may
consider and determine any question of law or issue of fact involving error or
defect in the criminal court proceedings which may have adversely affected
the appellant.
Id. Compare id. §§ 450.90, 470.35 (limiting Court of Appeals' appellate jurisdiction
in other cases to questions of law). See also People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 52, 468
N.E.2d 879, 883, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710 (1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
This case discusses the Court of Appeals' obligation to review facts in capital ap-
peals, as follows:
"A review of the facts means that we shall examine the evidence to deter-
mine whether in our judgment it has been sufficient to make out a case of
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. We are obliged to weigh the evidence
and form a conclusion as to the facts. It is not sufficient, as in most of the
cases with us, to find evidence which presents a question of fact; it is neces-
sary to go further before we can affirm a conviction and find that the evi-
dence is of such weight and credibility as to convince us that the jury was
justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Even
in a capital case, however, "this court should not readily interfere with ver-
dicts of jurors who have had the advantage of seeing and hearing
witnesses."
People v. Crum, 272 N.Y. 348, 350, 6 N.E.2d 51, 51 (1936), quoted in People v.
Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 52, 468 N.E.2d 879, 883, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710 (1984), cert.
denied 469 U.S. 1227 (1985). For a helpful discussion of the appellate courts' fact
review, see generally N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW 470.15 commentary at 549 (McKinney
1994). See also id. § 470.15(5). "The kinds of determinations of reversal or modifi-
cation deemed to be on the facts include, but are not limited to, a determination
142http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/3
WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED
to reach errors that were not properly preserved and to set
aside death sentences as being unduly harsh or severe.619
The statute requires the Court of Appeals to perform three
discrete functions, in addition to its general review powers, re-
garding appealed death sentences. The Court is charged to
determine:
(a) whether the sentence of death was imposed under the in-
fluence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary or legally im-
permissible factor including whether the imposition of the verdict
or sentence was based upon the race of the defendant or a victim
of the crime for which the defendant was convicted;
(b) whether the sentence of death is excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering both
the crime and the defendant. In conducting such review the
court, upon request of the defendant, in addition to any other de-
termination, shall review whether the sentence of death is exces-
sive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases by
virtue of the race of the defendant or a victim of the crime for
which the defendant was convicted; and
(c) whether the decision to impose the sentence of death was
against the weight of the evidence. 620
By enacting these provisions, the Legislature clearly in-
tended the Court of Appeals to police the administration of the
death penalty law to ensure, to the greatest extent possible,
that individual death sentences are not tainted by legally im-
that a verdict of conviction resulting in a judgment was, in whole or in part,
against the weight of the evidence." Id.
619. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 470.15(2)(c) (McKinney 1994). The new law elim-
inates a provision of pre-existing law which had denied the Court of Appeals the
authority, "as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice [to] set aside, reduce
or change a sentence of death as being unduly harsh or severe." Id. § 470.30(1)
(McKinney 1994) (quoting former § 470.30(1) (McKinney 1994)).
Section 470.30(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996) references § 470.15, which autho-
rizes the Appellate Division in criminal appeals to reverse or modify judgments:
deemed to be made as a matter of discretion in the interest ofjustice [which]
include but are not limited to .... [para.] (a) that an error or defect occur-
ring at a trial resulting in a judgment, which error or defect was not duly
protested at trial.., so as to present a question of law, deprived the defend-
ant of a fair trial; (b) That a sentence, though legal, was unduly harsh or
severe.
Id. § 470.15(6). See also N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW 470.15 commentary at 549 (McKin-
ney 1994); O'Connor, supra note 357, at 9.
620. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 470.30(3)(a)-(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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permissible factors, including the race of the defendant or the
murder victim, are not excessive or disproportionate when com-
pared to the sentences imposed in similar cases, and are not
imposed against the weight of the evidence. 621 These objectives
are laudable, and the powers afforded the Court potentially can
be of great importance in helping to guard against arbitrari-
ness. Still, the statute is conspicuously short on specifics about
how the sentence-review obligations are to be accomplished.
Much will fall on the Court of Appeals judges to craft and imple-
ment procedures to effectuate the statutory objectives.
Two of the Court's duties under the statute are ascertain-
ing whether death sentences were influenced by passion, preju-
dice, or other arbitrary or legally impermissible factors,
including race,622 and evaluating whether death sentences were
imposed against the weight of the evidence. 623 These duties will
require the judges to scrutinize the details of individual case
records to attempt to identify extralegal factors that may have
affected capital sentences, and to assess the sufficiency of the
legal foundation of particular death sentences. These inquiries
necessarily will be highly idiosyncratic. While they will require
the Court to focus on the unique circumstances of individual
cases, the answers to these questions may, in certain cases, also
be informed by the more systematic and statewide examination
of cases that will be required for the Court to complete the ex-
cessiveness or disproportionality review commanded by the
statute.624 A finding that the death sentence imposed in a case
is inconsistent with the punishment normally assessed in simi-
lar cases may well support an inference that extralegal factors
impermissibly influenced the sentence of death, or that a partic-
ular death sentence was imposed against the weight of the
evidence.
The sentence review required under subsection (b) of the
statute is commonly known as comparative proportionality re-
621. See BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 15; Memorandum of State Ex-
ecutive Department, McKinney's Session Laws 2283 (218th Session)(1995).
622. N.Y. CPiM. PRoc. LAw § 470.30(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
623. Id. § 470.30(3)(c).
624. See Baldus, Comparative Review, supra note 181, at 620.
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view (CPR).625 In other contexts, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that the death penalty is per se disproportion-
ate, or an excessive punishment for specific crimes, such as
rape,626 or when applied against offenders who are not suffi-
ciently culpable, such as minor participants in felony murder. 627
Comparative proportionality involves a very different notion of
excessiveness. It presumes that the death penalty lawfully may
be imposed on an offender for committing a crime such as first-
degree murder, yet it recognizes that a capital sentence in a
particular case still might be excessive in comparison to the
punishment typically imposed on offenders who commit similar
crimes. 628 Comparative proportionality review
requires the reviewing court to identify other cases from the same
jurisdiction that are "similar" in some pertinent respect to the
death sentence case under review and to decide, in light of the
sentences imposed in those other "similar" cases, whether the
death sentence being scrutinized conforms to the constitutional
standard of evenhanded, consistent sentencing in capital cases.629
625. See generally Richard Van Duizend, Comparative Proportionality Review
in Death Sentences Cases: What? How? Why?, 8 STATE CT. J. 9, 11 (Summer 1984)
[hereinafter Van Duizend, Comparative Proportionality Review].
626. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult, and hence violates
the Eighth Amendment).
627. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). See also Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death
penalty as disproportionate in the case of a defendant whose participation in a
felony that resulted in murder is major and whose mental state is one of reckless
indifference). The Court also has ruled that capital punishment is constitutionally
excessive when used against offenders who were age 15 or younger at the time of
their crimes, at least absent specific statutory authorization for such practice. See
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion). It further has
suggested that the execution of profoundly mentally retarded (as distinguished
from mildly or moderately mentally retarded) offenders would violate the Eighth
Amendment on grounds of disproportionality. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
333 (1989).
628. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). Comparative "proportionality
review presumes that the death sentence is not disproportionate to the crime in
the traditional sense. It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is none-
theless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punish-
ment imposed on others convicted of the same crime." Id. at 43.
629. See Baldus, Comparative Review, supra note 181 at 663.
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Although not required under the federal Constitution,630
CPR must be completed pursuant to statute in a majority of
death penalty jurisdictions.631 However, if the frequency with
which state supreme courts vacate death sentences because
they are comparatively excessive is a measure of how effective
CPR has been in helping to detect and correct arbitrary capital
sentencing decisions, this procedure has been an abysmal fail-
ure. The state courts overwhelmingly have declined to use CPR
to disturb capital sentences, 632 even though researchers have
produced abundant evidence that aberrational death sentences
are imposed within categories of similar killings.633
630. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 50. The Supreme Court ruled that California's
capital punishment statutes had sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness to
make comparative proportionality review of death sentences unnecessary under
Eighth Amendment standards. See id.
631. See Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 237. Statutes in 21 jurisdictions
require CPR in capital appeals, and identify two additional states in which state
supreme courts conduct CPR in the absence of a statutory mandate. Id. Connecti-
cut is identified in this reference as requiring CPR, but it recently repealed the
statutory provision requiring such review. See Com. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
46b(b) (West Supp. 1996).
632. See Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 238-39 & n.106 (citing refer-
ences). For an exhaustive study of state courts and their administration of CPR,
see Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High
Courts: Only the "Appearance of Justice"?, __ J. CrmM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY -
(forthcoming). See also Donald H. Wallace & Jonathan R. Sorensen, Missouri Pro-
portionality Review: An Assessment of a State Supreme Court's Procedures in Cap-
ital Cases, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281, 297 (1994); Steven M.
Sprenger, Note, A Critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court Proportionality Re-
view in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IOWA. L. REV. 719, 738-39 (1988) (reporting infre-
quency with which state supreme courts have vacated death sentences based on
CPR). The Missouri Supreme Court invalidated one death sentence out of 70 cases
in which CPR was conducted. See Wallace & Sorenson, supra, at 286. This action
was taken in a case in which the defendant's codefendant had been sentenced to
life imprisonment. See id. at 297.
633. See BALDUS ET AL, EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 203 (1990)
[hereinafter BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE] (estimating that between 13% and 25% of
the first 120 death penalty cases reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court probably
involved excessive sentences, and reporting that only 2 of those 120 sentences were
vacated on disproportionality grounds, under unusual circumstances that did not
require the court to compare the death sentences to a larger pool of similar cases);
Raymond Paternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death
Penalty in South Carolina: Experiences Over the First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. REV.
245, 377-78 (1988) [hereinafter Paternoster & Kazyaka, Administration] (estimat-
ing that 35% to 60% of death sentences reviewed by the South Carolina Supreme
Court may have been excessive; yet, that court did not vacate a single death sen-
tence based on CPR during the first 10 years of South Carolina's guided-discretion
death penalty legislation); Raymond Paternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, An Ex-
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If other state appellate courts have been deficient in their
conduct of CPR, a contributing factor may be the relative com-
plexity of the task. A court logically must complete a sequence
of steps, each laden with conceptual and practical challenges, if
it is to assess whether the death sentence imposed in a particu-
lar case is excessive or disproportionate compared to the
sentences imposed in other similar cases. First, it must begin
its search for similar cases in the proper universe of cases.
Courts have different choices. They can confine their quest to
identify cases similar to the one under review to others that
have resulted in capital sentences. Or, they can consider pro-
gressively more expansive collections of cases: all that progress
to a penalty-phase hearing, whether or not a death sentence is
imposed; all resulting in capital murder convictions, even if a
death sentence is not sought; all prosecuted under capital mur-
der indictments, whether or not a conviction for that offense
was obtained; or all cases that could have been prosecuted capi-
tally, regardless of whether they in fact were. The choice of the
universe that will be scoured for "similar" cases is profoundly
important, as the following example illustrates.
Assume that 100 indistinguishable murders are committed;
for example, intentional killings occurring during an armed rob-
bery. Assume further that 60 of the 100 defendants are indicted
for first-degree murder; that 40 of the 60 prosecutions for first-
degree murder result in a conviction for that offense; that prose-
cutors seek a death sentence in 20 of the 40 cases resulting in
capital murder convictions; and that juries sentence 10 of the 20
death-penalty eligible offenders to death. Finally, assume that
the death-sentenced defendant in a case being appealed has
committed a comparable robbery-murder, and the state's high-
est court must assess whether that defendant's sentence is ex-
cessive or disproportionate compared to the dispositions in
similar cases.
If the court limits its review to other cases resulting in
sentences of death, it will identify 10 similar cases, all involving
the same punishment as the case on appeal. It almost certainly
will conclude that the capital sentence imposed in the case be-
amination of Comparatively Excessive Death Sentences in South Carolina 1979-
1987, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 475, 495 (1989-1990).
1996] 187
147
PACE LAW REVIEW
ing reviewed is not aberrational, or excessive in light of the dis-
positions in other robbery-murder cases. Of course, such a
process does not constitute meaningful comparative proportion-
ality review at all, since the court gains only a sense of the raw
number of comparable cases resulting in capital sentences, and
remains completely in the dark about the relative frequency, or
the rate, of imposition of death sentences in like cases.634 Sur-
prisingly, some state courts limit their CPR to such a "prece-
dent-seeking' approach that involves only the review of other
death-sentence cases.6 3 5
Alternatively, all cases involving a penalty-phase trial
could be reviewed, whether or not a death sentence was im-
posed. In the above example, an appeals court would note that
death sentences were given in precisely half (10 out of 20) of
robbery-murder cases, with the other half resulting in
sentences of life imprisonment. 63 6 The picture looks quite dif-
ferent as the pool of cases used for comparison continues to ex-
pand. If all cases resulting in capital murder convictions are
consulted, including those in which the prosecutor elects not to
seek a death sentence, the apparent capital-sentencing rate for
robbery-murder cases dips to 25% (10 out of 40).637 When all
cases prosecuted under first-degree murder indictments are re-
viewed, just 1 out of 6 (16.7%) robbery-murders result in a
death sentence.6 38 And when all 100 of the robbery-murders are
634. See Baldus et al, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death:
A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 n.1 (1980) [hereinafter, Baldus,
Excessive Sentences].
635. See BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 633, at 283, 297 n.16; Sprenger,
supra note 632 at 730 & n.9, 738. In New Jersey, the state supreme court's CPR is
limited by statute to a comparison of other cases in which death sentences have
been imposed. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e) (West 1995). The New Jersey
Supreme Court has reserved ruling on the constitutionality of that restriction.
State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1063-64 (N.J. 1992) (declining to give this limita-
tion, which was adopted in 1992, retroactive effect to apply to cases pending on
appeal).
636. See BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 633, at 284, 298 n.19. Several
state courts rely on such a strategy for CPR. See id.
637. See id. Some state supreme courts have adopted this approach. See id. at
284, 299 n.21.
638. See Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 243 (quoting Van Duizend,
Comparative Proportionality Review, supra note 625). A Task Force working
under the auspices of the National Center for State Courts concluded that the pool
of cases for proportionality review should contain, as a minimum, all cases in
which the indictment included a death-eligible charge, and a homicide conviction
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included-a measure which does not blind the court to compa-
rable cases excluded through the exercise of prosecutorial
charging discretion and decisions about whether to seek the
death penalty, or by juries' guilt-determination and sentencing
discretion-a reviewing court would conclude that death
sentences are imposed in only 10 out of 100, or 10% of similar
cases. 639
The choice of the universe or pool of cases used to begin
CPR has clear implications for measuring the frequency with
which death sentences are imposed in cases that are similar to
the one being appealed.64° Other information relevant to a
court's sentence-review task also is affected by the definition of
this universe of potentially similar cases. One consequence may
be that racial discrimination is hidden. For instance, assume
that in the example used above, 50 robbery-murders were com-
mitted by white defendants, and 50 were committed by African-
American defendants. Further assume that all 50 black defend-
ants were indicted for first-degree murder, but only 10 white
defendants were so indicted. Such a result obviously would sug-
gest racial discrimination, but a court that reviewed only first-
was obtained. See id. Under this standard, it is not necessary that a capital mur-
der conviction be returned. See id. This raises the question of whether some cases,
which did not result in a conviction for a capital crime, would erroneously be in-
cluded in the comparison pool. See id. This is a valid concern, but not an insur-
mountable problem. The courts would have to scrutinize the facts of cases
carefully to guard against the risk of overinclusiveness. But refraining from exam-
ining cases that do not result in capital murder conviction poses the more serious
risk of underinclusiveness, or not taking account of comparable cases that were
removed through the exercise of prosecutorial or jury discretion. See Appellate Re-
view, supra note 615, at 243; Sprenger, supra note 632, at 731.
639. See BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 633, at 293. Some states may
wish to adopt a pool of cases broader than that defined above where there is a
concern that particular types of murder cases or those involving a defendant or
victim of a particular race are treated differently from their inception. In such
instances, it may be necessary to work out the agreements necessary to gather
information directly from police records for all homicides reported or to delete from
the pool certain classes of cases which are likely to be tainted. When there is con-
cern about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion or where the distinction between
capital and noncapital murder is not clear-cut, a pool of cases including all murder
indictments may be desirable. The task force guideline is recommended as the
minimum necessary for effective proportionality review and is not intended to
serve as a limit when a wider perspective is warranted. See Van Duizend, Com-
parative Proportionality Review, supra note 625, at 12 (citations omitted).
640. See generally Van Duizend, Comparative Proportionality Review, supra
note 625, at 11.
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degree murder indictments would be oblivious to this evidence.
If black defendants eventually received 8 out of the 10 death
sentences imposed (80%), this outcome would appear to be fair
since black defendants were the subject of roughly the same
percentage of first-degree murder indictments: 50 out of 60, or
83.3%. In fact, black defendants would be 4 times as likely to be
sentenced to death as white defendants in comparable cases: 8
out of 50 (16%) black defendants would be sentenced to die ver-
sus 2 out of 50 (4%) white defendants. 641
Eradicating the influence of race from the death penalty's
administration was of obvious concern to the New York Legisla-
ture.642 The appeal provisions within the death penalty statute
make two separate references to the race of the defendant and
the murder victim, 6 43 and the legislation expressly provides for
the individual, sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors re-
garding possible racial biases.644 Numerous legislators voiced
opinions about the statute's adequacy in guarding against ra-
cial discrimination,645 which is an area of special concern in
light of the Supreme Court's refusal in McCleskey v. Kemp 64 to
641. See BALDUS ET AL, COMMENTS: PROPOSED UNIFORM RULES FOR CAPITAL
CASE DATA REPORTS AND PROPOSED CAPITAL CASE DATA REPORT FORM 4 [hereinaf-
ter BALDUS, COMMENTS].
642. See generally BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43 at 15; Senate Debate,
supra note 13.
643. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 470.30(3)(a), (b) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See
supra note 620 and accompanying text.
644. See N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW at § 270.16(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See
supra notes 484-87 and accompanying text.
645. See, e.g., Senate Debate, supra note 13 at 1859 (remarks of Senator Mar-
tin Connor); id. at 1883-84 (remarks of Senator Stephen Saland); id. at 1897-98
(remarks of Senator Dale Volker); id. at 1905-06 (remarks of Senator David Pater-
son); id. at 1940-41 (remarks of Senator Catherine Abate); id. at 1984 (remarks of
Senator Mary Ellen Jones); id. at 1994-96 (remarks of Senator Alton Waldon, Jr.);
id. at 2004 (remarks of Senator Pedro Espada, Jr.); id. at 2033-34 (remarks of Sen-
ator Marty Markowitz); Assembly Debate, supra note 1 at 34 (remarks of Assem-
blywoman Deborah Glick); id. at 84 (remarks of Assemblyman Clarence Norman,
Jr.); id. at 106-08, 395-401 (remarks of Assemblyman Roger Green); id. at 151-55
(remarks of Assemblywoman Barbara Clark); id. at 166-67 (remarks of Assembly-
man Ramirez); id. at 220-21 (remarks of Assemblyman Jeffrion Aubry); id. at 247-
50 (remarks of Assemblyman Keith Wright); id. at 344 (remarks of Assemblyman
William Scarborough); id. at 377 (remarks of Assemblyman Vito Lopez); id. at 422-
23 (remarks of Assemblywoman Carmen Arroyo); id. at 456 (remarks of Asem-
blyman Edward Sullivan).
646. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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create a federal constitutional remedy for racially disparate
capital sentencing patterns.647
In McCleskey, the nation's High Court rejected the equal
protection and Eighth Amendment claims raised by a black de-
fendant sentenced to death for murdering a white victim.6
The defendant argued that his capital sentence had been
tainted by race discrimination, which permeated Georgia's
death penalty system. 649 These claims were substantiated by a
comprehensive statistical study, which the Court assumed to be
valid.650 The study demonstrated that white-victim homicides
were significantly more likely to be prosecuted as capital cases,
and result in death sentences, than comparable homicides in-
volving black victims. 651 Notwithstanding this evidence, the
Court, by vote of five to four, was unwilling to conclude that the
defendant had demonstrated that race had influenced his sen-
tence, or that Georgia's death penalty laws generally were ad-
ministered arbitrarily.652 The majority opinion concluded that
"McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative
bodies." 65
3
The New York Legislature did not specifically countermand
McCleskey. It could have followed the lead of bills introduced in
Congress, that ultimately were not adopted, that directly pro-
647. See id. at 319.
648. See id. at 299.
649. See id. at 291-92.
650. See id. at 291 n.7.
651. See 481 U.S. 279. After imposing statistical controls for nonracial factors
that could have contributed to the sentencing disparities, the researchers (David
Baldus, George Woodworth and Charles Pulaski, Jr.) concluded that the odds in
white-victim homicides were 4.3 times higher than in comparable black-victim
homicides to result in death sentences. See id. Disparate sentencing patterns
based on race were especially likely to be evident in "mid-range" cases that were
not at the highest or lowest levels of aggravation. Id. at 287 & n.5. For a detailed
description of the study and its conclusions, see Baldus, Comparative Review,
supra note 181, at 40-197.
652. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297. Numerous commentators have criticized
McCleskey. See, e.g., Vada Berger et al., Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response
to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24 HARv. C.R. C.L. L. REv. 437 (1989); Ellsworth, supra note
463, at 187-89; Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Death and Discrimination: Ra-
cial Disparities in Capital Sentencing 134-227 (1989); Randall L. Kennedy, Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L.
REv. 1388 (1988).
653. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
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vided what the defendant in McCleskey had requested.654 These
bills would have required the states to adopt the same analyti-
cal framework for resolving claims of race discrimination in cap-
ital sentencing as is used in the context of employment
discrimination and related claims with equal protection over-
tones.6 55 Specifically, the proposed federal legislation would
have allowed capital defendants to rely on statistics reflecting
racially disparate sentencing patterns to create a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination.656 The state then would have
the opportunity to rebut the inference of unlawful discrimina-
tion created by the statistics by identifying legitimate, race-neu-
tral factors in explanation of the particular sentencing
decision.657 Instead of adopting an analogous state Racial Jus-
tice Act, the New York Legislature took the more modest, but
significant, step of directing the Court of Appeals to examine
appealed death sentences for the possible influence of race, and
to consider the race of defendant and the race of the murder
victim (on the defendant's request) in the course of its compara-
tive proportionality review. 658
Although the statute does not explicitly identify the uni-
verse of cases the Court of Appeals is to examine as it begins its
obligatory review of appealed death-sentence cases, the new
legislation does direct trial court clerks to complete data reports
in designated cases so that necessary information is collected
for the state high court's appellate review.659 The statute re-
quires the Court of Appeals to promulgate rules "to ensure that
in every criminal action in which a defendant is indicted for the
commission of an offense defined in section 125.27 of the penal
654. See the proposed Racial Justice Act, H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), and the proposed Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, H.R. 4092, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994). These bills are reprinted in Baldus, Racial Discrimination, supra
note 186, at 420-25.
655. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e -
2000e-17 (West 1994) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
656. See BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43.
657. See id. For a more detailed description of the working of these proposed
bills, see Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 254-57; Baldus, Comparative Review,
supra note 181; Berger, supra note 491; Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or
Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish
Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE
777 (1990-91).
658. See BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43.
659. See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 211-a (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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law,"66 0 i.e., first-degree murder, the clerks of trial courts will
prepare a data report by completing a standard form published
by the Court of Appeals.6 61 The data reports must be completed
in all such cases, unless the indictment is dismissed, and the
forms are later forwarded to the clerk of the Court of Appeals. 662
Their purpose is to "assist[ I the court of appeals in determining
... whether a particular sentence of death is disproportionate
or excessive in the context of penalties imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime or crimes and the defendant."663 The
individual data reports thereafter are compiled into a single
"uniform capital case data report," which is to be made avail-
able for use by appellants in capital cases.664
The statutory definition of the class of cases in which capi-
tal case data reports are to be completed is susceptible of differ-
ent interpretations. At a minimum, trial court clerks must
prepare reports in all cases prosecuted under first-degree mur-
der indictments, whether or not those cases result in convic-
tions for first-degree murder, proceed to a penalty trial, or
result in a sentence of death.6 5 The unmistakable inference is
that the Court of Appeals should consider a universe of cases of
at least this size when it engages in comparative proportionality
review in capital appeals. However, as discussed above, limit-
ing the Court's review to cases involving first-degree murder in-
dictments presents the danger that prosecutorial charging
discretion will significantly reduce the number of potentially
capital cases available for the Court's consideration, and will
even mask racial discrimination and other types of arbitrari-
ness.66 6 A different reading of the statute avoids such problems.
Capital case data reports are to be completed in all cases
which meet the following criteria: (a) "the defendant is indicted
660. Id.
661. See id. The Court of Appeals distributed proposed Uniform Rules for
Capital Case Data Reports for public comment subsequent to the passage of the
statute. See BALDUS, COMMENTS, supra note 641.
662. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 211-a (McKinney Supp. 1996). The trial court clerks
are to complete the data report forms "by reviewing the record and upon consulta-
tion with the prosecutor and the attorney for the defendant .. " Id. They are to
be prepared within 45 days following the trial court's disposition of a case. See id.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. See id.
666. See supra notes 639-41 and accompanying text.
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for the commission of an offense," and (b) the offense allegedly
committed is "defined in section 125.27 of the penal law...."667
This section need not be interpreted to apply only to cases in
which first-degree murder indictments actually are returned.
An alternative reading, one which arguably is more consistent
with the legislative intent regarding the Court of Appeals' duty
to scrutinize capital cases for evidence of systemic race discrimi-
nation and other arbitrary factors that could produce compara-
tively excessive capital sentences, focuses on the defendant's
alleged commission of an offense that factually is within the
statutory definition of first-degree murder. Under this con-
struction, the Court would be at liberty to consider cases involv-
ing factual circumstances that define an offense as first-degree
murder, whether or not the case was prosecuted under a first-
degree murder indictment. In other words, the "commission of
an offense defined in"668 the first-degree murder statute, rather
than the return of a first-degree murder indictment, would trig-
ger the preparation of a capital case data report, and bring the
case within the ambit of the Court's review. Even if the statute
is not interpreted in this fashion, the Court certainly could exer-
cise its inherent and constitutional rule-making powers to en-
sure that it is informed of cases that could be defined as first-
degree murder, even if they are not so defined because of prose-
cutors' decisions not to seek, or grand juries' unwillingness to
return, indictments for first-degree murder.669
If it is to examine racial variables, and more generally con-
duct CPR (Comparitive Proportionality Review) effectively, the
Court of Appeals almost certainly will have to rely on statistical
techniques as a part of its analysis. This is a step that the New
Jersey Supreme Court already takes in completing its review of
capital sentences. 670 Systematic data collection and statistical
667. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 211-a (McKinney Supp. 1996).
668. Id.
669. See BALDUS, COMMENTS, supra note 641, at 2-6. This position regarding
the Court of Appeals' statutory and inherent authority to consider potentially capi-
tal cases in addition to those that have been prosecuted pursuant to first-degree
murder indictments is presented in BALDUS, COMMENTS. See id.
670. State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992). The New Jersey Supreme
Court appointed Professor David Baldus as a special master to assist it with the
data collection employed for its comparative proportionality review in capital ap-
peals. See id. at 1063.
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analysis are virtually indispensable for meaningful CPR. The
need for data and statistical techniques to interpret the data
owes largely to the demands of the second stage of the compara-
tive proportionality review analysis. Following the selection of
the universe of cases that will be combed for cases comparable
to the one under review, criteria must be developed and proce-
dures employed to identify cases that in fact are "similar" to the
appealed case. This is no easy task. Comparing actual murder
cases, involving innumerable potentially significant differences
between offense circumstances and defendant characteristics, is
a far more daunting challenge than constructing and analyzing
100 hypothetical indistinguishable capital murders.
Two basic complementary strategies are available to iden-
tify "similar cases considering both the crime and the defend-
ant."671 One approach depends on matching factually similar
cases. The other compares cases that are similar conceptually,
according to their overall level of aggravation or culpability.
These techniques are not mutually exclusive, and it would be
sound strategy for a court to use the two methods in tandem, as
cross-checks on reliability.672
Fact-based methods for comparing cases are made difficult
because no two cases involve identical crimes and defendants,
and it is difficult to know, a priori, the significance of the factual
differences that inevitably will exist between cases. Neverthe-
less, many state courts appear to rely principally on matching
the "salient factors" of cases when they conduct CPR. Thus, for
example, courts might consider factors such as whether the
murder was committed during a contemporaneous felony, or in-
volved the killing of a police officer, or was committed by a de-
fendant with a serious criminal record, or one who was just
eighteen years old at the time of the crime. The courts rely on
their experience, common sense, or intuition in selecting the de-
terminative salient factors.673
671. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 470.30(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
672. See Baldus, Arbitrariness and Discrimination, supra note 117, at 201;
Van Duizend, Comparative Proportionality Review, supra note 625, at 10-11.
673. See Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 244; Baldus, Comparative Re-
view, supra note 181, at 681-82; Baldus, Excessive Sentences, supra note 634, at 32-
36; Baldus, Arbitrariness and Discrimination, supra note 117, at 201; Van Du-
izend, Comparative Proportionality Review, supra note 625, at 10.
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Another fact-dominated method of comparison depends less
on evaluative judgments about what facts are important to sen-
tencing decisions, and relies to a much greater degree on statis-
tical findings regarding the "main determinants" of sentences.
The "main determinants" approach involves matching cases
that have roughly the same number of significant aggravating
factors, mitigating factors, and other important characteristics.
In contrast to the salient factor method of comparison, which
relies on matching specific case facts, the main determinants
approach identifies classes of cases with comparable numbers of
the "main determinants" of sentences, as assessed by statistical
analyses of sentencing decisions in potentially capital cases. 674
The other basic strategy for identifying similar cases as-
signs cases to different classes based on a measure of their rela-
tive level of aggravation or culpability. Under this technique,
cases need not share comparable facts in order to be classified
as similar. Instead, the most highly aggravated cases are
grouped, as are cases at intermediate and lower levels of aggra-
vation. The groupings are determined by statistical techniques
which identify and assign a weight to the aggravating, mitigat-
ing, and other case variables that contribute to sentencing deci-
sions.675 Experienced researchers consider the use of overall
culpability measures imperative for effective comparative pro-
portionality review.676
After cases similar to the one being appealed are identified,
the court must render judgment about whether the death sen-
674. See Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 244-45; Baldus, Comparative
Review, supra note 181, at 684-86; Baldus, Excessive Sentences, supra note 634, at
23-35; Paternoster & Kazyaka, Administration, supra note 633, at 363-65; Van
Duizend, Comparative Proportionality Review, supra note 625, at 22.
675. See Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 245; Baldus, Comparative Re-
view, supra note 181, at 689-92; Baldus, Excessive Sentences, supra note 634, at 40;
Paternoster & Kazyaka, Administration, supra note 633, at 369-77; Van Duizend,
Comparative Proportionality Review, supra note 625, at 22.
676. See BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE supra note 633, at 293:
[P]erhaps [our] most important recommendation . . . is that the courts
should supplement their fact-specific matching methods with some overall
measure of culpability that will allow the courts to classify and compare all
of the death-eligible cases in their jurisdiction, regardless of their factual
comparability. Indeed, we believe that until such measures can be under-
taken, proportionality review procedures will be plagued with the inconsis-
tency and ad hoc nature that has characterized most state systems to date.
Id. See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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tence imposed in the appealed case is excessive or dispropor-
tionate compared to punishments imposed in those other cases.
At the extreme, this assessment will not be difficult.677 Clearly,
if the appealed case is the only one of 100 comparable cases in
which a death sentence was imposed, the sentence should be
vacated as comparatively excessive. On the other hand, if 95
out of 100 of the similar cases resulted in a death sentence, the
capital sentence imposed in the case under review would not be
considered aberrational or disproportionate to the punishment
normally assigned in those other cases. But in many cases, the
judgment will not be so clear-cut, and the reviewing court will
require a more specific criterion by which to determine when a
death sentence is comparatively disproportionate. Different
standards have been suggested or utilized in this context, 678
although many courts simply do not articulate the bases of their
conclusions about comparative excessiveness.679
Many practical matters also are essential to a court's abil-
ity to conduct CPR effectively. Comprehensive verdict forms 68°
and a data collection instrument 681 must be developed so that
677. The New York Court of Appeals is required by statute to identify in its
decision "those similar cases it took into consideration." Id.
678. Professor Baldus and his colleagues have suggested that if the death-
sentencing rate among a class of similar cases is at least .80, a rebuttable pre-
sumption is justified that a capital sentence is not comparatively excessive. If the
capital-sentencing rate among similar cases is less than .35, the converse pre-
sumption arises that a death sentence is comparatively excessive. No presump-
tions are indulged in either direction when the death-sentencing rate within a
class of similar cases is between .35 and .80. Baldus, Comparative Review, supra
note 181, at 695-98. The controlling principle adopted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court is as follows: "[a] death sentence is comparatively excessive if other defend-
ants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for
committing factually similar offenses in the same jurisdiction.'" State v. Marshall,
613 A.2d 1059, 1081 (N.J. 1992) (quoting Tichnell v. State, 468 A.2d 1, 17 n.18
(Md. 1983)).
679. See BALDUs, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 633, at 287.
680. The Court of Appeals is required to "formulate and adopt rules for the
development of forms for use by the jury in recording its findings and determina-
tions of sentence." N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(15) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
See proposed N.Y. CT. App. RULE 218.1 (Uniform Rules for Capital Sentencing
Form) (distributed for public review and comment, Sept. 15, 1995). See generally
Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 218-22.
681. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 211-a (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra notes 660-65
and accompanying text. See proposed N.Y. CT. App. RULES 218.10, 510.7 (Uniform
Rules for Capital Case Data Reports) (distributed for public review and comment,
Sept. 15, 1995). See generally Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 222-26.
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information necessary for the court's comparative review of
cases is preserved and available for analysis. Special adminis-
trative assistance is important to allow one or more individuals
trained for the job to review the information submitted to the
court for completeness and accuracy, to monitor the continuing
data collection process, and to provide whatever technical or
support services the court deems appropriate. 6 2 The compara-
tive review process can be only as good as the underlying data
on which it is based. It is especially important that dispositions
entered on guilty pleas, which may not be appealed or sup-
ported by a comprehensive record, and other verdicts not result-
ing in death sentences be documented and reviewed as
thoroughly as appealed death-sentence cases.
As the court of original appellate jurisdiction in death pen-
alty appeals,683 and with the unique demands imposed by CPR
and its related review functions, the Court of Appeals predict-
ably will experience a substantial increase in its workload as
the death penalty law is put to use. Records in death-sentence
cases can be massive, involving thousands of pages of testimony
and crates of motions, documents, and exhibits.68 4 The judges of
the High Court, who have fact-review 68 5 and interest-of-justice
review68 6 powers in appealed death penalty cases, will have to
make detailed examination of the case record, mindful of the
fact that a human life hinges on their judgment, and of the
court's important role in helping to guard against arbitrary cap-
ital decision making. In some other jurisdictions, capital cases
command as much as one-third or more of state supreme court
judges' time.687
682. See generally Appellate Review, supra note 615, at 248.
683. See supra note 613 and accompanying text.
684. "Transcripts in [capital cases appealed to the California Supreme Court]
typically range from 5,000 to 9,000 pages, and some contain as many as 90,000
pages." William C. Vickrey, Opinion Filings and Appellate Court Productivity, 78
JUDICATURE 47, 49 (July-Aug. 1994).
685. See supra note 618 and accompanying text.
686. See supra note 619 and accompanying text.
687. See Appellate Review, supra note 615 at 233 (appeals in capital cases ac-
counted for roughly 20% to 40% of the California Supreme Court's docket between
the 1987-1988 and 1991-1992 terms of court); Michael L. Radelet & Michael Mello,
Death-to-Life Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 213 & n.84 (1992) (estimating that half of the Florida
Supreme Court's time is absorbed with death penalty case appeals); Michael L.
Radelet & Margaret Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and Death Penalty Ap-
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Upon finding reversible error in an appealed death penalty
case, the Court of Appeals has different remedies available.688
In addition to its normal authority to reverse a conviction and
order a new trial or other appropriate disposition, 6 9 the Court
may set the death sentence aside and remand a case for a de
novo sentencing hearing before a newly impanelled jury.690 Al-
ternatively, it is authorized to vacate the sentence of death and
remand with instructions that the defendant be resentenced by
a judge either to life imprisonment without parole, or twenty to
twenty-five years to life imprisonment.691
2. Post-Conviction Motions
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: Given the federal standard for
showing no constitutional right to a review of new evidence, the
New York standard being due diligence, . . . it is current New
York law that a person wrongly convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death in New York, unless they can show... that they
did exercise due diligence, has no right, Mr. Vitaliano, to have the
matter considered by the courts of New York under this bill.
Assemblyman Eric Vitaliano: Again, Richard, with the exception
that a court would be free, under this bill, to make a determina-
tion that in a death case, the failure to entertain that kind of ap-
plication would be unconstitutional and then the court could
create in judge-made law, judge-made rule, the right to entertain
that kind of application.
Assemblyman Brodsky: You are aware that other states, . . .
which do have death penalty statutes, have standards of interest
of justice as opposed to due diligence in their statutes. I take it
peals, 74 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 913, 914 (1983) (estimating that the Florida
Supreme Court spends 35% to 40% of its working time resolving death case ap-
peals). See generally Judith S. Kaye, Book Review, 64 TuL. L. REV. 985, 988-89
(1990) (reviewing JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A
STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (1989)) (observations of Chief Judge Kaye of the
New York Court of Appeals about the impact death penalty cases have on state
court dockets).
688. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 470.30(5)(b),(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
689. See id. § 470.35 (McKinney 1994).
690. See id. § 470.30(5)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996). But see Michael L. Radelet
& Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U.
RICH. L. REV. 289, 293-94 (1993) (describing Texas' appeals and death-sentencing
laws).
691. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 470.30(5)(c).
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that having that standard was considered and rejected.., in this
statute?
Assemblyman Vitaliano: Yes. We have that in this State in this
bill, Richard, on the direct appeal.
Assemblyman Brodsky: But not for post-conviction evidence of
wrong-
Assemblyman Vitaliano: Not at this time on post-conviction.692
A death sentence may be collaterally challenged through a
post-judgment motion to set aside the sentence. 693 Pre-existing
law authorized setting aside a sentence following judgment only
on the grounds that the sentence was "unauthorized, illegally
imposed or otherwise invalid as a matter of law."694 A statutory
amendment allows a death sentence to be set aside for five addi-
tional reasons:
(b) The judgment was procured by duress, misrepresentation or
fraud on the part of the court or a prosecutor or a person acting
for or in behalf of a court or a prosecutor; or
(c) Material evidence adduced at a trial resulting in the judgment
was false and was, prior to the entry of the judgment, known, by
the prosecutor or by the court to be false; or...
(f) Improper and prejudicial conduct not appearing in the record
occurred during a trial resulting in the judgment which conduct,
if it had appeared in the record, would have required a reversal of
the judgment upon an appeal therefrom; or
(g) New evidence has been discovered since the entry of a judg-
ment based upon a verdict of guilty after trial, which could not
have been produced by the defendant at the trial even with due
diligence on his part and which is of such character as to create a
probability that had such evidence been received at the trial the
verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant; pro-
vided that a motion based upon such ground must be made with
due diligence after the discovery of such alleged new evidence; or
692. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 23-24.
693. See N.Y. CPM. PRoc. LAw § 440.20(1).
694. Id. § 440.20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Under this provision, "[t]he sin-
gle ground for the motion to set aside sentence is an allegation of legal defect;
either because the sentence was not authorized by law, or because it was illegally
imposed." Id. § 440.20(1) commentary at 558 (McKinney 1994).
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(h) The judgment was obtained in violation of a right of the de-
fendant under the constitution of this state or of the United
States. 695
No changes were made in the law authorizing post-conviction
challenges to the underlying conviction in capital and other
criminal cases.696 Motions of this type may be supported by
three grounds in addition to those enumerated above. 697
It has been suggested that the more expansive provisions
authorizing post-conviction challenges to capital sentences
"may prove to be illusory" because the procedural bars that gov-
ern post-conviction motions to vacate judgment still apply.6 98
Specifically, subject to retroactivity principles, a court must
deny a post-conviction motion involving issues previously re-
solved on appeal, issues pending on appeal, and issues that
695. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 440.10(1)(b),(c),(f)-(h) (McKinney 1994) incorpo-
rated by reference in id. § 440.20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
696. See N.Y. CIuM. PRoc. LAw § 420.20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
697. See N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw § 440.10(1)(a), (d), (e) (McKinney 1994). The
additional grounds that may be offered in support of a motion to vacate judgment
are:
(a) The court did not have jurisdiction of the action or of the person of
the defendant; or...
(d) Material evidence adduced by the people at a trial resulting in the
judgment was procured in violation of the defendant's rights under the con-
stitution of this state or of the United States; or
(e) During the proceedings resulting in the judgment, the defendant, by
reason of mental disease or defect, was incapable of understanding or partic-
ipating in such proceedings ....
Id. Professor Preiser notes that of the three grounds applicable to a motion to
vacate judgment that do not apply to a motion to vacate sentence:
[tihe rationale for excluding [§ 440.10(1)] paragraph (a) is obvious, but there
is no ready explanation for the other two exclusions. For example, a person
could well be competent during the trial and then become incompetent when
faced with the reality of conviction and the possibility of a death sentence
(paragraph [e]). Also, while the people ordinarily would not be introducing
material evidence at the sentencing proceeding, they are permitted to do so
in cases where one of the two aggravating circumstances not included in the
elements of the crime become relevant (see CPL § 400.27[7]) and may well
be forced to do so where a new jury is empaneled [sic] for the sentencing
proceeding (see id., subd. 6).
Id. § 440.20 commentary at 69.
698. Jay M. Cohen & Robert Rosenthal, The New York Death Penalty Statute
§ 1.01(2)(e)(1995). See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 440.20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996)
(requiring a court considering a motion to vacate a capital sentence "to apply sub-
divisions two and three of section 440.10, other than paragraph (d) of subdivision
two of such section, in determining the motion.").
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were not presented on appeal due to the defendant's "unjustifi-
able failure to raise such ground or issue upon an appeal actu-
ally perfected . ,,699 A court may, but is not required to, deny
a motion to vacate a judgment or sentence under other circum-
stances: when the defendant failed to adduce facts in an appeal
which could have been presented to support an issue that was
omitted from the appeal but later was raised by post-conviction
motion;700 when the issue was resolved through a prior motion;
or when, through a prior motion, "the defendant was in a posi-
tion adequately to raise the ground or issue underlying the
present motion but did not do so."701
During the course of the legislative debates, the prospect of
executing innocent people under the death penalty law almost
certainly evoked more discussion than any other issue.70 2 Re-
699. N.Y. CrM. PRoc. LAW § 440.10(2)(c) (McKinney 1994). See id.
§ 440.10(2)(a), (b).
700. See id. § 440.10(3)(a) commentary (McKinney Supp. 1996) for an exam-
ple falling under this provision.
701. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(3)(b), (c) (McKinney 1994). Under this
section generally, "[alithough the court may deny the motion under any of the cir-
cumstances specified in this subdivision, in the interest of justice and for good
cause shown it may in its discretion grant the motion if it is otherwise meritorious
and vacate the judgment." Id. § 440.10(3).
702. See Senate Debate, supra note 13, at 1848-51, 2056 (remarks of Senator
Dale Volker; id. at 1860-64 (remarks of Senator Martin Connor); id. at 1894-96
(remarks of Senator David Paterson); id. at 1940 (remarks of Senator Catherine
Abate); id. at 1954-55 (remarks of Senator Franz Leichter); id. at 1958 (remarks of
Senator Emanuel Gold); id. at 1976-78 (remarks of Senator Joseph Galiber); id. at
1984 (remarks of Senator Mary Ellen Jones); id. at 2007 (remarks of Senator Pedro
Espada, Jr.); id. at 2020 (remarks of Senator Suzi Oppenheimer); id. at 2039 (re-
marks of Senator Richard Dollinger); Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 11-14, 20-
23, 300, 466 (remarks of Assemblyman Eric Vitaliano); id. at 19-25, 288, 298-99
(remarks of Assemblyman Richard Brodsky); id. at 31-32, 390-92 (remarks of As-
semblywoman Deborah Glick); id. at 44 (remarks of Assemblyman Joseph
Robach); id. at 47-54, 471-72 (remarks of Assemblyman Martin Luster); id. at 82-
83 (remarks of Assemblyman Clarence Norman, Jr.); id. at 86 (remarks of Assem-
blyman Stephen Kaufman); id. at 124 (remarks of Assemblyman Daniel Feldman);
id. at 136 (remarks of Assemblywoman Susan John); id. at 142 (remarks of Assem-
blyman David Townsend, Jr.); id. at 150-54 (remarks of Assemblywoman Barbara
Clark); id. at 167-68 (remarks of Assemblyman Roberto Ramirez); id. at 178 (re-
marks of Assemblyman John Guerin); id. at 198-202 (remarks of Assemblyman
Richard Gottfried); id. at 223 (remarks of Assemblyman Jeffrion Aubry); id. at 233,
482 (remarks of Assemblyman Frank Barbaro); id. at 268-69 (remarks of Asem-
blyman John Brian Murtaugh); id. at 298-300 (remarks of Assemblyman Michael
Balboni); id. at 335-37 (remarks of Assemblyman John McEneny); id. at 351-54
(remarks of Assemblyman Anthony Genovesi); id. at 356-58 (remarks of Assembly-
man Paul Tonko); id. at 371-72 (remarks of Assemblyman Vito Lopez); id. at 396-
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searchers have produced evidence that six New Yorkers were
executed during the twentieth century for crimes they did not
commit, 70 3 and that over twenty additional incidents occurred
involving erroneous convictions and near-executions of innocent
people. 704 New York's last execution occurred in 1963,705 but the
experiences in other states demonstrate that miscarriages of
justice continue to occur in capital cases even under modern
legal procedures. 706
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to authorize state
death row prisoners to use the federal courts to assert claims of
innocence. In Herrera v. Collins,707 the Court ruled that a con-
demned state prisoner's claim that he was innocent of the crime
for which he had been sentenced to death, standing alone, could
not be entertained on federal habeas corpus, except in the rar-
est of circumstances. 708 The defendant in Herrera had been
97, 402 (remarks of Assemblyman Roger Green); id. at 445 (remarks of Assembly-
man N. Nick Perry).
703. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 73 (1987) [hereinafter Miscarriages
of Justice]. The findings of this study have been critized and defended, respec-
tively, in Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Re-
sponse to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988), and Hugo Adam
Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and
Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988).
704. See Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 703, at 37. Among the more fa-
mous cases involving the near-execution of innocent persons in New York was Isi-
dore Zimmerman's. Zimmerman came within two hours of being executed before
Governor Lehman commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. He was released
from prison after 24 years, when he succeeded in demonstrating that evidence con-
sistent with his claims of innocence had been suppressed at his trial. See id. at
171-72. See also Policy Perspectives, supra note 4, at 602-03; Tabak & Lane, supra
note 586, at 108.
705. See Policy Perspectives, supra note 4, at 526. See supra note 3 and ac-
companying text.
706. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING THE
DANGER OF MISTAKEN ExECUTIONS (1st Sess., Oct. 21, 1993) (identifying 48 cases
between 1973 and 1993 in which a convicted person was released from death row
because of innocence); Tabak & Lane, supra note 586, at 99-110. See also Martin I.
Rosenbaum, Inevitable Error: Wrongful New York State Homicide Convictions,
1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 807 (1990-1991) (documenting 59
wrongful homicide convictions in New York between 1965 and 1988).
707. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
708. See id. In Herrera, the Court ruled that "a claim of 'actual innocence' is
not itself a constitutional claim [cognizable on federal habeas corpus], but instead
a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
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barred from presenting his claim of innocence to the state
courts because Texas law required that challenges to criminal
convictions based on newly discovered evidence must be filed
within thirty days of final judgment or be forever lost.70 9
While New York law imposes no time limit on post-convic-
tion challenges to judgments based on newly discovered evi-
dence, it does bar such challenges absent a showing that the
new evidence "could not have been produced by the defendant
at the trial even with due diligence on his part. . . ."710 In con-
trast to the Court of Appeals' authority to reach issues on the
appeal of death penalty cases, the state courts have no "interest
of justice" powers 711 to address claims of innocence on post-con-
viction motions based on newly discovered evidence when the
"due diligence" exception does not apply.7 12 State and federal
law consequently can interact to deny a condemned prisoner
any judicial forum in which to present newly discovered evi-
dence of innocence.7 13
If a trial court grants a defendant's motion to set aside a
death sentence, the defendant is entitled to a new penalty trial
before a specially convened jury.714 If the nature of the error is
such that the defendant could not lawfully be resentenced to
death, the court must sentence the defendant either to LWOP
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Id. at 404. However, the
majority opinion allowed for a narrow exception to this rule.
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a
capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made
after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and
warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining
claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital
cases, and the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often
stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an
assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.
Id. at 417. See generally Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
709. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 410-11 n.8 (1993) (citing TEx. R. APP. PRoc.
31(a)(1) (1992)).
710. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 440.10(1)(g) (McKinney 1994); Id. § 440.20(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1996) (incorporating prior provision by reference). See supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
711. See supra note 619 and accompanying text.
712. See supra note 619 and accompanying text.
713. See generally Herrera, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
714. See N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAw § 440.20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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or to regular life imprisonment. 715 The prosecution is entitled to
appeal an order setting aside a capital conviction or a sentence
of death,716 and such appeal is lodged directly in the Court of
Appeals. 717 The defendant is entitled to appeal the denial of a
post-conviction motion in a death case to the Court of Ap-
peals,718 and has a right under the death penalty statute to the
appointment of counsel for filing and appealing an initial post-
conviction motion. 719
F. The Final Stages
1. Death Warrants and Stays of Execution
Within seven days of an offender's being sentenced to
death, the trial judge must issue a death warrant directing the
Commissioner of Correctional Services to execute the sentence
during the week designated in the warrant. 720 The execution
must be scheduled for a week within thirty to sixty days of the
issuance of the death warrant.721 However, this is a purely for-
malistic exercise because an appeal from a judgment resulting
in death automatically stays the execution,722 and appeals in
capital cases are mandatory. 723 The issuance of the death war-
rant does have implications for the condemned prisoner's condi-
tions of confinement. The corrections commissioner is
authorized, although not required, to house death-sentenced
prisoners separately from the general prison population, 724 and
715. See id.
716. See id. An appeal stays the trial court's order that directs a new sentenc-
ing proceeding. See id.
717. See id. § 450.80(1), (2).
718. See id. § 450.70(2), (3) (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1996).
719. See N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35-b(12) (McKinney Supp. 1996). However, the
courts generally have discretionary authority to appoint counsel to represent indi-
gent defendants in post-conviction proceedings. See also N.Y. CouNTY LAw § 722-b
(McKinney 1991); People ex rel. Anderson v. Warden, 68 Misc. 2d 463, 325
N.Y.S.2d 829, 837 (Bronx Co. 1971). See supra notes 547-48 and accompanying
text.
720. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 650 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
721. See id. § 651.
722. See N.Y. CiuM. PRoc. LAw § 460.40(1) (McKinney 1994).
723. See id. § 470.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra note 614 and ac-
companying text.
724. See N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW § 652(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996) A prisoner sen-
tenced to death
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to promulgate special rules governing the visitation rights of
death-sentenced prisoners. 725
A stay of execution remains effective through the final de-
termination of the appeal.7 26 However, the statute ensures that
a prisoner who seeks further review of his or her conviction or
death sentence will have an opportunity to do so through the
resolution of a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, and the filing and appeal of an initial post-con-
viction motion challenging the conviction or sentence.7 27 It does
so by directing the Court of Appeals to adopt specific rules to
this effect. 728 The statute additionally requires the court to is-
may, in the commissioner's discretion, either be kept isolated from the gen-
eral prison population in a designated institution or confined as otherwise
provided by law. The commissioner, in his discretion, may determine that
the safety and security of the facility or of the inmate population, or of the
staff, or of the inmate, would not be jeopardized by the inmate's confinement
within the general prison population.
Id. Most states do maintain segregated "death rows" for prisoners, but in some
jurisdictions death-sentenced prisoners may be incarcerated with the general
prison population. See AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANAGING DEATH-
SENTENCED INMATES: A SURVEY OF PRACTICES 40 (1989) ("More than three-fourths
(31 or 77.5%) [of state prison systems] report that they provide separate housing
within the institution for their inmates with death sentences; eight institutions
reported that they did not."); Amanda Wunder, Survey Summary: Capital Punish-
ment 1994, 19 CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM 8, 12-14 (Nov. 1994) (identifying states
with and without designated death rows in their prison systems, and reporting
that Delaware, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota
do not maintain death rows).
Death-sentenced male prisoners in New York will be incarcerated at Clinton
Correctional Facility in Dannemora, and condemned female prisoners will be in-
carcerated at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, in Bedford Hills. N.Y. State
Dept. Correctional Services, Directive No. 0054, Unit for Condemned Persons 1
(Aug. 31, 1995). Originally, executions were planned to take place at the South-
port Correctional Facility, near Elmira. State Moves Death House to Prison Near
Elmira, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.) Jan. 18, 1996, at A7. However, local opposi-
tion arose and this plan was abandoned. The Green Haven Correctional Facility,
which is located in Stormville, in Dutchess County, has been designated as at least
the temporary site of executions. Personal communication, Public Information Of-
fice, N.Y. Dept. of Correctional Services (Aug. 29, 1996).
725. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 652(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
726. If the appeal results in the death sentence being affirmed, the trial judge
or another supreme court judge must issue a new death warrant within seven
days. See id. § 650(2). See also N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw §§ 460.40 (1), 470.30 (2).
727. See BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 15.
728. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 460.40(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See N.Y.
CT. App. RULES 510.3-510.6 (1996). The statute's indirect route of requiring the
Court of Appeals to adopt rules to effectuate the law's detailed provisions is rather
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sue rules to provide that stays of execution shall be issued to
permit the consideration of subsequent post-conviction motions,
or other legal challenges to the judgment or sentence, "only...
for good cause shown."729
Supreme court judges also are authorized to issue stays of
execution if and to the extent necessary to permit determina-
tion of a petition alleging that the condemned prisoner is incom-
petent for execution.730  An execution must be stayed
throughout any period that a prisoner has been found incompe-
tent.731 A stay may not be issued on a defendant's second or
subsequent petition alleging incompetency, unless, after notify-
ing the district attorney who prosecuted the defendant and giv-
ing that prosecutor the opportunity to be heard, the court finds
that there is "reasonable cause" to believe that the defendant is
incompetent.7 32 The Governor is required to stay the execution
of a death warrant upon being advised by the Commissioner of
Corrections that the condemned prisoner is pregnant. 733 Both
the State and the defendant have the right to appeal stay or-
ders, and the Court of Appeals is required to adopt rules provid-
ing for "the expeditious perfection and determination of such
appeals."73
2. Determining Incompetency for Execution
In a political world you get a Supreme Court judge who sits up
there, his term is about up, high profile case, the community is up
in arms, horrible crime, gone through the whole process, the
shrinks say he is incompetent [to be executed], the judge can't live
with that because he can't go before the voters in a week or a
unusual. "Given the level of specificity in the statute, it is difficult to understand
why these stay provisions were not simply spelled out in the statute itself."
O'Connor, supra note 357, at 9.
729. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 460.40(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See also N.Y.
Ct. App. Proposed Rule 510.5 (Sept. 15, 1995).
730. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 656(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). A supreme
court judge sitting either in the county in which the defendant was sentenced to
death or in the jurisdiction in which the defendant is incarcerated is authorized to
issue a stay when a petition alleging incompetency is filed. See infra Part Il.F.2 for
a discussion of incompetency to be executed.
731. See N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw. § 656(5) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
732. See id. § 656(8).
733. See id. § 657(3). The statute forbids the execution of pregnant con-
demned prisoners. See id. § 657(1).
734. Id. § 460.40(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
2071996]
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month or a year and say, "I let that guy off, I didn't execute that
guy, bring me another panel."
Isn't there a risk for that and there's no protection, no due
process protection, because you've written that out, so you can't
appeal that. Nobody can review that.
-Assemblyman Alexander Grannis7
35
The federal Constitution forbids the execution of death-sen-
tenced prisoners who are mentally incompetent.736 The prohibi-
tion against executing incompetent prisoners long preceded the
adoption of the Eighth Amendment and has been justified on
several grounds, including humanitarian, penological, religious,
and practical. 737 New York's death penalty statute flatly pro-
vides that "[t]he state may not execute an inmate who is incom-
petent."738 "An inmate is 'incompetent' when, as a result of
mental disease or defect, he lacks the mental capacity to under-
stand the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to
be carried out."739
The Supreme Court has not defined a minimum standard
for measuring competency in this context.74 New York's statu-
735. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 428.
736. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
737. The Court in Ford v. Wainwright said:
One explanation is that the execution of an insane person simply offends
humanity... ; another, that it provides no example to others and thus con-
tributes nothing to whatever deterrence value is intended to be served by
capital punishment. Other commentators postulate religious underpin-
nings: that it is uncharitable to dispatch an offender "into another world,
when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it[.]" . . . It is also said that
execution serves no purpose in these cases because madness is its own pun-
ishment.... More recent commentators opine that the community's quest
for "retribution"-the need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of
equivalent "moral quality"-is not served by execution of an insane person,
which has a "lesser value" than that of the crime for which he is to be
punished.
Id., 477 U.S. at 407-08 (citations omitted). An additional reason sometimes offered
is that an incompetent prisoner may not be able to communicate effectively with
counsel, nor bring to light reasons that would militate against his or her execution.
See id. at 422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the ability of the con-
demned to communicate with counsel is not a necessary part of the definition of
competency for execution).
738. N.Y. CoRREcT. LAw § 656(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
739. Id.
740. The Court was not required to assess the substantive definition of incom-
petency that the State of Florida utilized in the leading case on incompetency to be
executed, Ford v. Wainwright, because it found substantial deficiencies in the
208
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tory definition reflects a narrower conception of incompetency
for execution than has been adopted in several other jurisdic-
tions, 741 and it is narrower than the standard recommended by
the American Bar Association 742 and the test offered by Black-
stone. 743 It differs from these other standards by failing to re-
quire that the prisoner have the "capacity to recognize or
understand any fact which might exist which would make the
punishment unjust or unlawful, [and have] . . .the ability to
convey such information to counsel or to the court."744 The ra-
tionale for not executing prisoners who lack this minimum com-
municative capacity was explained by Sir Matthew Hale who
stated that, "if after judgment he become of non sane memory,
state's procedures for determining incompetency. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The defini-
tion of incompetency under Florida law closely resembles New York's definition; it
exempts prisoners from execution who 'd[o] not have the mental capacity to un-
derstand the nature of the death penalty and why it is imposed' on them." Id. at
421 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985)). In a
concurring opinion, Justice Powell approved of this standard, and indicated that
he "would hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who
are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer
it." Id. at 422.
741. See Roberta M. Harding, "Endgame": Competency and the Execution of
Condemned Inmates-A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition
Against the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 105, 134-37, 144-51 (1994) (identifying standards for competency for execu-
tion used in different jurisdictions). See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(1) (West Supp.
1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.060(1) (West Supp. 1996).
742. The American Bar Association standard is as follows:
a. Convicts who have been sentenced to death should not be executed if
they are currently mentally incompetent. If it is determined that a con-
demned convict is currently mentally incompetent, execution should be
stayed.
b. A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental ill-
ness or mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature of the
pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason for the punish-
ment or the nature of the punishment. A convict is also incompetent if, as a
result of mental illness or retardation, the convict lacks sufficient capacity to
recognize or understand any fact which might exist which would make the
punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey such informa-
tion to counsel or to the court.
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD 7-5.6 (1989).
743. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24-25. See also Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406-07 (1986).
744. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD 7-5.6(b) (1989). See
supra note 742. See generally Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 20 n.3 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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his execution shall be spared; for were he of sound memory he
might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution."745
This omission is especially ironic in light of one of the proce-
dural quirks built into the statute. The issue of the prisoner's
incompetency for execution must be raised by filing a petition
alleging such incompetency, either in the court in which the
prisoner was sentenced, or in the court of the county in which
the prisoner is incarcerated. The petition must be accompanied
by the affidavit of a qualified psychiatrist or certified psycholo-
gist who, "based at least in part on personal examination, at-
tests that in the psychiatrist's or psychologist's professional
opinion the inmate is incompetent and lists the pertinent facts
therefor."74 However, a prisoner has no statutory right to coun-
sel until after the petition alleging incompetency has been
filed, 747 with its supporting affidavit. How and whether con-
demned prisoners already experiencing mental difficulties will
be able to secure a psychiatrist's or a psychologist's affidavit,
attach it to a petition alleging incompetency to be executed, and
file the petition in court, without the assistance of legal counsel,
remains to be seen.748 The statute creates a classic "Catch-22"
situation: there can be no judicial inquiry regarding compe-
tency, and no court-appointed legal counsel for the prisoner al-
745. 1 MArrHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRoWN 35 (1736), quoted in Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 419 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
746. N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 656(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
747. See N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35-b(12) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (providing for
court-appointed counsel under the statute only through the resolution of the ap-
peal of an initial post-conviction motion); N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 656(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1996) ("Upon the filing of a petition [alleging incompetency to be executed]
... if the inmate does not have counsel and is financially unable to obtain counsel
the court shall appoint competent counsel experienced in the trial of criminal mat-
ters to represent the inmate."). Note that counsel appointed under this section
need not meet the special qualifications required to provide defense representation
for the trial and appeal of capital cases, and the litigation of post-conviction mo-
tions. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra notes 510-
23 and accompanying text.
748. The statute provides that:
[tihe petition [alleging incompetency for execution] may be fied by the in-
mate, the inmate's counsel, an employee of the department [of corrections],
the inmate's legal guardian, a member of such inmate's immediate family
or, in the event that the inmate does not have regular contact with a mem-
ber of his or her immediate family, a bona fide friend who has maintained
regular contact with the inmate.
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 656(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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leging incompetency, until after the prisoner-who may be
incompetent-files a petition in a court of law, with the at-
tached affidavit of a qualified mental health professional, set-
ting forth facts in support of his or her alleged incompetency.749
The filing of an initial petition alleging incompetency for
execution triggers a stay of execution, if necessary to resolve the
petition; 750 however, stays are to be issued on subsequent peti-
tions only when the court finds "reasonable cause" to believe the
prisoner is incompetent.751 A petition may be filed either in the
county in which the prisoner was prosecuted or in which the
prisoner is confined, although on request of either the district
attorney or the prisoner's counsel it may be transferred to the
former court unless such a transfer would be "unduly burden-
some or impracticable." 752 Promptly upon the filing of a peti-
tion, the court is to appoint three psychiatric examiners. 753 The
examiners must be impartial, and they must be either qualified
psychiatrists or certified psychologists. 754 The three "psychiat-
ric commissioners" are sworn as referees. 755 Their charge is "to
inquire into the inmate's competence and report to the court"
their conclusions. 756
The psychiatric commissioners must promptly examine the
allegedly incompetent prisoner.757 All three commissioners are
to be present at the examination.758 Upon application to the
court, both the prisoner's attorney and the district attorney
have the right to have the prisoner examined by a qualified psy-
749. See generally Senate Debate supra note 13, at 1901, 1903-04 (remarks of
Senator David Paterson).
750. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 656(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra notes
730-31 and accompanying text.
751. N.Y.CoRRECT. LAW § 656(8). See supra note 732 and accompanying text.
752. N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 656(2). The petition is to be served on either the
district attorney who prosecuted the defendant, or the district attorney in the
county in which the death-sentenced prisoner is confined. See id. If service is
made on the latter district attorney, he or she is promptly to notify the district
attorney who prosecuted the defendant. See id. § 656(3).
753. See id. § 656(2).
754. See id. The qualifications of a "qualified psychiatrist" and a "certified
psychologist" are defined in N.Y. CRIM. Puoc. LAw § 730.10(5), (6) (McKinney
Supp. 1996).
755. N.Y. CORRET. LAW § 656(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
756. Id.
757. See id. § 656(3).
758. See id.
1996]
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chiatrist or certified psychologist of their designation7 59 Each
attorney has the right to be present at any examination made of
the prisoner. 60
Before rendering an opinion about the prisoner's compe-
tency, the psychiatric commissioners must conduct a proceeding
at which they receive and consider evidence from the prisoner's
attorney and the district attorney.761 Written submissions, tes-
timony, and psychiatric evidence all must be considered.7 62
Although trial rules of evidence do not apply, the proceeding
must be conducted on the record, and both sides have the right
to cross-examine witnesses.763 The psychiatric commissioners
are to report their opinions regarding the prisoner's competency
to the court within sixty days of the conclusion of the proceed-
ing.7 64 They must include findings of fact in their report, and
provide the court with a transcript of the competency
proceeding.7 65
The opinion of a majority of the psychiatric commissioners
regarding the prisoner's competency is determinative unless the
court rejects the conclusion as clearly erroneous. 766 If the opin-
ion is rejected on this ground, the court appoints another panel
of psychiatric commissioners to conduct a new examination and
competency proceeding.767 If the psychiatric commissioners'
finding is accepted, the court enters an order accordingly.768 A
new death warrant is issued if the prisoner is found to be com-
petent for execution.7 69 The execution must be stayed if the
759. See id.
760. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §656(3) The court is to allow reasonable fees and
reasonable costs for all psychiatric examiners, including the psychiatric commis-
sioners. All such fees and costs are paid by the State, rather than by the county.
See id. § 656(7).
761. See N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW § 656(4).
762. See id.
763. See id. § 656(4).
764. See id. § 656(5).
765. See id. The 60-day period for the psychiatric commissioners to issue
their opinion to the judge is to be met "[ulnless impracticable .... " Id.
766. See N.Y. CoRREcT. LAw § 656(6).
767. See id.
768. See id.
769. See id. § 656(5). The judge entering the order finding competency must
"promptly inform" the judge who issued the prior death warrant. See id. The lat-
ter judge, in turn, must "promptly issue a new warrant.. . ." Id.
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prisoner is found to be incompetent. 770 "Any other provision of
law notwithstanding, no other review, judicial or otherwise,
shall be available with respect to an order finding the inmate to
be incompetent or competent."77' 1
The provision barring further review of a trial court's find-
ings regarding competency for execution presumably is in-
tended to minimize delay in carrying out executions in the
latter stages of the capital punishment process. 772 This empha-
sis on expeditiously achieving finality, however, creates the
highly unusual result that a trial judge's finding-which itself
is largely dictated by the majority vote of the psychiatric com-
missioners-definitively resolves an issue of fundamental con-
stitutional significance, i.e., the accused's Eighth Amendment
right not to be executed if mentally incompetent. The
nonreviewability of the trial judge's resolution of this issue
raises due process concerns,773 which are exacerbated because of
the community pressures confronting trial judges (whose jobs
are determined by popular election) in politically supercharged
death penalty cases.774
Unlike the law in some other states, New York's statute
does not forever bar the execution of a prisoner who once has
770. See id.
771. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §656(5)
772. Cf. Executive Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4 (describing the state's
interest as "compelling" in "avoiding undue and unseemly delay in carrying out
death sentences," in discussion of necessity for showing of good cause to obtain a
stay of execution in connection with legal proceedings that follow rejection of an
initial post-conviction motion and appeal).
773. See generally Paul F. Enzinna & Jana L. Gill, Capital Punishment and
the Incompetent: Procedures for Determining Competency to be Executed After
Ford v. Wainwright, 41 FLA. L. REV. 115 (1989); Note, Ford v. Wainwright: The
Eighth Amendment, Due Process and Insanity on Death Row, 7 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
89 (1987).
774. See Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 424-29 (colloquy between Assem-
blymen Alexander Grannis and Eric Vitaliano) (quoted in part, supra text accom-
panying note 735). For an excellent article discussing the pressures confronting
elected judges in capital cases and an argument that the actual or perceived im-
partiality of elected judges in death-penalty cases is compromised, see Stephen B.
Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759
(1995). See generally Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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been found incompetent. 775 If the prisoner's incompetency is
the product of a mental illness, the prisoner is transferred to a
secure mental health facility; otherwise, the prisoner remains
in the custody of the Department of Corrections. 776 The admin-
istrator of a secure facility to which a prisoner is committed is
authorized to make a determination that the prisoner has
regained competency, at which time notification is given to the
court that found the prisoner incompetent. The court then ap-
points a new psychiatric commission to examine the prisoner
and return an opinion about his or her present competency. 777
This substantial involvement of mental health professionals in
the competency process is sure to present ethical dilemmas for
those professionals. These dilemmas may be especially acute
for psychiatrists and psychologists who are in a position to treat
an incompetent prisoner, when the prisoner thereafter may be
restored to competency and executed.778
775. Cf MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75A(d)(3) (Supp. 1995) (requiring commuta-
tion of incompetent prisoner's death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole). See also Harding, supra note 741, at 138-39 (discussing practice
in Kansas and Nebraska which, de facto, results in the permanent commutation of
the death sentence of an incompetent prisoner to life imprisonment without
parole).
776. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 656(5) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
777. See id. §656(6).
778. See Richard J. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty:
Conscientious Abstention, Professional Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System,
14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 67 (1990); Charles Patrick Ewing, Diagnosing and Treat-
ing "Insanity" on Death Row: Legal and Ethical Perspectives, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
175 (1987); Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Ford-
ing Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1992); Michael L. Radelet &
George W. Barnard, Treating Those Found Incompetent for Execution: Ethical
Chaos With Only One Solution, 16 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297 (1988).
Issues regarding the restoration of competency to death-sentenced prisoners by the
use of psychotropic drugs also have confronted the courts and mental health pro-
fessionals. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992) (ruling that state constitu-
tion forbids involuntary medication of prisoner to restore competency to be
executed); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993) (ruling that state constitu-
tion forbids involuntary medication of prisoner to restore competency to be exe-
cuted). See generally Keith Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of
Antipsychotic Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REV. 361 (1994); Kristen Wenstrup Crosby, Com-
ment, State v. Perry: Louisiana's Cure-to-Kill Scheme Forces Death-Row Inmates
to Choose Between a Life Sentence of Untreated Insanity and Execution, 77 MINN.
L. REV. 1193 (1993).
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3. Executive Clemency
The New York Constitution gives the Governor "the power
to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction
• .. upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limita-
tions, as he may think proper, subject to such regulations as
may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying for
pardons."779 In capital cases, a reprieve temporarily postpones
an execution, a commutation reduces a death sentence to a
lesser punishment, and a pardon absolves the defendant of
guilt, and thus removes the force of both the conviction and the
punishment.780 New York governors historically have not been
reluctant to exercise their commutation powers in capital cases.
Although 692 people were executed under state law between
1890 and 1963, governors also commuted approximately 213
death sentences since 1890, making for a ratio of roughly 3 com-
mutations to every 10 executions.78' Such use of the commuta-
tion power is consistent with the practices of governors and
pardon boards in other states in the pre-Furman era.
78 2
New York governors have not had occasion to consider exer-
cising their clemency powers in capital cases for several years,
but future chief executives will have to confront this issue. The
779. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Governor "shall annually communicate to
the legislature each case of reprieve, commutation or pardon granted, stating the
name of the convict, the crime of which he was convicted, the sentence and its date,
and the date of the commutation, pardon or reprieve." Id.
780. See Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 690, at 289.
781. See Policy Perspectives, supra note 4, at 565-66. Governors followed dif-
ferent commutation policies. Governors Smith and Lehman regularly commuted
the death sentences of all offenders whose appeals were not affirmed unanimously
by the New York Court of Appeals. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPrrAL PUNISH-
MENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 73 (1974). Governor Dewey
would commute death sentences when a dissent was made based on the facts of a
case, as distinguished from the law. See Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Note,
Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 130, 170 (1964). Governor
Rockefeller considered dissenting opinions issued in capital cases by the Court of
Appeals, but only as one factor among others in arriving at commutation decisions.
See id. Governor Rockefeller commuted five death sentences to terms of life im-
prisonment in 1965, following significant changes in the state's death penalty stat-
ute that were enacted that year. See Policy Perspectives, supra note 4, at 526.
782. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 264-66 (1990-1991) (presenting in-
formation from 11 states regarding commutation practices in capital cases during
various periods before and up to 1968, and reporting that the ratio of commuta-
tions to death sentences was approximately 2:8, to 3:8).
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pendency of judicial proceedings has caused governors and par-
don boards in other states to refrain from initiating clemency
review in great numbers of capital cases, which makes assess-
ing the actual rate at which death sentences have been com-
muted following Furman rather difficult. Nevertheless,
indications are that commutations of capital sentences have
dropped precipitously in recent years.78 3
In light of reported public opinion about the death penalty,
state governors may be especially eager to disassociate them-
selves from any actions that could be perceived as inconsistent
with enforcing capital punishment, or as not being tough on
crime.7v 4 If commutations of capital sentences have become po-
litically improvident, or otherwise have fallen into disuse, there
are potentially serious consequences for the entire capital pun-
ishment process. The Supreme Court has assumed that execu-
tive "[c]lemency is . . . the historic remedy for preventing
miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been ex-
783. See id. at 263-64 (reporting that in the decade 1961 through 1970, the
ratio of commutations to death sentences was 182-to-1,155, or 1 commutation for
every 6.3 capital sentences. In the 10 years between 1979 and 1988, there were 63
commutations and 2,535 death sentences, or a ratio of 1 commutation for every
40.2 death sentences); Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 690 (identifying 70 commu-
tations of capital sentences between 1973 and 1992; 41 of these commutations fol-
lowed court action that made it incumbent on state governors or pardon boards to
commute death sentences if cumbersome retrials were to be avoided, meaning that
only 29 commutations were granted for "humanitarian" reasons); James Brooke,
Utah Debates Firing Squads in Clash of Past and Present, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
1996, at 16 (quoting Richard C. Dieter, Executive Director of the Death Penalty
Information Center, as stating that "[cilemency is becoming a thing of the past in
death-penalty cases." The article further reports that 10 death sentences were
commuted in 1991, but "that number fell to one in 1994 and to zero in 1995."). In
early 1996, Governor Jim Edgar of illinois commuted the death sentence of Guine-
vere Garcia just hours before Garcia's scheduled execution. Clemency Brings New
Viewpoint, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.) Jan. 17, 1996, at A-9.
784. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 774, at 771-76; Glenn L. Pierce &
Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in American
Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711, 720-26 (1990-1991).
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hausted"78 5 in capital cases, and that "clemency has provided
the 'fail safe' in our criminal justice system."786
New York's death penalty statute makes only brief refer-
ence to the clemency process. 78 7 It specifies that the governor
alone has the power to issue a reprieve to postpone an execu-
tion.7s8 It further requires the clerk of court in the county in
which sentence was entered to transmit copies of the con-
demned offender's trial and sentencing proceedings to the gov-
ernor "[w]ithin a reasonable time" following the issuance of a
death warrant. 789 Finally, it authorizes, but does not require
the governor "to request the opinion of the attorney general, the
district attorney, and the convicted person's counsel, or any of
them, as to whether the execution of the person should be re-
prieved or suspended."790
The statute requires no specific procedures to help ensure
that the governor's clemency decision is based on full and accu-
rate information, and that it has been fairly considered. 791 The
785. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (rul-
ing that Texas' policy of denying judicial consideration of claims of newly discov-
ered evidence filed later than 30 days after final resolution of an appeal is not
unconstitutional in capital cases, and creates no right of federal habeas corpus
review of a death-sentenced prisoner's claim of actual innocence, and relying in
part on the existence of executive clemency to review and act on such claims). See
generally Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of Innocence for Death-
Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943 (1994).
786. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993).
787. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 655 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
788. See id.
789. Id. § 653. The clerk of court also is to transmit a statement of conviction
and sentence, and "to the extent practicable," any exhibits introduced in the of-
fender's trial or sentencing proceedings. Id.
790. Id. § 654.
791. The state constitution indicates that the governor's authority is "subject
to such regulations as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying
for pardons." N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See supra note 779 and accompanying text.
A literal reading of this section would allow procedural regulations only for the
governor's pardoning power, and not also for the governor's power to grant re-
prieves or commutations. Even if the constitution provision were given this re-
strictive interpretation, nothing would prevent the Governor from implementing
more rigorous procedures to govern the receipt and evaluation of information rele-
vant to clemency decisions. Additionally, the Governor's constitutional authority
to exercise clemency would still have to comply with whatever state or federal due
process protections might be held to apply. See Kobil, supra note 556; Daniel Lim,
State Due Process Guarantees for Meaningful Death Penalty Clemency Proceed-
ings, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 47 (1994).
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condemned prisoner has no statutory right to counsel for assist-
ance in presenting a case for executive clemency.7 92 Nor are
there other procedural devices that would enhance the reliabil-
ity of clemency decisions, such as the requirement for a hearing,
the right of both the prisoner and the state to offer evidence and
present argument, and requiring a statement in explanation of
the governor's decision. Instituting such measures would pro-
mote not only informational accuracy, but also would foster
"both the applicant's and society's sense that the decision has
been a considered one."793
4. Execution
Assemblyman Philip Boyle: [Albout six weeks ago, I wanted to
make sure that I knew everything I possibly could about the
death penalty, so I called up the Official Executioner of the State
of Texas and I asked if I could go down and witness an execution.
I have to say that I'm happy that Governor Pataki has de-
cided to use lethal injection. From the moment that the injection
starts-and I was provided the very unique opportunity to actu-
ally stand next to the executioner when it happened-from the
moment they start ... the injection, the prisoner is dead within
five seconds. He will cough once or twice and then a blast air, and
they're gone. As far as I could tell, it was very painless and over
very quickly.794
Assemblyman Alexander Grannis: Mr. Boyle must have been in
Texas on a good day because there have been bad days in Texas
when things didn't go so well. Here was one time when a techni-
cian had to probe both arms and legs of an inmate for forty-five
minutes before they found a suitable vein. Is that going to be the
painless way that we go about this with these execution techni-
cians that you've got in your bill?
There was another case where a needle popped out, it
sprayed all over the room, all hell broke loose, they had to run in,
dodging this needle spraying out this deadly fluid to shove it back
in the inmate's arm.
792. See N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (right to court-ap-
pointed counsel terminates following appeal of initial motion for state post-convic-
tion relief). See supra notes 542-59 and accompanying text.
793. Kobil, supra note 556, at 225.
794. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 190, 193.
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Another time while the curtains were still up-the witnesses
were watching, it took forty-seven minutes to locate a vein; the
condemned man had to actually assist the doctor in finding the
vein.
Assemblyman Eric Vitaliano: That's got to be the definition of a
good sport, Pete.
Assemblyman Grannis: Well, or a bad day.795
The statute provides for death by lethal injection.796 This
method of execution displaces electrocution, which had been
used in New York since the electric chair was introduced in
1890. 797 A commission appointed in 1886 to study replacing
hanging as New York's form of execution actually considered le-
thal injection, but ultimately rejected it because of opposition
from the medical profession, and based on the judgment that
electrocution represented the most humane way to cause
death.798 Now, however, lethal injection clearly is the preferred
method of execution in this country. New York joins at least
thirty-one of the thirty-seven other death penalty states, and
the federal government, in making lethal injection either the
exclusive procedure for carrying out death sentences, or among
the alternative methods of execution available. 799
795. Id. at 257.
796. "[Tlhat is, by the intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a
lethal quantity into the body of a person convicted until such person is dead." N.Y.
CoRREcT. LAw § 658 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
797. New York was the first state to use the electric chair, and William Kem-
mler was the first person executed by electrocution, on August 6, 1890. The fasci-
nating story behind the development of the electric chair-which included a
vitriolic dispute between Thomas Edison and George Westinghouse regarding the
respective merits of direct and alternating currents-is reported in Deborah W.
Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The Engineer-
ing of Death over the Century, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 551, 566-607 (1994).
798. See id. at 571-73.
799. The statutes designating the method of execution used in the different
states are collected in Stacy A. Ragon, Comment, A Doctor's Dilemma: Resolving
the Conflict Between Physician Participation in Executions and the AMA's Code of
Medical Ethics, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975, 979 n.29 (1995). The following states
make lethal injection the method of execution, or an available alternative method,
that are cited in the above Comment: Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
100 (West Supp. 1996)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-1(a) (Michie Supp.
1996)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) (1995)); Ohio (Omo REy. CODE ANN.
§ 2949.22(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1995)); and South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-
3-530(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995)). Both federal law and military law provide for
execution by lethal injection. See 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 (1995); Army Reg. 190-55, U.S.
Army Correctional System: Procedures for Military Executions, para. 6-1 (Oct. 27,
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Texas conducted the first execution by lethal injection, in
1982.800 The rapid movement of states to adopt lethal injection
doubtlessly was inspired by the perception that lethal injection
produces death less painfully and more humanely80l than such
traditional methods of execution as the electric chair,80 2 the gas
chamber,803 hanging,80 4 and the firing squad.80 5 Nevertheless,
1986) (cited in State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411, 421 n.7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994)). Elec-
trocution is retained as the exclusive method of execution in six states: Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Tennessee. Ragon, supra, at 979 n.29.
800. Charles Brooks was the executed prisoner. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
PHYSICIANS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE
DEATH PENALTY & PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BREACH OF TRUST: PHYSICIAN
PARTICIPATION IN EXEcUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1994) [hereinafter
BREACH OF TRUST].
801. When he was still Governor of California, Ronald Reagan endorsed the
idea of execution by lethal injection, as follows:
Being a former farmer and horse raiser, I know what it's like to try to elimi-
nate an injured horse by shooting him. Now you call the veterinarian and
the vet gives it a shot and the horse goes to sleep-that's it. I myself have
wondered if maybe this isn't part of our problem [with capital punishment],
if maybe we should review and see if there aren't even more humane meth-
ods now-the simple shot or tranquilizer.
FRANKLixN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAwINS, CAPrIAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERI-
CAN AGENDA 110 (1986) (quoting Henry Schwarzschild, Homicide by Injection, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1982, at A15). In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court rejected a
civil suit filed by condemned prisoners that had alleged that the Food and Drug
Administration was required to approve the drugs used for lethal injection as "safe
and effective" for human executions. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
802. See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (describing execution by electrocution); Denno, supra
note 797, at 624-76 (describing the process of electrocution and several botched
uses of the electric chair).
803. See Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (describing execution by lethal gas); Gomez v. United States
District Court, 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of stay of
execution) (same); Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that exe-
cution by lethal gas violates Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments).
804. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2125 (1994) (rejecting claim that execution by hanging is cruel and unusual
punishment); Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (describing hangings); Denno, supra note 797, at 678-86
(describing hangings).
805. See Denno, supra note 797, at 687-89 (describing execution by firing
squad). Gary Gilmore was executed by firing squad in Utah in 1977. Id. In 1996
John Taylor was executed by firing squad in the same state. Utah Debates Firing
Squads In Clash of Past and Present, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at 16. The
Supreme Court approved of the firing squad as a method of execution in Wilkerson
v. Utah. 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
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several attempts at executing prisoners by lethal injection have
been plagued by problems. Locating a suitable vein to accom-
modate the needle used for lethal injection has taken up to
forty-five minutes, while a prisoner lay strapped to the execu-
tion gurney. In one case, the syringe was dislodged from the
condemned prisoner's arm two minutes after the injection pro-
cess had begun. The death chamber was sprayed with the le-
thal solution, and the needle had to be reinserted before the
execution could resume. In another case, a prisoner's violent
reaction to the drugs used for lethal injection involved "violent
choking, gasping and writhing on the gurney-so much so that
one witness fainted."80 6
One factor that may contribute to the problems with ad-
ministering lethal injection is the medical profession's position
that it is unethical for physicians and nurses to participate in
executions.80 7 The American Medical Association's (AMA) ethi-
cal opinion on physician participation in executions is unequivo-
cal: "A physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to
preserving life when there is hope of doing so, should not be a
participant in a legally authorized execution."808 "Participation"
is defined to include:
- prescribing or administering tranquilizers and other psycho-
tropic agents and medications that are part of the execution
procedure;
- monitoring vital signs on site or remotely (including monitor-
ing electrocardiograms);
- attending or observing an execution as a physician;
- rendering of technical advice regarding execution;
- selecting injection sites;
- starting intravenous lines as a port for a lethal injection
device;
806. JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990 147 (1994). See also AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS ... THE DEATH PENALTY: A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE
58-60 (1989). Lethal injection as a method of execution thus far has withstood
constitutional challenge in the courts. See LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 469,
471 (D. Ariz. 1995) (citing cases).
807. See BREACH OF TRUST, supra note 800, at 13-14.
808. Id. at ix (quoting CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, art. 2.06 (1992)).
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- prescribing, preparing, administering, or supervising injec-
tion drugs or their doses or types;
- inspecting, testing, or maintaining lethal injection devices;
- consulting with or supervising lethal injection personnel.80 9
Under these guidelines, a physician may "certify" death (con-
firm that the prisoner is dead after another has pronounced
death), but may not "determine" death (monitor the prisoner's
condition during the execution and identify the point at which
death has occurred).8' 0
New York's statute provides that a licensed physician or
physicians "may be present" at an execution, but that an "exe-
cution technician" or technicians-whose names "shall never be
disclosed"-shall "assist in the execution .... ,8 1l After imply-
ing that a physician's presence at an execution is not obligatory,
the statute contains an apparent contradiction, by requiring
that, "[i]mmediately after the execution an examination of the
body of the convicted person shall be made by the licensed phy-
sicians present at the execution," who are to report in writing
"the nature of the examination and the occurrence of death
.... 12 Thus, while apparently attempting to limit physicians'
involvement to "certifying," rather than "determining" death
through one of its provisions, the statute simultaneously seems
to require a physician's attendance at an execution, in violation
of the AMA code of ethics.1 3 This ambiguity is certain to pro-
duce confusion about the role envisioned under the legislation
for physicians in the execution process and its aftermath.
Executions are to occur in "a suitable and efficient facility,
enclosed from public view," within a prison facility designated
by the Commissioner of Corrections.8 14 Those authorized to be
809. Id. at 15.
810. Id. at 14-15. See id. at 15-16 for other actions that physicians may take
without "participating" in executions.
811. N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 660(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
812. Id. § 661 (emphasis added).
813. See supra notes 799-800 and accompanying text. See also Falk & Cary,
supra note 478, at 234; David J. Rothman, Physicians and the Death Penalty, 4
J.L. & POL'Y 151, 159-60 (1995).
814. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 659 (McKinney Supp. 1996). Green Haven Correc-
tional Facility has been identified, at least temporarily, as the execution house.
See supra note 724.
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present at an execution include the Commissioner,8 15 desig-
nated execution technicians, corrections officers, and a licensed
physician. The Commissioner is required to invite a judge of
the supreme court, the district attorney, and the sheriff of the
county in which the prisoner's conviction was returned. The
prisoner's attorney and six adult citizens also must be invited to
executions.816 At the condemned prisoner's request, two mem-
bers of the clergy,8 17 and four relatives or "bona fide friends"
also may witness the execution, "unless the commissioner deter-
mines that the presence of any named relative or friend at the
execution would pose a threat to the safety or security of' the
prison facility.8 18 The statute makes no specific provision guar-
anteeing the press or other media representatives access to wit-
ness executions.8 19 No person under eighteen years of age is
permitted to witness an execution. 20 Detailed provisions are
made for the disposition of the executed prisoner's body.82'
III. Conclusion
The conclusion to which their most mature, calm, and industrious
investigation on the subject has led the committee, is, that the
punishment of death by law ought to be forthwith and forever
abolished by the State of New York.
815. See N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW § 660(1). However, "[t]he commissioner may ap-
point a deputy with the department [of corrections] to execute the warrant of exe-
cution and to perform all other duties imposed upon the commissioner under this
article." Id. § 661(3).
816. See id. § 660(1). The names of the six adults who witnessed the execu-
tion are not to be disclosed until after the execution has been completed. See id.
817. See id. § 660(2).
818. Id. § 660(3).
819. Denying the media access to witness executions would present serious
First Amendment concerns. See Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (5th
Cir. 1977). Department of Corrections regulations specify that four of the six adult
witnesses to the execution required by statute shall be representatives of the news
media. See N.Y. State Dept. Correctional Services, Directive 0402, Media Access to
the Unit for Condemned Persons and Capital Punishment Unit (Aug. 31, 1995).
For an interesting historical account that includes a discussion of the press me-
dia's access to executions, see Michael Madow, Forbidden Spectacle: Executions,
the Public and the Press in Nineteenth Century New York, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 461
(1995).
820. See N.Y. CORaEcT. LAW § 660(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
821. See id. § 662.
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-Assemblyman John L. O'Sullivan (1841)822
The question whether the Commission should recommend the ab-
olition or the retention of capital punishment in New York State
presents the gravest problem our commissions call on us to
face.... In the end, we are obliged to choose between competing
values on the basis of imperfect data and our choice, on balance, is
to vote for recommending abolition.
-Statement of the Majority of the Temporary State Commis-
sion on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code (1965)823
The year 1995 doubtlessly marks a significant chapter in
New York's long history with capital punishment. The death
penalty legislation passed by the Legislature and signed into
law by Governor Pataki defines twelve forms of first-degree
murder as capital crimes and provides detailed sentencing pro-
cedures, jury-selection and right-to-counsel provisions, appel-
late review processes, and a specific execution protocol.
However, before any executions occur, the statute and its ad-
ministration will have to survive a series of challenges
presented under both the state and federal constitutions. If the
analysis in this Article is correct, the law in several respects
may not measure up against constitutional requirements.
Only defendants who plead not guilty and exercise their
right to trial by jury can be sentenced to death; those who, with
the consent of the prosecutor and approval of the court, plead
guilty to first-degree murder cannot be punished by death. A
life sentence with parole eligibility after twenty to twenty-five
years is unavailable as a sentencing verdict to capital juries
when the death penalty is sought, yet a judge can only impose
that sentence or life imprisonment without parole when an of-
fender pleads guilty to first-degree murder or when the prosecu-
tor does not pursue a death sentence. 24 Capital sentencing
juries are instructed that if they do not reach a unanimous ver-
dict about whether a convicted first-degree murderer should be
sentenced to death or LWOP, then a twenty to twenty-five year
822. J. O'SULLIVAN, REPORT IN FAVOR OF THE ABOLITION OF THE PUNISHMENT
OF DEATH BY LAW, MADE TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 7-8 (2d
ed., Apr. 14, 1841 & photo reprint 1974).
823. NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW
AND CRIMINAL CODE, SPECIAL REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 69 (1965).
824. See supra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
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to life sentence will be imposed-an outcome which has no ra-
tional penological basis, and which may persuade jurors to re-
linquish their principled views that an offender should receive
either death or LWOP simply to prevent the offender from re-
ceiving a sentence with parole eligibility.8 25 Aggravating factors
proved during a first-degree murder trial are conclusively estab-
lished. Defendants who present no evidence during the guilt-
phase of a capital trial are precluded from relitigating those
aggravating circumstances when they are used to determine
punishment.8 26 Other serious constitutional issues inhere else-
where in the statute.8 27
If the statute is invalidated by judicial action, the Legisla-
ture is almost certain to attempt to repair those provisions that
can be repaired, and again try to make capital punishment a
viable sanction.8 28 If amendments and revisions to the statute
ensue, the Legislature hopefully will not seize the opportunity
to expand the death penalty law's reach or weaken its proce-
dural protections. In many of its particulars, New York's death
penalty statute is procedurally rigorous. Still, however well-
crafted the legislation may or may not be, those opposed to the
death penalty will have little satisfaction until the statute is
removed from the books. As Assemblyman John McEneny
observed:
[Tihis [is] a better bill than we have seen in recent years.... [T]o
put as much justice as possible into the bill and as many safe-
guards as can be put into the bill [is] to make it the kind of legisla-
tive action that more people can vote for with confidence.
825. See supra notes 367-401 and accompanying text.
826. See supra notes 272-95 and accompanying text.
827. For example, other issues include whether guilt-phase jurors in first-de-
gree murder trials may be death-qualified (or life-qualified) (see supra notes 450-85
and accompanying text); whether the right to court-appointed counsel under the
law can be terminated following the appeal of an initial post-conviction motion (see
supra notes 540-61 and accompanying text); and whether mentally retarded of-
fenders convicted of the first-degree murder of corrections employees may be sen-
tenced to death (see supra notes 415-27 and accompanying text).
828. The death penalty bill contains a severability clause: "If any section,
part or provision of this act shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid or ineffec-
tive by any court of competent jurisdiction, such declaration shall be limited to the
section, part or provision directly involved in the controversy in which such decla-
ration was made and shall not affect any other section, part or provision thereof."
N.Y.S. 2850, N.Y.A. 305, § 37, 218th Sess. (1995).
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But I would confess that when the foundation is rotten, that
no matter how the house is built, the house is doomed to failure
and will not survive. The foundation, the premise that somehow
justice can be arrived a0 through the execution of a human being
... is not a sound foundation and cannot build a sound and lasting
house.8 29
In the event that the legislation withstands constitutional
scrutiny, either in its original form or following amendment and
revisions, it nevertheless must survive an equally significant
test. The remarks of Assemblyman Scott Stringer are on point:
[A]fter tonight we sort of have an interesting political problem on
our hands. Because on the one hand, we're going to pass this
death penalty bill and we're all going to leave here, some people
are going to think that we actually reduced crime and we've de-
terred crime, but the reality is in the weeks and months and years
to come no one is going to feel safer because we have the death
penalty. The problems in our individual communities are still go-
ing to be the same. The issues that we talked about tonight, un-
fortunately, are still going to be there.
And, yet, somebody is going to have to go back to the electo-
rate and explain that we passed the death penalty and we didn't
do anything else and the problems still exist.830
The supreme irony of the passage of the 1995 death penalty
bill may be that this very act ultimately will hasten the demise
of capital punishment from the New York landscape. The en-
actment of a death penalty statute, and the execution of a smat-
tering of first-degree murderers, will not contribute to solving
the crime problems in New York State. At the same time, the
existence of a death penalty law will thrust into focus the nu-
merous problems associated with capital punishment: its une-
ven, unfair, and invidiously discriminatory application; the
diversion of much-needed resources from other social programs;
the inevitable risk of executing innocent people; and its dehu-
manizing impact on individuals and their government. Aboli-
tionists eventually may claim victory, and in retrospect define
the enactment of the capital punishment law as only a short-
term anomaly.
829. Assembly Debate, supra note 1, at 334-35.
830. Id. at 433.
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WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED
Abolition sentiment in New York has a long and respecta-
ble history.83' Neither the arguments for or against the death
penalty have changed substantially over the course of this his-
tory.83 2 The 1965 Legislative Commission that recommended
that capital punishment be abolished by statute in New York
State very ably summarized its reasons for taking such action:
First: The execution of the penalty of death calls inescapably
upon the agents of the State to perpetrate an act of supreme vio-
lence under circumstances of the greatest cruelty to the individual
involved....
Second: The retention of the death penalty has a seriously
baneful effect on the administration of criminal justice....
Third: Some erroneous convictions are inevitable in the
course of the enforcement of the penal law and error sometimes
cannot be established until time has passed. Such errors cannot
be corrected after execution....
Fourth: Experience has shown that the death penalty cannot
be administered in the United States with even rough
equality....
Fifth: . . . There will be cruel and repulsive murders in New
York whether the penalty of death is abolished or retained. The
important point is that their number never will be greatly influ-
enced by abolition. We may be confident, therefore, that in pro-
posing action that is right upon so many grounds we shall not
jeopardize the safety of the people of New York.8 33
The re-enactment of death penalty legislation in New York
in 1995 thus marks both the end and the beginning of an era in
the state's history with capital punishment. For the first time
in over two decades, the Legislature and the Governor have con-
curred that the death penalty should be reinstituted. In due
course, the courts will review their handiwork. Ultimately, the
people will again pass judgment on whether state-sanctioned
executions are consistent with their notion of enlightened and
effective government.
831. See PHILIP E. MACKEY, HANGING IN THE BALANCE: THE ANTI-CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE, 1776-1861 (1982). See supra notes
822-23 and accompanying text.
832. See generally PHILIP E. MACKEY, VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OP-
POSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1787-1975 (1976).
833. NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW
AND CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 823, at 69-70.
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